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1 
Introduction 
 
Communities living with hazards 
 
David King and Alison Cottrell 
 
This book, Communities Living with Hazards, is a celebration of the twenty-
fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Centre for Disaster Studies.  The 
Centre was formally established by resolution of the Council of James Cook 
University on 5 April 1979.  Staff and researchers with the Centre in 2004 
contributed papers that encapsulated their areas of disaster research in order 
to present a summary of the diversity and orientation of the Centre after 25 
years. 
 
Disaster and hazard research at James Cook University was given impetus 
following the devastation of Townsville in 1971 by Cyclone Althea. A group of 
geographers and engineers, led by John Oliver and Hugh Trollope built up 
expertise in cyclones that enabled them to contribute significantly to the 
analysis of Cyclone Tracy’s destruction of Darwin in 1974. The engineers 
established the Cyclone Testing Station in 1977, while Oliver continued 
research on the physical and social impacts of cyclones and other natural 
hazards. This research was given focus by the establishment of the Centre in 
order to improve understanding of both hazards and their impact on people 
and communities. The social impact was given stronger emphasis by the 
developing needs of emergency managers and subsequently the 
International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction throughout the 1990s. 
By 2005 the emphasis of research in the Centre had become primarily social 
and community in orientation, but was not restricted to natural hazards. Just 
as emergency managers have been forced to pay greater attention to human 
induced catastrophes, so also have researchers in the Centre become 
involved in the impact of terrorism and complex human disasters.  
 
The social emphasis of research in the Centre is focussed on communities. 
The term is used to cover a range of quite different groupings and places, 
such that Alison Cottrell starts the book with a discussion of the complexity 
of the concept of communities. The term hazards is used to be inclusive of 
the variety of hazards that particularly face communities in Australia, and 
also the human generated hazards of terrorism and war outside Australia 
which increasingly involve Australians, as victims and as responders. 
 
Much of the Centre’s research over the past decade has focussed on the 
vulnerability of people and communities to hazards. The practical aim of this 
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research has been to contribute to a reduction of that vulnerability through 
partnerships with local, state and federal government organisations, non-
government organisations (NGOs) and community and business groups. 
However, in working with this wide range of communities and organisations, 
and witnessing a significant number of disasters and their impacts, 
constantly recurring themes of risk and resilience shaped the ideas of 
vulnerability. Tackling vulnerability tends to emphasise the weaknesses and 
problems of communities, whereas recognising and building on 
characteristics of resilience emphasises the strengths and positive 
characteristics of society.  
 
Alongside these aspects of communities there is the reality of many different 
priorities in people's lives competing with the need to prepare for a potential 
hazard.  People, communities, and organisations accept risk in varying 
degrees, which they balance against their other activities and priorities.  This 
balancing of risk alongside vulnerability and resilience is brought together in 
the idea of “living with” hazards. 
 
Because people live and work in the tropical north of Australia the 
communities and hazards have a strong northern flavour, with small cities 
and towns and remote outback communities in a vast landscape that is 
regularly impacted upon by cyclones, floods, droughts and bushfire.  
However, the local lessons learned are applicable nationally and 
internationally.  The commonality of living with hazards, and the practical 
steps that people must take to reduce the risk they face from predictable 
regular hazards transcends culture and geography.  The book consequently 
begins with the larger picture of communities, organisations and a range of 
hazards and responses, through to the itinerant communities of our visitors.  
From the Indigenous communities that are a significant feature of the 
northern landscape, case studies of communities and places lead from 
cyclone, flood and isolation into the bushfire threat and back to the 
expanding cities and urban sprawl. 
 
In the first chapter Alison Cottrell challenges definitions of community.  
Communities are complex, dynamic and frequently not geographical in 
nature, although that is the most common planning view of a community. An 
example is presented of the isolated Bloomfield community north of the 
Daintree rainforest as a complex, culturally mixed remote community that 
tackles its vulnerability to extreme wet seasons and floods through resilient 
endurance and self-reliance. 
 
David King’s chapter on organisations extends the definition of communities 
to the range of organisations and networks that play a role in mitigation of 
hazard impact, and response and recovery from a disaster.  This began as an 
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analysis of the part played by non-government organisations (NGOs) in 
disasters.  As NGOs were defined, their links to other types of organisations, 
government and non-government, became difficult to isolate within the 
overlapping roles and responsibilities of mitigation, response and recovery.  
The chapter reviews the complexity and diversity of government, non 
government and community organisations and their changing roles in the 
disaster situation. 
 
Early research began with a response to Cyclone Althea and developed as a 
Centre after Cyclone Tracy.  Undertaking post-disaster studies has always 
been core business in the Centre.  The events of specific disasters are 
historical milestones that shape local and national history. Learning from 
each crisis continues to be a critical role of researchers in the Centre.  David 
King also examines in chapter 3 the experiences learned from disasters that 
have involved research on fieldwork, and examines these experiences against 
those of other centres and researchers.   
 
In chapter 4 Douglas Goudie examines issues of transport and infrastructure 
as they constrain evacuation planning.  Evacuation of actual risk populations 
is an option throughout Australia, but authorities tend to give advice and 
leave people to make their own arrangements in advance of the onset of the 
natural hazard.  This puts responsibility on individual households to practice 
self-reliance and to evaluate risk and probability.  Such an expectation 
requires detailed knowledge of hazards, likely impacts and safe evacuation 
routes. Goudie’s work is directed towards the practical needs of warnings, 
education, hazard and route mapping, and anticipation of constructions and 
bottlenecks.  The use of Geographical Information Systems (GIS) is both as 
an organisational planning and a community educational tool. 
 
Scott Cunliffe’s review of hazard risk in international tourism widens the 
scope of communities.  Northern Australia, in particular, derives significant 
income and employment from the world's largest industry, tourism. Cunliffe 
looks at the problems of risk, insurers’ issues and the reliance of tourism 
destinations on the sustainable flow and consequent safety of visitors.  
Emphasis is also extended beyond Australia to the less developed countries 
of the surrounding region, both as destinations for Australian and other 
OECD country tourists, as well as their specific vulnerability and 
sustainability. 
 
In chapter 6, Yetta Gurtner focuses on the post-disaster recovery of two 
destinations which are popular for Australian tourists.  The Bali bombing 
devastated the tourist industry of an island, with its slow recovery further 
affected by subsequent terrorist attacks.  The Bali bombing of 2002 was also 
one of Australia's worst disasters in terms of Australian lives lost.   
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The impact of the Indian Ocean tsunami in December 2004 was utterly 
catastrophic and researchers in the Centre, along with other colleagues, 
conducted research in four of the stricken countries in a variety of impact 
studies. Gurtner concentrated on the tourist resort of Phuket and was able to 
compare and contrast the recovery experiences of Bali and Phuket. Attention 
is also drawn to the impact on the destinations, the host communities, and 
by extension the lessons that may be learned for Australian tourist 
destinations and their sustainability. 
 
Chapter 7 provided details of research from some of the more remote 
communities in northern Australia.  The Bloomfield region case study, 
introduced by Alison Cottrell in chapter 1, began as part of a series of post-
disaster studies following Cyclone Rona in 1999, when the Indigenous 
community of Wujal Wujal was isolated for many weeks.  Non-indigenous 
residents in the same area, who were equally dependent on Wujal Wujal’s 
facilities and lifelines, requested a community hazard vulnerability study, but 
drew the attention of organisations such as the Bureau of Meteorology and 
Queensland Department of Emergency Services to the specific circumstances 
of remote and especially Indigenous communities.  The Centre worked with 
the Bureau of Meteorology in the area of the weather warnings to Indigenous 
communities throughout remote northern Australia. Douglas Goudie has 
summarised a portion of that knowledge in chapter 7, drawing on published 
Indigenous stories and weather knowledge, and oral traditions from 
fieldwork conducted by several members of the Centre alongside 
counterparts from the Bureau of Meteorology. 
 
In chapter 8, Eddie McLachlan presents some details of fieldwork 
experiences of Indigenous weather knowledge from Mornington Island in 
the Gulf of Carpentaria.  Transcripts of some of the interviews provide the 
authentic voice and indicate the resilience of Aboriginal elders on 
Mornington Island.  Their stories are both cultural and historical, 
representing the experiences of people grounded deeply in an environment 
that they know intimately. 
 
In chapter 9 Jim Monaghan shares detailed knowledge of the Pormpuraaw 
and Kowanyama communities on the western side of the Cape York 
Peninsula, concentrating on the risk of bushfire to the outstations which are 
established intermittently by each community.  This research was carried out 
as a specific hazard mitigation planning tool.  Jim Monaghan has worked in 
these communities for most of the last decade; mapping the lands, 
communities and resources of Pormpuraaw and Kowanyama.  The extensive 
Land Information System contributed to the development of a Natural 
Disaster Risk Management plan for Pormpuraaw and all-hazard mapping for 
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each community.  The strength of this work is seen in the complete 
integration of people, community, culture, land and meaning. 
 
The risk of wildfires at the urban-rural interface is the focus of chapter 10 by 
Luke Balcombe.  The complexity of settlement patterns and the relationship 
to hazardous bushfire environments is identified.  The reasons which 
support the need for community engagement and education are also 
identified.  Finally, preferred strategies for community education are then 
proposed. 
 
Chapter 11 is a review of community perceptions and expectations of 
bushfire/wildfire experiences by Sally Bushnell and Alison Cottrell.  This 
review provides the basis for understanding the variability between and 
among communities, leading the authors to conclude that locality remains 
important and that effective methods and models for community 
engagement need to be developed for application at the local level. 
 
The need for research on communities and their experiences of hazards is 
unlikely to decline.  The material covered by this book indicates some of the 
many different approaches that might be taken in addressing these issues.  
Current trends indicate a particular concern for understanding the strengths 
and limitations of post-disaster impact assessments and the associated 
methodologies.  In particular, there are concerns to ensure that the impacts 
of hazards and disasters are not to the greatest disadvantage of the few.  One 
consequence is a current trend for a focus on community development 
approaches to response, recovery and mitigation for the Centre for Disaster 
Studies and more broadly. 
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1 
 
What is this thing called 
‘community’?: An example in far 
north Queensland 
 
Alison Cottrell 
 
The Bloomfield River region lies in tropical north Queensland, Australia (see 
Figure 1.1). It is a mountainous area adjacent to the coast and bordered by 
the Wet Tropics World Heritage Area. The catchment is vulnerable to 
flooding, bushfires and tropical cyclones. In the process of conducting an 
appraisal of community awareness and preparedness for natural hazards 
(Cottrell et al., 2001), it became apparent that it was necessary to ask the 
question: what is a community, and what are the implications for hazard 
studies and practice? 
 
The people who live in the Bloomfield River region are a mix of indigenous 
and non-indigenous residents estimated to amount to approximately 2,000 
people, depending on the time of the year. Most income is from social 
security payments and government employment. There is an Aboriginal 
community at Wujal Wujal; cattle properties; tourist ventures which range 
from inexpensive camping to the very expensive; ‘eco-tourism’ resorts; 
people who have retired on independent incomes; those working for the 
public sector; and those who have ‘opted out’ of mainstream living, some of 
whom hold very strong views about conservation. Major industries include 
retail, tourism, grazing and horticulture. 
 
The Bloomfield River Region 
 
The Bloomfield River region is the traditional country of the Kuku-Yalangi 
people. Many of the people have homes in the township area of Wujal Wujal, 
the township of Ayton and/or have seasonal camps in other parts of the 
region or live on outstations in the region. The diversity of the Aboriginal 
residents at Bloomfield was documented by Anderson (1984), and appears to 
have maintained its diversity. In particular there are two main families of 
political significance, between whom governance of the Aboriginal 
community fluctuates.  
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Figure 1.1 The Bloomfield River region, Queensland, Australia 
 
The remainder of the residents in the region have a variable, but in some 
cases lengthy, history (Anderson, 1983) depending on the sector with which 
they are involved. For example, there are some families associated with 
grazing who have been there for several generations. There are also those 
who have had tourism related businesses for a decade or more. Some people 
came with the establishment of hippy colonies in the 1970s, bought 
properties and stayed. More recently, a number of retirees have settled, as 
well as a group the locals referred to as ‘ferals’ who live in makeshift 
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dwellings in the forest areas.1 There are also an unpredictable, and 
unmonitored, number of tourists who move through the area. 
 
Leaving aside the issue of tourists, there appears to be quite a lot of mobility 
in the region. Residents regularly travel to Cairns or Cooktown to shop, seek 
medical and other professional services, board at schools and visit relatives, 
be they Aboriginal or non Aboriginal. 
 
There are three local governments involved in the region. The area physically 
covered by the Wujal Wujal Aboriginal Shire Council is that area relating to 
what was previously a mission and then a Deed of Grant in Trust (DOGIT) 
community. The social responsibility of this council extends beyond the 
physical boundaries to meet the needs of the Aboriginal community in the 
broader region. Cook Shire is technically responsible for the residents to the 
north of the Bloomfield River and has a local representative who reports to 
the council in Cooktown. The Douglas Shire, which is based in Mossman, is 
responsible for the residents south of the Bloomfield River but has no local 
representative. While there is a sealed road from Mossman through the 
tourist destination Daintree region, this terminates at Cape Tribulation, after 
which an unsealed motor-able track traverses the next 30 to 40 kilometres 
through the Daintree National Park. Environmentalists have campaigned 
vigorously for the closure of this road, and subsequently due to lower levels 
of maintenance it is impassable for extensive periods of the wet season. This 
and the lower level of political support from Douglas Shire led to feelings 
that residents north of the river were better served than those to the south. 
However, networks of relationships appear to readily cross the river. 
 
There are a number of community groups operating in the area, some of 
which are highly active in community development and planning: the 
Bloomfield/Yalangi Catchment Committee (representing 26 interest groups); 
the Bloomfield River District Residents Association; the Bloomfield Sports 
Association; the Bloomfield River District Residents Association; a State 
Emergency Services (SES) group being established to be based at Wujal 
Wujal but involving the whole catchment; a well-established health centre is 
located at Wujal Wujal and serves the whole region; and a Home and 
Community Care group servicing the needs of the elderly and those with 
disabilities at Wujal Wujal and Ayton; There is a Community Economic 
Development Program (CEDP) at Wujal Wujal and Rossville, and a District 
Citizens Association at Bloomfield River. 
 
                                                 
1  Interestingly, there is a component of retired hippies who refer to young people who have opted for the 
simple lifestyle as ‘ferals’. This would make an interesting research topic as to whether this relates merely 
to length of residence, or to ownership of property vis a vis Hall, Thorns and Willmott, (1984), 
Community class and kinship – bases for collective action within localities. 
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The people who live in the region are quite diverse. Those who have moved 
into the area have done so for a variety of reasons, sometimes leading to 
conflicts in aspirations for the region. For example, many of the retirees have 
aspirations for greater access to infrastructure and services, there are also 
those with strong conservation values, and the Aboriginal community has a 
desire for increased services while maintaining traditional control. It is clear 
then, that there is variation in the level of horizontal integration between and 
within segments of the community. As well, the level of vertical integration is 
also varied (Warren, 1963; Martinez-Brawley, 1990). For example, 
representatives and administrators for the Wujal Wujal Council have strong 
linkages to other levels of government and services and many members of 
the non-Aboriginal community use the Internet extensively as well as having 
linkages to government agencies and other support networks. 
 
The fact that the area becomes isolated so quickly in the wet season, 
combined with the fact that three local government bodies are required to act 
to meet community needs and do so to varying degrees essentially means 
that the community is left to deal with its problems on its own. This raises 
the issue of community based disaster or hazard response planning, and 
consequently, coming to grips with the issue of what is a community, 
and what are the implications for hazard studies and practice? 
This question needs to be addressed because there seems to be an 
assumption that rural and/or remote communities approach the ideal 
‘gemeinschaft’ (i.e. community) (Cahnman & Heberle, 1971). However, from 
the above description it is clear that in the Bloomfield River region, this may 
not be an accurate description.  
 
Defining Community  
 
To some extent the issue of defining community in Australia, in the context 
of hazards, has been addressed by Marsh and Buckle (2001), Buckle (1999) 
and Sullivan (2003). The discussion centred on the two issues of the 
complexity of community and the need to be clear about defining 
community. However, it is not merely the defining of community that is the 
issue here, but also whether it is ideology that is being discussed. It is 
important to move the discussion forward by elaborating on how the 
ideas/definitions/theories of community have developed over time. A 
detailed discussion of the diversity of perceptions of community within 
sociology is covered by Bell and Newby (1971) who built on Hillery’s (1955) 
analysis of community definitions. Although Hillery was pessimistic about 
clarity because of the 94 definitions identified, Bell and Newby built on that 
analysis to find some common threads (see Table 1.1 below). They conclude 
that a “majority of definitions include, in increasing importance for each 
element, the following components of community: area, common ties and 
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social interaction” (Bell & Newby, 1971, p. 29). They then proceed to 
introduce the notion that conceptualising community as networks may be a 
productive strategy. This view of community is pursued with great vigour by 
Wellman (1988, 2001). 
 
Wellman (1988) argues that the evidence that communities exist beyond 
location is clearly apparent. Wellman also suggests that by focussing on 
community as network allows the endurance of social relationships to be 
evidenced and that conceptualising community as networks allows linkages 
between small and large scale phenomena in a seamless manner. 
 
Table 1.1 A classification of selected definitions of community  
(after Hillery) 
 
Distinguishing ideas or elements mentioned in the definitions Number of 
definitions 
I. Generic Community  
 A. Social Interaction  
  1. Geographic Area  
   A. Self-sufficiency 8 
   B. Common Life 9 
     Kinship 2 
   C. Consciousness of Kind 7 
D. Possession of common ends, norms, means 20 
   E. Collection of institutions 2 
   F. Locality Groups 5 
   G. Individuality 2 
2. Presence of some common characteristic, other than 
area 
 
   A. Self-sufficiency 1 
   B. Common Life 3 
   C. Consciousness of Kind 4 
D. Possession of common ends, norms, means 5 
  3. Social System 1 
  4. Individuality 3 
  5. Totality of Attitudes 1 
  6. Process 2 
 B. Ecological Relationships 3 
II. Rural Community  
 A. Social Interaction  
  I. Geographic Area  
   A. Self-sufficiency 1 
   B. Common Life 3 
   C. Consciousness of Kind 3 
D. Possession of common ends, norms, means 3 
   E. Locality Group 5 
  Total Definitions 94 
Source: Bell and Newby, (1971), pp. 28-29 
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History of Ideas about Community 
 
Nisbet (1970), Bell and Newby (1971) and Wellman (1988) all remind us of 
the long history of intellectual traditions which inform our debates about 
what is community. For Nisbet, there is a ‘rediscovery of community’ in the 
nineteenth century.  Nisbet identified the nineteenth century concerns with 
community as a reaction to the concept of contract, rationalism and 
modernism of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries (which in itself was a 
reaction to community as embedded in feudal relations). It is not unusual in 
social theory to find that at any point in time there are various views held 
about social phenomena, but that at a particular point in time certain 
approaches/views dominate. In the 19th century various levels of scale are 
used about the notion of community.  That is community as nation, 
community as town or city, community as a geographical location. These 
remain with us, as do strong feelings about what constitutes community, for 
example Nisbet states: 
 
By community I mean something that goes far beyond mere local 
community. The word, as we find it in much nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century thought encompasses all forms of relationship which 
are characterized by a high degree of personal intimacy, emotional 
depth, moral commitment, social cohesion, and continuity in time. 
Community is founded on man (sic) conceived in his wholeness rather 
than in one or another of the roles, taken separately, that he may hold 
in a social order. It draws its psychological strength from levels of 
motivation deeper than those of mere volition or interest, and it 
achieves its fulfilment in a submergence of individual will that is not 
possible in unions of mere convenience or rational assent. Community 
is a fusion of feeling and thought, of tradition and commitment, of 
membership and volition. It may be found in, or be given symbolic 
expression by, locality, religion, nation, race, occupation or crusade. Its 
archetype, both historically and symbolically is the family, and in 
almost every type of genuine community the nomenclature of family is 
prominent. Fundamental to the strength of the bond of community is 
the real or imagined antithesis formed in the same social setting by the 
non-communal relations of competition or conflict, utility or 
contractual assent. These, by their relative impersonality and 
anonymity, highlight the close personal ties of community (Nisbet, 
1970, pp. 47-48).  
 
In Nisbet’s (1974) view community is central to sociology: community and 
conflict in relation to the military, political, religious, revolutionary, 
ecological, and plural communities are discussed at some length. 
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Nisbet (1970) and Bell and Newby (1971) both structure their discussions of 
community in ways that offer us mechanisms for a clearer understanding of 
the matter. Both discussions refer to Community as Typology or Types; 
Community as Methodology or Study Method; and Community a 
Microcosm, or the Molecular Community. Nisbet (1970) also discusses the 
Empirical Community and the Moral Community while Bell and Newby 
(1971) expand on Ecological Approaches; Community as Organisations; and 
Community, Locality and Network. 
For this discussion: types, methods, the empirical and the moral community 
deserve some attention. 
 
Community as Methodology 
 
Durkhiem is identified by Nisbet as the key figure in the use of community as 
a methodology for understanding four major themes in human behaviour: 
morality; analysis of contract; the study of suicide; and the nature of ‘man’ 
(sic) (Nisbet, 1970, pp. 82-97). Bell and Newby (1971) include a series of 
community studies which illustrate this approach quite extensively. 
 
Community and Typology 
 
It is difficult to imagine a discussion on ‘community’ which does not refer to 
Toennies. Cahnman and Heberle (1971) discuss clearly the influence of the 
Romantic Period and in particular the influence of Comte and Hobbes on 
Toennies. It is also apparent that from very early on Toennies had to defend 
this position with other academics of the time; it was necessary to make it 
clear the position was not idealising gemeinschaft (community) and 
demonising gesellschaft (society), as Cahnman and Heberle state: 
 
By “community,” the reader must not understand a territorial or 
administrative entity, but what is held in common, what makes for 
cohesion, what provides bond among men (sic). Occasionally, the 
meaning of the word “community” comes near to the one of 
“communion,” as in intimate friendship and similar relations that are 
beyond question. … We (the editors) have translated Gesellschaft as 
“association” rather than as “society, “because in the word 
“association” the meaning of choice and purpose comes clearly to the 
fore… (Cahnman & Heberle, 1971, p. xx). 
 
It is necessary to also view the social relations of both ideal types as having 
positive and negative characteristics, particularly to avoid the trap of 
resorting to ideology and rhetoric.  
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Toennies clarified this position:   
 
I have not considered it as an “ideal”, but as an ideal, or constructional, 
type. ...I do not know of any condition of culture or society in which 
elements of Gemeinschaft and elements of Gesellschaft are not 
simultaneously present, that is, mixed (Cahnman & Heberle, 1971, pp. 
9-10).  
 
Clearly then, Toennies differentiates between heuristic devices and what 
might be described as ‘reality’ or praxis. As well, the need for clarification is 
already apparent. The debate about what constitutes ‘community’ clearly: 
“has entertained social scientists for almost as long as there has been 
societies to study” (Sullivan, 2003, p. 19). 
 
This need to distinguish between heuristic devices and ‘reality’ brings us 
clearly to the door of ideology. It also brings to the fore the notion of the 
moral community which will be discussed later. Whilst the distinction 
between theory and ideology can sometimes appear blurred, Neuman (1997, 
pp. 37-38) provides a useful clarification. Cohen (1985) verges on accusing 
theorists of ideology when examining the dichotomies that were historically 
present in theories of community. Toennies’ gemeinschaft versus 
gesellschaft; Durkeim’s mechanical versus organic solidarity; Redfield’s folk 
versus urban society was another ‘imagined entity’ (Bell & Newby, 1971, p. 
43) and the Chicago School of urban scholars who dealt with urban 
development in particular. The dichotomy was extended to include post-
industrial society by Richmond to further a developmental view of social 
relationships with an implication that the more urban and (post) industrial 
tended to be more sophisticated and have more advanced social relations. 
 
In critiquing these ideal types of simple versus complex, Cohen (1985) 
identifies three ‘myths’ about ‘community’ which seem to prevail: the myths 
of simplicity, egalitarianism and inevitable conformity. In terms of 
simplicity, Cohen suggests that there are no simple relationships in any 
community. In urban communities there may be a greater number of roles 
encountered by individuals, but even in small societies, relationships are 
complex. Cohen suggests that in some cases, living in large communities 
makes it easier to withdraw from difficult situations, particularly if dealing 
with a stranger. Whereas in a small community, often financial and other 
activities are conducted by people who are in contact with each other on a 
regular basis. This regular contact requires much more careful social 
transactions if amiable relations are to be maintained. In large communities 
it is possible to have relations conducted with strangers and with people who 
are contacted on a regular basis. Therefore there are few social relations 
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which are ‘simple’, and face to face, and intimate relations occur in all 
societies. 
 
Cohen also suggests that egalitarianism should be questioned as to whether 
it is: “ideology (‘we should all be equal here’)…rhetoric (‘we are all equal 
here’)…and…pragmatism (‘we behave as if we were all equal here’)…” 
(Cohen, 1985, p. 33). None of these, Cohen suggests, should be confused with 
the social reality of egalitarianism. 
 
The myth of inevitable conformity is the view that small scale, isolated 
communities will become overwhelmed by the dominant culture of the large 
urban centres and lose any identity they may have had. Cohen suggests that 
these views: “Assume that people can have their culture stripped away, 
leaving them quite void, then to be refilled by some imported superculture. 
They assume, in other words, that people are somehow passive in relation to 
culture: they receive it, transmit it, but do not create it” (Cohen, 1985, p. 36). 
Community, Cohen suggests, is a socially constructed, symbolic 
phenomenon. As social change occurs, social and physical boundaries may 
be lost, but the symbolic socially constructed boundaries are not lost. 
However, this shared sense of community which is symbolic may not have 
exactly the same meaning for each member of the community. For instance, 
community members may use similar words to describe their community 
and its activities, but when pressed to describe what these definitions 
actually mean to them, differences become apparent. 
 
Similarly, Milofsky (1988) indicates: “Communities and their organizations 
are hard to study…because they exist primarily in the minds of people. Each 
member perceives a different community, as roles, geographic location, 
cultural background, occupation, and a host of other factors vary. 
‘Community’ also has a background factor in the lives of most people” 
(Milofsky, 1988, p. 4). This brings us to the idea of the moral community. 
 
The Moral community 
 
Nisbet (1970), in discussing the centrality of the idea of community to 
sociology, introduces the significance of Comte’s views on the notion of the 
“community lost, community to be gained” (Nisbet, 1970, p. 56). This is a 
theme well recognised by those who consider the issue of community. Not 
only do researchers and lay people alike have ideas about what community 
is, but researchers and lay people may also hold views about the moral worth 
of community. Again, this can be reflected in those continua of oppositional 
typologies. Depending on the viewer, urban and complex may be 
sophisticated and contemporary or the small and simple may be the ‘truer’ 
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community to be valued and preserved or lamented in its passing. Similarly, 
Wellman (1988) argues:  
 
Contemporary urbanites perversely flatter themselves by remarking 
how stressful are modern times. They fear that communities have 
fallen apart, with loneliness and alienation leading to a war of all 
against all. They are sure that their pre-industrial ancestors led 
charmed lives when they could bathe in the warmth of true solidarity 
community…Paradoxically, few urbanites will confess to living lives of 
lonely desperation. They know they have supportive communities, and 
that their friends, neighbors, kin and co-workers have them as 
well….At the same time, nostalgia for the perfect pastoral past dims 
awareness of the powerful stresses and cleavages that have always 
pervaded human society (Wellman, 1988, p. 81).  
 
It is the ‘loss of community’ lament that is most problematic for researchers 
because some get caught up with what people want community to be, rather 
than what more objective observations might reveal, that is, what might be 
described as the empirical community. 
 
The Empirical Community 
 
For Nisbet (1970) the study of small communities to make what might be 
described as ‘scientific’ generalizations about social relations clearly began 
with Le Play’s study of kinship and community in The European Working 
Classes where he compared 45 families from all over Europe (see also Périer, 
1998). Bell and Newby (1971) provide a useful summary of American and 
European studies of community, with the wry observation that despite the 
fact there is so much trouble defining community, community studies are 
none-the-less conducted. The methods used to study communities are 
varied, but the authors identify some generalizations. Participant 
observation is one method, but one which despite the richness of the 
outcome is often criticized for being overly sympathetic to the object of 
study. Survey techniques may appear attractive for larger population areas, 
but there is the warning that surveys target individuals not communities, and 
that unless these are offset with other information could be quite misleading. 
Researchers are also reminded that there are other forms of data, specifically 
organisational and other records that might be interrogated to provide 
information. Above all, Bell and Newby (1971) insist that social interaction is 
what is sought within the notion of studying community. This by necessity 
requires identification of organizations and their interactions, class and 
other status relations which might influence involvement, and power and 
conflict relations. Bell and Newby also include the use of ecological 
approaches and network analysis. The merits of network analysis in 
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community studies are exemplified particularly in Wellman (1988) and 
Tindall and Wellman (2001).   
 
Implications for Community studies in the context of Hazards 
 
Clearly, there is a need to understand in general terms, what is meant when 
people refer to ‘community’. Are they lamenting the ‘loss of the (moral) 
community’ in times of high levels of urbanisation, population mobility and 
social change? If it is an individual speaking, it is important to remember it is 
their view of what constitutes community which may differ from other views. 
What are people implying when they talk about community, is it a locality or 
is it the networks of relationships that occur at that locality? It cannot be 
assumed that communities are homogenous entities for which planning is 
easily undertaken. Communities are also not static, geographically, in terms 
of membership and in terms of ideology or beliefs. In particular researchers 
should not be concerned with discovering, or wishing to discover, imaginary 
idealised social structures. When using ‘community’ as a methodology, 
however, there can be a danger of developing a series of case studies that are 
atheoretical. 
 
Some authors suggest there is no such thing as community, or that 
community has come to be meaningless and that the term should not be 
used.  Bell and Newby (1971) warn against semantic sleights of hand by 
merely choosing another word. However, it is highly unlikely that in the 
short term community will be lost from our vocabulary, and as Nisbet (1970) 
quotes Durkheim: “If the idea of society were extinguished in individual 
minds, and the beliefs, traditions and aspirations of the group were no longer 
felt and shared by individuals, society would die. We can say of it what 
we…said of divinity: it is real only insofar as it has a place in the human 
consciousness…” (Nisbet, 1970, p. 95). For Wellman (2001) the notion of 
community is well and truly alive, even in, or perhaps especially because of, 
the age of the Internet. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the context of hazards, and the Bloomfield River region is an example, 
geographic location remains of importance, because the types of hazards to 
which people may be exposed are to a large extent determined by location. In 
the context of the discussion of what might constitute community in the 
context of hazards, there are some clear conclusions to be made. What was 
sought was an empirical view of community, that would allow a more 
effective approach to hazard mitigation. What was found was clearly a 
location with at least two primary community networks within which social 
status and power relations figure strongly, and do vary. Within the 
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Aboriginal community2 there were two politically strong families and within 
the non-Aboriginal community, a range of networking options, with some 
people clearly having very little influence.  These networks are of prime 
importance to a situation where hazard planning and mitigation are 
intended. It can be understood that the networks may be able to provide 
mutual support in the context of a natural hazard.  
 
It is also clear that because of networks outside the geographical location, 
resources such as weather information are more readily available than might 
have been assumed. The benefits of community studies to hazard mitigation 
and planning clearly remains useful, but it must be acknowledged that each 
community will be different and that this needs to be understood by service 
providers. 
 
                                                 
2  It is interesting to note the Aboriginal community was referred to as ‘community’ while the mainstream 
community was referred to as ‘residents’, by Aboriginal people and mainstream people alike. 
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Government, non-government and 
community organisations in 
disasters 
 
David King 
 
In the event of a disaster, communities become the targets of specialist 
organizations and undergo a concentration of activities. The complex 
unstructured activities and routines of daily life are disrupted and even 
totally overwhelmed by a single catastrophic event that requires a redirection 
of priorities, resources and people, to deal with all aspects of the disaster 
impact as rapidly as possible. The whole community must be mobilised to 
restore functions and meet needs, to return to the normality of the pre-
disaster state. This latter purpose is least likely to be achieved, as the 
destroyed community can seldom rebuild to the same complex, but 
randomly haphazard state that existed before the disaster.  
 
To mobilise the whole community to a single purpose of recovery, requires a 
high level of organisation. Response to a disaster demands that there be 
purposeful organisations ready to provide leadership and action. Emergency 
Management is predicated on the existence of such purposeful organisations. 
However, while organisations are at the core of Emergency Management 
Response and Recovery they are by no means simple or singular. Disaster 
generates the activities of a plethora of organisations, which interact with the 
community, rather than simply organising disaster response. The 
community also organises itself, re-assigning priorities and using existing 
organisations and networks. 
 
The Emergency Management Organisational Environment 
 
This chapter examines the range and roles of organisations that are involved 
in all aspects of disaster. The organisations are the structure of disaster 
Preparedness, Prevention, Response and Recovery, but the community and 
its citizens are the core of the effects of the disaster itself. In recognition of 
this Emergency Management has shifted its roles from a concentration on 
the traditional phases of Preparedness, Prevention, Response and Recovery 
to a much more community centred approach (Cronstedt, 2002). However, 
professional emergency managers, who have the greatest knowledge of such 
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shifts in approaches and the reasons behind them, are only employed in 
some of the organisations that are involved in disasters. While the 
professional emergency managers may provide the most direct leadership 
and integrative structure to the tasks of dealing with disaster (Britton, 2001), 
the numerous other organisations that become involved have formerly 
existed to provide other kinds of services and functions which must be 
subsumed to deal with the immediate needs of a disaster. Thus although 
professional emergency managers in mainstream hazard oriented 
organisations may be aware of the complexity of the management and 
leadership roles that they are practising, this does not necessarily transfer to 
the managers and leaders of other organisations.  
 
The traditional Emergency Management structure of Preparedness, 
Prevention, Response and Recovery (or its variant acronyms) is presented in 
Figure 2.1 below. These four processes structure the tasks of planning for 
likely disaster scenarios and for responding, and then reconstructing society 
and community in the event of a disaster occurring.  
 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Integrated Emergency Management System (source: EMD, 2000) 
 
Increasingly Emergency Management is using the term Mitigation as a larger 
group of activities that subsume both Preparedness and Prevention. The US 
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) uses preparedness and 
mitigation as separate stages. Emergency Management Australia (EMA) 
defines mitigation as “measures taken in advance of a disaster aimed at 
decreasing or eliminating its impact on society and the environment. See 
also prevention.” (EMA, 1998, p. 76).  
Preparedness Mitigation 
Recovery Response 
 
Emergency or Disaster 
= 
Motivating Force 
All Hazards 
All 
Phases All Partners 
All Resources 
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Preparedness is defined as “arrangements to ensure that, should an 
emergency occur, all those resources and services which are needed to cope 
with the effects can be efficiently mobilised and deployed. Measures to 
ensure that, should an emergency occur, communications, resources and 
services are capable of coping with the effects” (EMA, 1998, p. 88). As a 
disaster is an event that is “beyond the day to day capacity of the prescribed 
statutory authorities and which requires special mobilising and organising of 
resources other than those normally available to these authorities” (EMA, 
1998, pp. 32-33) the implication is that preparation is entirely contingent 
upon the scale of the disaster, which is presumably affected by preventive 
measures that have been put in place. The activities cannot exist separately. 
Preparing for a disaster will most likely initiate the process, but from then 
onwards both sets of activities are inextricably linked, reinforcing and 
complementary. As Emergency Management stakeholders have been using 
mitigation as an inclusive concept that subsumes preparedness and 
prevention, it has been used in that sense in Figure 2.1 above, partly in order 
to simplify a diagram that attempts to express the complexity of the stages of 
Emergency Management. However, it is irresponsible for any agency to 
prepare for a disaster without instigating preventive measures, even if these 
are as basic as information and warnings.  The Emergency Management 
structure partially defines organisational roles and responsibilities, but has 
tended to portray them as steps or as a linear process, as in Figure 2.1.  Many 
commentators (Cronstedt, 2002; Britton, 2001; Yates, 1999; Comfort et al., 
2001) have criticised this linear model of Preparedness, Prevention, 
Response and Recovery. 
 
These weaknesses and criticisms of the traditional model have led the author 
to develop a three-dimensional model as presented in Figure 2.2 below. 
 
If the Emergency Management system is simplified into three main groups 
of activities: Mitigation; Response; and Recovery, there are distinct 
identifiable roles and responsibilities. Organisations fit into these three 
broad areas, but not as exclusive processes. Many organisations, both 
government and non-government, are involved in multiple aspects of 
disaster mitigation, response and recovery. All these elements are ongoing 
and interlinked and Figure 2.2 illustrates how these processes may operate 
simultaneously, interlinking and reinforcing. Mitigation is practised by all 
organisations and communities to varying degrees, even subconsciously or 
by seasonal routine. Mitigation of disaster impact is not a process that stops 
when hazard impact turns into a disaster. The disaster impact is part of the 
mitigation process in testing, challenging and confronting both the 
organisations and citizens. A process of learning and direct experience feeds 
back into mitigation, which grows in potential from the actual experience of 
the disaster.  
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Figure 2.2 Mitigation, Response and Recovery in space and time 
 
Thus mitigation is shown as an iterative and encompassing process. It 
proceeds through feedback loops, identifying and responding to 
shortcomings and needs. It can also appear to revert, or go backwards, as 
obstacles are confronted and mitigation measures fail or are too costly or 
difficult to implement. Mitigation can be made even more difficult through 
the contradictory efforts of different agencies. For example, road safety 
oriented street designs are concerned with traffic calming and a hierarchy of 
types of streets that reduce and slow local traffic. In flood or storm surge 
evacuation these design elements can create bottlenecks and congestion and 
may actually endanger lives. Levees provide short term protection, but in the 
long term may result in far more serious and widespread flooding.  In other 
locations, flood drainage channels may also exacerbate flooding. The design 
of roads to act as drainage channels reduces their effectiveness in the event 
of evacuation.  
 
Response has been typically the Emergency Management focus for a hazard 
impact or disaster. The reality of a disaster overwhelming the emergency 
services limits their initial response. The first response is from the impacted 
community. People who experience the direct effects of a disaster are not 
passive victims. They are active participants who will work through a range 
of organisations and networks to deal with the crisis. People may be 
traumatised, injured and suffering loss, but despite this they are the first 
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people on the scene, the first to respond and the first to begin the recovery 
process. Recovery begins the moment a disaster happens (Sullivan, 2003).  
The event also triggers a response in those organisations that have a 
responsibility or a role in the disaster. Preparation for a predictable and 
probable hazard is beyond being just mitigation, it is part of the response. 
Decisions have been made before the event that determine who will do what 
when the event happens. As citizens take shelter and carry out final 
precautions and preparations, the emergency organisations also position 
themselves to deal with the impact. Post-disaster studies in northern 
Australia (King, 2002) have shown that people leave a significant amount of 
preparation until the last minute, when the impact of the hazard is certain 
(or at least the probability is very high). All of the post disaster studies 
undertaken by the author in northern Australia have been floods and tropical 
cyclones, or both, which can be predicted to such an extent that people can 
feel confident in carrying out late preparations. The media refers to panic 
buying and last minute panic preparations, but observations of people and 
communities have not portrayed panic. In the immediate few hours before 
impact people are calm and purposeful in their behaviour, although most 
will express emotions that principally include concern, excitement and some 
degree of nervousness. In the tropical north of Australia people are advised 
to clear up potential debris at the beginning of the cyclone season, and to 
prepare an emergency kit. The fact that they delay this preparation until a 
cyclone or flood is inevitable, is a behavioural response that is mirrored by 
most organisations. Mental preparation and planning notes what needs to be 
done, but scarce resources cannot be allocated to the hazard response until it 
happens. Thus actions which are expected as preparations, are in reality 
postponed to become part of the response; a pre-disaster response. The 
response is therefore a direct outcome of mitigations and begins immediately 
before the hazard hits. The completely unexpected and extreme disaster has 
probably not been prepared for or mitigated against. Response and Recovery 
in such an event will begin immediately after it has happened.  
 
Recovery is triggered by the response. It begins immediately after the 
disaster has occurred, but it is not a linear process (Sullivan, 2003; 
Cronstedt, 2002). The response to the disaster involves many different 
organisations, government and non government, each of which has separate 
roles, responsibilities and agendas. They carry out different tasks, at separate 
times and places, as well as overlapping and even sometimes competing with 
one another. In the ideal world all of these organisations would be 
coordinated by a single authority. In the developing world especially, this is 
frequently not the case.  
 
A coordinating authority may exist, but it is frequently under-funded, poorly 
resourced, and even ignored by non-government organisations (NGOs), 
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other government departments and politicians. This happened on a large 
scale in Papua New Guinea (PNG) following the Sissano Lagoon Tsunami 
disaster in 1998. To a lesser degree, coordination of the response to the 
impact of Cyclone Zoe on Tikopia and Anuta in the Solomon Islands in 2003 
was constrained by a collapse of governance in that country, with the 
consequent inability of coordinating authorities to initiate a rapid response 
without outside assistance. Thus response is contingent upon the wealth of a 
nation, not just in terms of its physical capability, but more importantly in 
terms of governance.  
 
The response phase can easily be poorly coordinated or chaotic. Even in the 
best of circumstances, the devastating impact of a disaster means that 
responses will come in pulses of activities that will inevitably occur 
separately in time and space. As response cannot be equal, recovery is most 
certainly not equal or linear. Recovery is also community initiated as well as 
developing from the organisational response. Community and organisational 
Response and Recovery efforts may proceed in parallel, virtually 
independent of one another. Again, this process of parallel recovery is far 
more likely to occur in developing countries, where a lack of pre-disaster 
infrastructure exacerbates problems of Response and Recovery.  
 
Recovery proceeds in unequal pulses that involve a series of feedback loops 
as well as setbacks and secondary crises, such as public health emergencies 
that emanate from the initial disaster and redirect resources and efforts, 
thereby slowing the recovery process, and adding fresh impacts and trauma 
to the afflicted community. Recovery is an iterative process that develops 
opportunities as well encountering constraints.  
 
The Organisations 
 
It is within these complex interlinking phases of Emergency Management 
that organisations operate. Primary Emergency Management is generally 
practised by governments, with citizens reasonably expecting that emergency 
organisations will come to their aid in a disaster. Their expectations include 
a response from the army or defence force. The reality of a disaster is that the 
local emergency services and the civil functions of local government 
organisations are unable to cope, and the army does not necessarily have an 
Emergency Management role. Some countries use their defence forces to a 
greater extent than Australia, with civil defence having a much stronger 
relationship to military defence. Until 2001 Australia’s peak Emergency 
Management body, EMA, came under the Department of Defence, although 
it was not answerable to the military, nor they to EMA, although EMA is a 
civil defence organisation in the event of war. However, it remains a 
misconception of many citizens that the defence forces will automatically be 
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involved in a major disaster. On many occasions they have been involved, 
especially in such massive disasters as Cyclone Tracy in 1974 and 1975, but 
they only participate on request from civil authorities. This also applies to 
overseas relief operations, where the decision to use the defence forces is 
made by central government.  
 
Emergency Management is therefore primarily a civil government activity, 
coordinated from the local level through state or provincial governments, up 
to a central government response depending upon the severity of the disaster 
(Douglas, 1999; Norman & Coles, 2003). In developing nations a lack of 
resources, as well as traditions of military involvement in government, may 
result in a stronger reliance on military intervention in disasters. There are 
many developing nations that have a small or even no defence force, 
especially in the Pacific where only PNG and Fiji have armies. Although PNG 
has experienced a long civil war on Bougainville, its colonial and 
development experience put strong emphasis on its police and civil 
authorities, such that it’s defence force continues to take a secondary role in 
disaster response.  
 
Emergency Management is structured through laws that apportion 
responsibility for preparedness and prevention, and for response and 
recovery. For example in Queensland the Disaster Management Act 2003 
(Queensland Government, 2003) specifies arrangements that are primarily 
carried out at the level of the local government. Local governments vary 
enormously in size and area. The smallest local government areas in 
northern Australia have less than 1,000 people and many have land areas in 
excess of 50,000 square kilometres. Their organisational capacity to deal 
with disaster is very limited, although the remotest parts of the north cope 
with floods and cyclones that in more developed parts of Australia would 
constitute a natural hazard or become a disaster. A similar resilience 
supports communities in remote parts of developing nations in South-East 
Asia and the Pacific.  
 
Although legislation puts responsibility on local levels of government to 
prepare for disaster, the capability to respond adequately is limited. Apart 
from local government, disaster preparation is a requirement for all other 
government departments that provide social and welfare services to the 
community. In a disaster these needs are increased and are more urgent. 
Emergency Management coordinates the responses of all these government 
organisations, but they are separate entities answerable to different political 
masters. Each government department has its own priorities, agendas and 
needs, even within an atmosphere of cooperation. While many of these 
organisations have clearly defined, exclusive roles, such as health and police, 
organisations responsible for specific community members, such as the aged, 
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or specific ethnic groups, may end up side by side providing very similar 
services.  
 
Government is only one of many types of organisations that become involved 
in disasters. The trend in government has been towards less government and 
more privatisation. Former government roles in welfare and service 
provision are now provided by private enterprise. There is a blurred line 
between companies that are providing services to the public, and the 
traditional NGOs that began life as charities. At the further end of the 
business end of this continuum of organisations are companies that are in 
business to make profits for their shareholders, but which possess plant, 
machinery and expertise or infrastructure to play a very significant role in 
community recovery. Some companies are devastated or go out of business 
in a disaster, but for many others it is an opportunity for expansion, and 
inevitably profit, although individuals working for these companies may be 
no less motivated by altruism than members of government and relief 
organisations. The need to operate profitably does not in any way lessen 
their commitment to any of the phases of Emergency Management. At the 
same time they may even be able to provide services more efficiently and at a 
lower cost. That is often the aim of privatisation.  
 
At the other end of this continuum are charities and humanitarian NGOs 
whose members are driven principally by beliefs, altruism and often a strong 
political agenda. However, the humanitarian NGOs have been undergoing 
quite dramatic changes to their roles. These issues and their impact on 
Emergency Management, especially in developing countries will be returned 
to later in this chapter. 
 
On one scale there exists this continuum between altruistic NGOs at one end 
and purely commercial business operations at the other end. Stretching this 
scale is a size and spatial continuum that ranges from the international and 
national government organisations down to community, household and 
residual leadership. These ideas are expressed in Figure 2.3 in terms of these 
continua. 
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Figure 2.3 Organisation and membership of organisations 
 
Table 2.1 below lists the types of organisations involved in Emergency 
Management and disaster response and recovery. The model expressed in 
both Figures 2.1 and 2.2 and listed in Table 2.1, is organisations coming 
together from diverse backgrounds to focus on a disaster event, within the 
dimensions of space, time and specialist roles and skills. 
 
Table 2.1 Organisations involved in Emergency Management 
 
Direct Indirect Residual & 
Spontaneous 
International Businesses Culture 
Government 
Organisations 
Economic 
Organisations 
Community Networks 
Non-government 
Organisations 
Recreational 
Organisations 
Internet 
Privatised Specialists Religious 
Organisations 
Residual Leadership 
Grass Roots 
Organisations 
Cultural Groups Volunteers 
Community 
Organisations 
Interest Groups Fixers & Tradespersons 
 Political Groups Illegal Groups 
 Media Family & Household 
  Individuals & Visitors 
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The organisations directly involved are those that have a primary 
responsibility for Emergency Management and disaster mitigation. 
Government organisations include all levels of government as outlined 
earlier. The NGOs include the traditional relief organisations and charities, 
but there are also NGOs that would be included in the indirectly involved 
group of organisations, such as Landcare, the formal organisations of 
religions, various types of youth groups that provide volunteers and so on. 
These are separate from organisations like the State Emergency Services 
(SES), which rely on volunteers, but are sponsored directly by government. 
However, many groups, including rural fire brigades, surf lifesaving clubs 
and others, are essentially community organisations. Grass Roots 
Organisations (GROs) are very definitely local community groups. Within 
the developing world, many GROs were formed as progress associations for 
the sake of advancing development, but adapted to relief and recovery in the 
event of a disaster. In the developed world GROs have often been single 
issue, but otherwise quite loose organisations. Some of these have responded 
directly to disasters or the threat of a hazard, as victim support or lobby 
groups, but there are far more GROs that are indirectly involved in disaster 
Response and Recovery (Fahey, 2003). They may not have been formed with 
any thought of hazard or disaster, but once formed they create and maintain 
community links and networks which may be rapidly used in a crisis.  
 
The indirect group of organisations are those which exist primarily for a 
purpose other than hazard mitigation, but which contribute resources, 
personnel, networks and knowledge during and after a disaster. Included 
here are the media, in all of its forms and roles. The media are primarily a 
private enterprise industry, but it is crucial to government organisations and 
emergency managers who depend upon media response to get information, 
warnings and messages to the community. The media are often the earliest 
responders to a disaster, providing initial information and immediate 
impressions. When category five Cyclone Zoe hit the island of Tikopia, a 
remote and extremely isolated outlier of the Solomon Islands the first 
outsider to provide any news of the islanders’ survival was a freelance 
journalist who chartered a helicopter from New Zealand. It is interesting that 
the journalist’s initial report of devastation and survival described people 
fishing. Thus although the media comprised the first outsider, the Tikopians 
had got on with their own process of survival and recovery.  
 
The media are also extremely powerful in advertising a crisis and prompting 
political and citizen response. The corollary of this power is the invisibility of 
unreported, or poorly reported disasters. Disasters are, in part, constructed 
by the media. They often exaggerate human interest elements, they look for 
scandals and government ineptitude, assign blame and instigate generous 
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relief responses. They self censor some images of suffering, but are also 
guilty of misusing distressing images to increase the impact of their stories. 
 
Emergency managers have no control over the media and need their positive 
support at all phases of Emergency Management. All organisations must 
therefore devote some of their resources to media liaison and must 
continually work at these networks. NGOs especially, work hard at 
developing their media image and ensuring media visibility as citizen 
generosity is a key component of their income.  
 
There also exists a level of informal organisation that can be grouped under 
residual and spontaneous organisations. These are two quite separate 
community processes. The spontaneous response and resulting organisation, 
or community, or network, occurs directly as a consequence of the disaster 
event. The ‘residual organisations’ are those elements of civil society that 
underpin all that people do, the ways in which society is defined and 
constructed, the traditional, and the informal. Residual organisations are 
culturally constructed, grounded in community and civil society, 
representative of the ways people organise and network. This is not 
necessarily something ancient and ‘culturally known’, although it certainly 
includes that part of society, but it also includes all that is immediate and 
functional.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4 A matrix of types of organisations 
 
The size and numbers of organisations that participate in any disaster vary 
with the spatial extent, the severity and the population that is involved.  
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Obviously, the more organisations that are involved, the more complex is the 
task of Emergency Management. These organisations bring to the 
community a wide range of skills and approaches. These variations are 
illustrated in Figures 2.3 and 2.4.  
 
Figure 2.3 expresses a range in size, organisational structure and scale. No 
organisation can encompass all of these types, they will sit primarily in one 
or more sectors. Figure 2.4 illustrates the variety of structures within 
organisations and the community. The upper left area is structured, the 
lower right is unstructured. Urban society, in particular, is a highly complex, 
unstructured matrix of networks and linkages. It is like the structure of the 
Internet, allowing enormous numbers of groupings and largely informal 
organisations (Alexander, 1966). This is the community which is managed by 
formal Emergency Management with its clear cut organisational hierarchy. 
Cutting across this continuum is a range of organisations from the formally 
structured NGOs which may include businesses and companies, through to 
the spontaneous and residual. Where the community initiates and pursues 
its own Response and Recovery, it is in the lower right area of the model, 
unstructured but not necessarily disorganised. 
 
Thus it is inevitable in any disaster that problems of organisation and 
leadership will emerge. The effectiveness with which these issues are 
resolved will have a powerful influence on the effectiveness of Response and 
Recovery. Organisations will pursue their own agendas generating both 
contradiction and complementarity. Communities will pursue their own, 
often parallel, routes to Response, Recovery and Mitigation (Spillan, 2003; 
Palmer, 2001; Benini, 1999; Juratowitch et al., 2003; Silberbauer, 2003; 
Prater & Wu, 2002; Loosemore & Hughes, 2001).  
 
NGO Roles in Complex Emergencies 
 
The roles of NGOs in complex emergencies have been distorted away from 
needy communities towards the demands of governments and international 
agencies. Understanding the shift in the roles of NGOs raises issues that may 
help countries that have experienced a complex disaster, to better coordinate 
the naturally occurring processes of community recovery and redevelopment 
within a NGO policy. However, the problems and issues faced by the NGOs 
themselves are also complex. 
 
Most NGOs involved in development have evolved from a humanitarian 
liberal and idealistic agenda, but performance in development has been 
ineffective or patchy, both sectorally and geographically (Edwards & Hulme, 
2002). With local knowledge and local institutional organisation, 
development NGOs found themselves well placed to intervene in relief when 
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states collapsed and conflict emerged (Keen, 1998; Harvey, 1998; Edwards & 
Hulme, 2001). Being reliant on donors for funding many NGOs found 
themselves beneficiaries of increased publicity as wars and associated 
natural disasters developed. It was easy to shift from development to relief 
when the budget expanded, although obviously to professionals committed 
to improvement in the quality of life in developing societies, there was no 
choice but to become involved in relief.  
 
The accountability of NGOs is both to the donor and to the recipient, upward 
and downward. The end of the Cold War took many governments, such as 
the USA and USSR, out of direct aid competition in the developing world. 
Aid was both relatively reduced and channelled through international 
agencies and NGOs (Fowler, 2001; Reno, 1997). NGOs became more 
connected with donors who were bigger and more powerful (Edwards & 
Hulme, 2001). Even though developing nation governments may have lost 
the ability to govern their own countries they have still been able to exert an 
influence on NGOs. This is acceptable and even necessary where 
coordination is needed, but it has added another level of accountability 
upward, to the detriment of downward accountability (Edwards & Fowler, 
2001; Keen, 1998; Edwards & Hulme a & b, 2001; Hilhorst, 2002). Thus 
NGOs are in greater danger of disengaging from direct partnership with 
disaster affected communities, while they serve instead the needs and 
agendas of host governments, private donors, donor agencies and Western 
donor governments. 
 
The concept of political aid and a hierarchy of victims (Fox, 2001) challenge 
the political naivety of NGO relief efforts that indirectly (or directly through 
corruption and theft) support combatants and extend or exacerbate the 
conflict (Fox, 2001; Duffield, 2001; Macrae & Leader, 2001; Keen, 1998). 
Thus on one side NGOs have been criticised for supporting corrupt 
governments by providing outside funded welfare projects, while on another 
side they undermine those same governments by enabling combatants to 
stay in business (Woodward, 2001), on yet another side they play into the 
globalisation agenda by practising privatisation of social services and 
international aid (Cliffe, 2000; Fowler, 2001; Edwards & Hulme, 2001) and 
on the fourth side they have neglected accountability to, and partnership 
with, the community they exist to serve. 
 
Against this background, the development NGOs have been drawn into 
increasingly complex conflicts, involving many players, unclear goals, 
struggles for resources and in some cases associated natural disasters; and 
all of the outcomes of displacement, medical crises; collapse of government 
and destruction of infrastructure. These ‘new wars’ of the new millennium or 
the twenty-first century, challenge all relief agencies to participate in the 
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peace process as actively as the military organisations that are involved. 
Most of the ‘new wars’ have taken place in Africa, and they are symptomatic 
of a collapse of governance and development. Within the Asia Pacific region 
the East Timor conflict was the last of the ‘old wars’, a post-colonial struggle 
for independence, where there were clear goals on both sides. The collapse of 
governance in the Solomon Islands during 2002 and 2003 was more typical 
of the new conflicts and the complex humanitarian response. PNG faces the 
danger of similar disruption, while in Indonesia and the Philippines complex 
ethnic/political conflicts share many similarities with those of Africa. Of 
particular significance is the connection between economic setbacks and a 
slowing of development with the emergence of regional, ethnic and religious 
conflicts. 
 
Firstly, the ‘new wars’ involve a dislocation of globalisation and network 
connections, especially in relation to the trade in cheap arms and the 
migrations of refugees (Cliffe, 2000). Secondly, these wars create their own 
political economies. The commonly used term ‘warlord economies’ (Reno, 
1997), describes conflicts as a competition for resources that had formerly 
been controlled by the patronage system that had developed out of 
colonialism.  Thirdly, the public and private spheres are blurred as 
combatants change sides, and mercenaries and criminals become involved. 
Fourthly, there are no significant political goals in these new wars. The ‘new 
wars’ are cheap wars (Keen, 1998; Richards, 1996) where terrorism or 
dominance of the unarmed civilian population is easily achieved, but the 
capacity to defeat a government is insufficient. The under-funded hand to 
mouth campaigns of such rebels contributes to their lack of goals.  
 
As international agencies and NGOs move into a humanitarian disaster, 
alongside or parallel to community activity, the involvement of central 
government may facilitate or direct redevelopment within a broader political 
framework and development strategy. A strong civil society that works with 
NGOs may improve the developmental aspects of relief (Harvey, 1998). Civil 
society as a concept includes all the positive aspects of community, 
independent of the state and thereby the grassroots that presents a bottom 
up approach to development. Civil society is not totally undermined by 
disaster, but in the face of war or disaster it transforms and re-emerges. It is 
a rehabilitation model that is downwardly accountable and separate from 
state and donor politics. Its mechanism for reconstruction is to utilise 
community or traditional institutions and structures. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Organisations exist to respond to disasters and to reconstruct places and 
communities, but the circumstances of each disaster throw up unique 
problems and sets of complex issues that will stress and constrain even the 
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most experienced disaster organisations.  Disasters overwhelm.  Most 
governments and government agencies, especially at the local area level that 
experiences the disaster impact, will have had little previous direct 
experience of dealing with an actual disaster.  Organisations exist primarily 
to meet other needs and provide regular and routine services.  In developed 
industrialised countries, governments and non-government organisations 
are overwhelmed by disaster, but when governance is much weaker, 
especially in the poorer countries of the world, formal organisations are even 
less likely to be able to respond or even to function at all.  Added to weak 
governance, are issues of cultural pluralism, social and economic divisions, 
control of the state territory, and thus even the willingness, let alone 
capacity, of governments to provide aid or assistance to specific groups or 
locations. 
 
Conventional models of Emergency Management presuppose that 
government and non-government organisations will proceed through regular 
processes to respond, aid recovery, and mitigate against future hazards.  The 
reality is that capacity is far more constrained than Emergency Management 
processes portend.  Also underplayed in formal organisational models is the 
role of virtually everyone else in responding to and recovering from a 
disaster.  Community, business, non-formal organisations and individuals 
take actions to respond to hazards and recover from disaster without 
necessarily relating to the roles of formal organisations.  Organising the 
organisational and non-organisational response is part of the process and 
chaos of any disaster.  It is possible to identify all the levels and types of 
organisations and communities that have been examined in this chapter, but 
what each would do in the unique disaster event remains as unpredictable as 
the disaster impact itself.  What is essential is the recognition by Emergency 
Management that it will always deal with the consequences of a disaster in 
partnership with a plethora of government, business and community 
organisations each of which has its own priorities, structures and 
procedures. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A modified version of this chapter was first published as Organisations in disaster,  
Natural Hazards, 40(3), 657-665 in March 2007. 
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3 
 
Enhancing resilience and reducing 
vulnerability: Lessons learned from 
past disasters 
 
David King 
 
Learning from the reality of disasters that have been experienced or which 
have been learned vicariously from the experience of other people and 
communities, empowers people to reduce their vulnerability and to enhance 
their resilience in the face of catastrophe.  Unfortunately the process of 
learning is neither as obvious nor as commonsense as the drama and tragedy 
of an unfolding disaster demands. Lessons are not fully learned, the missing 
details may become fatal flaws in people’s understanding of events, and 
reconstruction of events from the perspectives of participants, observers and 
analysts are necessarily piecemeal, driven by drama, economy and politics, 
un-contextualised and unique. Learning from past disasters is not a simple 
or obvious process.  This chapter begins with reflections on perception; 
scale; emphasis; and place, in order to understand some of the diversity of 
disaster learning experiences.  Examples of lessons learned from local, 
regional and distant disasters provide a review in order to identify issues, 
commonalities (within unique events) and those mitigative actions that may 
reduce each person’s and each community’s vulnerability to a range of 
hazards, and simultaneously enhance their resilience before, during and 
after a catastrophic event. 
 
Do communities or individuals learn anything from the experience of the 
disaster?  Is vulnerability to future events reduced by direct experience or 
indirectly experiencing disaster, and/or is resilience enhanced?  The 
Integrated Emergency Management System model of Prevention, 
Preparedness, Response and Recovery assumes a continual feedback loop.  
Emergency managers are required to learn from each disaster through 
debriefing, studies, reorganisation, and redefinition of priorities. 
 
Many lessons learned for communities by emergency managers are passed 
down to communities through education, warnings, information, mitigation, 
physical prevention structures, planning and intervention.  Emergency 
managers, as professionals, have a more global view and their job of 
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protecting communities is to learn lessons from all disasters in order to 
improve mitigation and capacity to respond and to aid recovery.  
 
The problem for emergency managers in indirectly learning from other 
disasters is that experience comes second hand from other participants and 
must then be processed, redefined, understood and transmitted third hand 
to communities for which they are responsible.  At the same time individuals 
and communities learn of other disaster experiences primarily through the 
media, and sort information and structure other people’s experiences to fit 
their own situation and place.  This process at community level is much more 
piecemeal than that of emergency management.  However, it is also location 
and situation specific, whereas the emergency managers’ sorting and 
understanding of others’ experiences is directed to responsibility for many 
communities – the whole state, or nation, or even an international region. 
Thus at the initial level of learning indirectly from other communities’ 
disasters and experiences, there are two radically different learning 
experiences.  The emergency manager’s learned experience is top-down and 
global, while the community’s is bottom-up and personal.  
 
Post-disaster Studies 
 
The first stages of a disaster response require rapid appraisals to assess 
needs and response levels. Needs analyses inevitably form part of the 
briefings and may contribute to deeper reflections and lessons that can be 
learned, especially at the organisational level. However their primary 
function is to satisfy immediate needs under pressure.  Researchers are often 
not involved at this initial stage.  Researchers usually visit the scene of a 
disaster within a few days, or up to a week or so, after an event.  The aim is to 
keep out of the way of response teams, and researchers do not enter a 
declared disaster area until they have been granted permission from the 
authorities who are primarily involved in response and relief.  The aim of the 
post-disaster research is to record issues, experiences and impacts, while 
these are fresh in people’s minds.  These studies are also primarily records of 
what happened in an event, but they form the first stage of attempting to 
analyse issues and ultimately to synthesise disaster experiences into more 
general conclusions that can inform policy. 
 
Enormous numbers of post-disaster studies and reports are available, 
ranging from measurements of purely physical impacts to records of highly 
personal human experiences.  For tropical cyclones and hurricanes alone, 
Haig (2004) brought together over 200 studies into a web site International 
Post Cyclone Database. This database cross references individual studies 
according to their titles, keywords, survey aims, type, study area, 
methodology, key findings, events name, date, location, cities, states and 
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countries.  As further events are added, comparisons of issues impacts and 
experiences are enhanced. 
 
A review of 130 post-disaster studies (King, 2002) summarised places, 
events, types of disasters and classified their methods. As the USA and 
Australia had funding programs for post-disaster surveys, the majority of 
these reports were written by USA and Australian researchers although 
because US-based research could obtain funding to examine overseas 
disasters, many studies of events in other parts of the world had been carried 
out by US-based researchers.  Of the 130 studies that were examined, 29 
were cyclones/hurricanes, 21 were floods and 13 earthquakes, with eight 
bushfires and nine tornadoes. These were the dominant disasters in a list 
that also covered human induced hazards. These five hazard groups are the 
major killers, but to an extent are predictable, with appropriate behaviour 
and preparatory actions that can be taken to reduce vulnerability and 
impact.  As these were all post-disaster studies they were all consequently 
case studies of specific events, occasionally more than one, but primarily 
concerned with a single disaster on those issues related to a place and time. 
 
Members of the Centre for Disaster Studies carried out a series of post 
disaster studies between 1997 and 2006 covering 16 separate disasters in 20 
different locations (see Table 3.1). With the exception of the Indian Ocean 
Tsunami and human induced disasters like the Bali bombing, all were floods 
and cyclones and in particular the events were concentrated in local 
communities. 
 
The first event in Table 3.1 below, Cyclone Gillian, was a non event but a 
warning to the Bureau of Meteorology about the lack of preparation.  No 
warning had been issued to a major Queensland urban area since the 
beginning of the decade.  This category one cyclone dissipated before 
reaching the coast, however, it occurred in the middle of a working day and 
the experience illustrated chaos in the manner in which schools and 
workplaces were closed down as well as a general lack of preparation. 
 
Two much later studies took up a related theme of severe category 5 cyclone 
warnings in communities that subsequently were spared impact or received 
much less impact than expected. In 2005 Cyclone Ingrid crossed Cape York 
Peninsula but missed all the communities it had threatened and in 2006 
Cyclone Monica crossed the Peninsula and deepened into a very severe 
category 5 as it skirted the Northern Territory. Monica weakened to a 
category 3 when it finally crossed over Darwin. Surveys targeted people’s 
attitudes to preparing for the worst and not going through it, the ‘cry wolf’ 
syndrome. Research showed a high level of tolerance for being fully warned. 
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A Litany of Disasters 
 
Table 3.1 Post-disaster studies carried out by the Centre for Disaster 
Studies, 1997-2006 
 
Place Year Hazard Name Research Method 
Townsville 1997 Cyclone Gillian Questionnaire, 
warnings & behaviour 
Cloncurry 1997 Flood  Questionnaire, 
interviews 
Cairns 
Mareeba 
Innisfail 
 
1997 
 
Cyclone 
 
Justin 
Longitudinal 
questionnaire & short 
survey questionnaire 
Townsville 1998 Floods (ex-Cyclone 
Syd) 
Household telephone, 
business & Magnetic 
Island surveys 
interviews 
Burketown 
Normanton 
Karumba 
 
1998 
 
Floods 
 Questionnaire, 
interviews 
Innisfail Flooded buildings 
survey 
Cairns – Barron River 
suburbs 
Evacuation 
questionnaire 
Port Douglas & 
Mosman 
Warnings & behaviour 
questionnaire 
Wujal Wujal 
 
 
1999 
 
 
Cyclone 
 
 
Rona 
Warnings & impact 
interviews 
Broome 2000 Cyclone Rosita Questionnaire, 
interviews 
Cairns 2000 Cyclone Steve Longitudinal 
questionnaire 
Mornington Island 2001 Cyclone Abigail Questionnaire, 
interviews 
Sierra Leone 2002 Civil War  Interviews, meetings, 
secondary data 
Bali 2003 Terrorism  Interviews, meetings, 
secondary data 
Tikopia, Solomons 
Anuta, Solomons 
2003 
 
Cyclone Zoe Basic needs 
assessment 
Phuket, Thailand 
Maldives 
2005 Tsunami Indian Ocean 
tsunami 
Interviews, 
observations, field 
measurements, 
secondary data  
Port Douglas 2005 Cyclone Ingrid Interviews, 
questionnaire 
Innisfail & nearby 
communities 
2006 Cyclone Larry Interviews, 
questionnaire 
Darwin 2006 Cyclone Monica Telephone survey 
 
 
37 
Centre for Disaster Studies researcher, Anderson-Berry, focussed on the 
northern beaches of Cairns during 1996 to measure cyclone awareness and 
preparedness in a community that had not experienced a cyclone threat for 
six years.  In 1997 the giant Cyclone Justin, filled the Coral Sea and took a 
month before finally crossing the Cairns northern beaches coast line as a 
category 2. This was an opportunity to resurvey experience and behaviour 
amongst the same population that had completed the awareness and 
preparedness survey only six months earlier. Making this a truly longitudinal 
study, category 2 Cyclone Steve in 2000 passed over the same communities 
(Anderson-Berry & King, 2005). A high proportion of residents who had 
taken part in the earlier surveys were still available to participate in the third 
study, providing a valuable measure of a small but significant increase in 
community awareness and preparedness. 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Cyclone Tessi damaged Townsville’s Strand in 2000, just 
after reconstruction had been completed following severe 
damage caused in 1998 floods. 
 
Other cyclones provided further opportunities to pursue awareness and 
preparedness, but also to examine issues of warnings and hazard 
perceptions. Cyclone Abigail in 2001 was only a category two, but it passed 
over a low-lying Indigenous community at Mornington Island, where Eddie 
McLachlan, a Centre for Disaster Studies researcher was already recording 
indigenous hazard knowledge.  Just as this study was oriented to a particular 
emphasis, similarly Cyclone Rosita at Broome in 2000 was an opportunity to 
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concentrate on an issue, by looking at the impact on a tourist location.  The 
vulnerability of tourists and tourist destinations has developed as a major 
research area for the Centre, not just because of its significance on the 
Queensland coast but principally because of the lack of crisis management in 
the tourist industry. 
 
In 1999, Cyclone Rona initiated a series of issues. Post-disaster studies 
following the passage of this exceptionally wet cyclone addressed different 
issues in locations that were over 200 km apart.  This cyclone was preceded 
and accompanied by flooding rains and crossed the coast at Cow Bay in the 
Daintree rainforest. Wujal Wujal and Bloomfield communities to the north 
(around 1000 Indigenous and Non-indigenous residents) were totally 
isolated for weeks and failed to notice formal warnings of the close proximity 
of the cyclone. Anderson-Berry’s initial visit to the community was followed 
by a series of studies as researchers in the Centre directed emphasis to 
remote and Indigenous communities, examining their vulnerability, 
resilience and warnings.  South of Cyclone Rona’s eye, Douglas Shire was 
fairly well-prepared but the controversial issue was the efficacy of warnings. 
The post-disaster surveys in Port Douglas and Mosman were concerned with 
this issue of official warnings and their effectiveness.  While the survey at 
that time showed a satisfactory level of awareness and preparedness, a 
similar kind of survey was carried out in the same locations in 2005 after 
category 5 Cyclone Ingrid had passed (ultimately crossing Cape York 
Peninsula but causing very little damage).  In this case the survey was carried 
out for the opposite purpose of eliciting community response to what the 
media had termed a ‘false alarm’.  Community attitudes towards their 
preparations were positive, as it should be, but the issue of false alarm 
perceptions remains a concern to emergency managers. 
 
Cyclone Rona’s passage dumped vast amounts of rain on the Atherton 
Tablelands to the west of Cairns, causing the Barron River to flood.  This 
river emerges from the mountain range on to the coastal plain of Cairns 
adjacent to the suburbs of Lake Placid and Caravonica.  As the river rose 
rapidly, authorities issued an evacuation order to all residents of these two 
suburbs during the middle of the night.  The post-disaster survey in Cairns 
was therefore a detailed questionnaire issued to all households that had 
evacuated, to record their problems, perceptions and experiences. Of value to 
the Cairns City Council, which had not previously conducted an evacuation, 
the survey also illustrated the controversial issue of pets in evacuation 
centres.  More than 80% of households took pets with them, from cats and 
dogs to some truly bizarre creatures.  As a consequence the Cairns City 
Council followed up the pets issue in council surveys that were carried out 
during 2004. 
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The fourth of the Cyclone Rona studies also concentrated on flood 
experiences in Innisfail, 90 km south of Cairns, where houses and 
commercial properties in low-lying areas adjacent to the Johnstone River 
were inundated. The survey stressed property damage and loss related 
directly to house type (especially low or high set) and measured precise flood 
levels on property and within buildings. 
 
Cyclone Larry in March 2006 was in a sense ‘the big one’ that had been 
feared for many years, but it just missed a coastal city (either Cairns or 
Townsville could have been severely impacted upon). Once again it was 
Innisfail that was the victim along with surrounding small communities and 
villages on the coastal plain and on the Atherton Tableland. This impact area 
experienced a category 5 that rapidly weakened to a 4 but remained a severe 
4 until it had passed the Tableland. Although a rural area, the affected 
population of more than 50,000 people was scattered through many small 
towns and communities. The lesson learned from household surveys was of a 
well prepared, experienced and knowledgeable community that behaved 
correctly and consequently experienced no loss of life and few injuries. 
 
Many floods in northern Australia are related to cyclonic weather systems, 
but there were significant differences in the three sets of post-flood surveys.  
At Cloncurry in 1997 the Cloncurry River rose rapidly to unprecedented 
levels, inundating parts of the town, thereby forcing the evacuation of people 
and property.  The Gulf of Carpentaria lowland floods the following year 
inundated a vast area, as the great rivers that drain into the Gulf coalesced 
into an inland sea.  Towns and communities in the region became islands 
with problems and issues that emanated from their isolation: lack of food; 
inundation of septic systems; loss of power and freshwater; a strong risk of 
secondary disease and infection; and widespread destruction of roads, 
drainage, bridges and culverts.  Most remote cattle stations have 
traditionally stocked up on provisions for the isolation of the wet season but 
the predominantly Indigenous small towns and Aboriginal communities lack 
that capacity.  Most households have low incomes, high dependency on 
welfare and are unable to stockpile supplies.  Because of this characteristic of 
the market, retailers are also restricted in their ability to stock up.  Despite 
these problems these isolated communities were remarkably resilient.  The 
communities endured and made do with what they had available. 
 
Stoic endurance is easily attributed to the social construction of the outback 
community.  Certainly post-disaster studies undertaken by the Centre 
illustrated many examples of the term ‘outback spirit’. However, the same 
spirit of neighbourliness was equally evident in Townsville during the 1998 
flood.  This was an extreme rain event (a consequence of a decayed cyclone, 
in which over 700 mm of rain fell in less than 24 hours) with creek flash 
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flooding causing severe damage in a small number of locations.  While 
carrying out a 1000 household telephone survey in the days following the 
flood, interviewers recorded many remarkable anecdotes of bravery and 
selflessness, as well as some of the problems of inappropriate behaviour.   
 
 
 
Figure 3.2 Damage to the Black River settlement in Thuringowa following 
floods in 1998. 
 
Despite having used a variety of research methods and approaches these 
mainly local events involving predictable and regular hazards of flood and 
cyclone demonstrated some general trends and impacts.   
 
The following general trends and impacts have been noted: 
 
• unequal distribution of the hazard impact; 
• loss of essential services during and for a period after the hazard event; 
• lack of expectation in the community of the severity of the impact; 
• late or minimal preparation for the hazard; 
• response and assistance within the community and between 
neighbours; 
• confusion concerning warnings, and especially the way in which they 
were portrayed and transmitted by the media; 
• a level of resilience which involved acceptance of the hazard and 
generally a lack of attribution of serious blame. 
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This idea of acceptance of natural hazards was expressed by a Thai informant 
in Phuket during the week following the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 2004 that 
it was easier in an emotional or psychological sense to deal with natural 
hazards rather than terror.  This sentiment encapsulates an aspect of 
community resilience that to some extent accepts natural hazards as part of 
the natural order, something over which little control is possible. War and 
terror on the other hand undermine people’s faith in human nature, threaten 
all of our humanity and may even be a direct physical threat.  
 
Immediate post-tsunami disaster observations in Thailand also suggested 
lessons that can be learned from the devastation which could be applied 
directly to other hazards and other areas, such as coastal Australia (King & 
Gurtner, 2005).  Tsunami damage resembled many aspects of storm surge 
damage.   
 
The immediate response to the tsunami in many parts of the world was a 
transfer and internalisation of the threat.  While tsunamis may occur in 
many parts of the world’s plate boundaries, cyclones and hurricanes are 
much more regular an occurrence, with the storm surge accompanying a 
severe storm being just as destructive as a tsunami albeit over a longer 
period of time and with a greater opportunity for evacuation. 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Storm surge damage at Tikopia Solomon Islands, left, and 
tsunami damage at Phuket Thailand, right. 
 
Other significant transfers of the tsunami experience relate to the 
vulnerability of critical infrastructure and lifelines.  Particularly noticeable 
on Phuket was the lack of damage to significant infrastructure, with response 
coming from the intact and functioning administrative centre.  Recovery was 
able to progress rapidly despite widespread destruction in the coastal zone.  
This would probably not be the case in Australian coastal settlements where 
far too much of the critical infrastructure, economy and services are in low 
lying or coastal locations.  Land use planning and building structure 
locations were identified as significant issues for post-tsunami mitigation. 
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Similarly in Australia there are many people in the community who oppose 
development along coastal foreshores because of the extreme vulnerability of 
this zone to storm surge.  As the primary tourist resource is the beach and 
the sea, it is inevitable that pressure for development on the foreshore will 
continue to come from the tourist industry, whether in Thailand or northern 
Australia.  The Indian Ocean tsunami caused particularly severe damage to 
small buildings on the foreshore, a lesson that is directly transferable to 
residential absolute beach frontage. 
 
In Thailand the impact of the tsunami was felt particularly strongly in the 
tourist industry, tourists themselves and tourist workers.  Tourists have 
often been omitted from community hazard mitigation efforts and yet they 
are especially vulnerable. The need for hazard education was highlighted by 
the tsunami.  Education needs to be targeted to diverse communities, 
including tourists and tourism operators as separate identifiable 
communities.  Warning systems for both tsunamis and cyclones can only be 
effective if communities are educated to understand what the warning means 
and how to behave. 
 
Hazard Experience and Emergency Management 
 
There are common themes in emergency managers’ and researchers’ 
perspectives on the lessons that can be learned from disasters.  There are 
also common patterns and processes that are identified in similar types of 
disasters.  Yet while a particular level of flood, category of cyclone or scale of 
earthquake may demonstrate similar processes, the resulting disasters are all 
different.  Location, culture, society, politics, organisation, awareness and 
many other factors all contribute to the unique features of each disaster.  To 
learn lessons from disasters it is important to recognise commonalities while 
being aware of that which is unique, or specific to the location.  Researchers 
and emergency managers do this by recognising the special circumstances of 
each catastrophe and identify those factors as part of the explanation. There 
are many examples in studies of previous disasters that identify both those 
factors that are common and those which are unique.   
 
For example Keys (2005), reporting on the 2002 floods in Germany and the 
Czech Republic identified the dismantling of former warning mechanisms 
and changing land management systems as an emergency management issue 
that could be transferred to the Australian experience, but at the same time 
he was impressed by the scale of the disaster which gave it its unique 
characteristics. Bankoff’s (2003) assessment of flooding in the Philippines 
also recognises environmental problems, alongside the complexity of social 
and environmental factors, but he reduces the uniqueness to the social 
construction of vulnerability.  Both writers stress the importance of 
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understanding historical changes and processes to understand current 
hazards, but bring quite different perspectives on the nature of society. 
 
The perspective brought by the researcher to a disaster event configures the 
lessons that may be learned and transmitted.  Emergency managers are 
particularly involved in organisation and the political system.  The limited 
number of questions and surveys that are available to researchers result in 
specific selections. Prater and Wu’s (2002) study of Taiwan's 1999 
earthquake was oriented to analysis of organisational and institutional 
responses.  Similarly Wachtendorf’s (2000) study of the Red River flood 
positively emphasised cross border political arrangements; in this instance 
the US/Canada border. Betts (2003) on the other hand found institutional 
failings in flood warning systems in Victoria.  The research perspective was 
from the bottom-up community level. Wachtendorf’s was much more a view 
from the top down. Where researchers stand, or come from, influences the 
issues seen and the lessons learnt.  This does not mean that one view is 
wrong and another right.  All are real reflections of disastrous events, but the 
lesson that is learned is perhaps less from the event than from the observer. 
Pfister’s (2002) assessment of Grafton's floods in 2001 identified a poor 
response to evacuation warnings and concluded a need for better warning 
education.  As an emergency manager, this observation is Pfister’s role and 
the correct view of community. However, community workers in southern 
India, Thomalla and Schmuck (2004) observed a similar sort of community 
response in Orissa in 1999 and concluded failures in government and NGO 
organisations as well as in the communities themselves.  However, an 
overview of two decades of hazard research in southern India by Winchester 
(2000) concluded that NGOs had been effective but the crucial need was to 
target the poor who make up the bulk of the victims. 
 
Many post-disaster studies examine post-traumatic stress, most are carried 
out by psychologists and psychiatrists and are often much more longitudinal 
in scope.  Some emphasise the relief workers, others the victims. Johnes 
(2000) for example examined the impact of the Aberfan spoil heap collapse 
over 30 years after the event and Blatt (2001) subsequent to a mine disaster 
in Austria, both in order to assess failures in government and media that 
hampered recovery.  The lessons learned were organisational although the 
emphasis was trauma. Jonkman and Kelman (2005) identified inappropriate 
behaviour as a cause of flood deaths, and Gordon (2004), reflecting on a 
range of emergencies, concluded that social processes and relationships are 
drained and undermined during and following a disaster.  The trauma and 
grief experienced by victims and survivors is not necessarily just a 
consequence of the actual hazard, but is constructed or exacerbated by other 
processes that are equally part of the disaster - organisational and social 
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failings, the lopsided construction of the event by the media and a lack of 
appropriate knowledge. 
 
Because a disaster is a terrible and destructive experience, researchers and 
emergency managers are invariably driven to find explanations as to why 
things went wrong in order to mitigate against future disasters.  Post-
disaster surveys and reflective papers can be expected to identify 
shortcomings.  However, there is a significant category of positive analyses.  
These may broadly be put into groups of resilience and education.  Recent 
resilience papers cover events of great diversity: destruction of the World 
Trade Center (Kendra & Wachtendorf, 2003), recovery and sustainability in 
Kobe (Shaw & Goda, 2004), community first aid response after the 
Northridge earthquake (Kano et al., 2005), social and ecological resilience 
(Adger et al., 2005), and emotional and psychological response and 
resilience following the Katherine floods of 1998 (Skertchly & Skertchly, 
2000). Handmer and Hillman (2004) also illustrate the importance of 
economic recovery in enhancing resilience following a range of Australian 
disasters. 
 
Resilience is the key to learning from disasters.  Studies that find flaws and 
organisational failings that have contributed to a disaster, stress 
vulnerability.  At the community level when levels of impact and loss are 
identified it is clear which groups or locations in the community were the 
most vulnerable in a specific crisis.  The outcome should then be a reduction 
of the vulnerability of those people and places.  However, the things that 
make people vulnerable are often structural social issues.  Poverty, ethnic 
isolation, infrastructural disadvantage, low levels of education, and such 
factors as complex as cultural practices and beliefs are areas of community 
vulnerability that are outside the control of the emergency manager. 
 
While identifying factors of vulnerability to a disaster helps in understanding 
the process, these may not necessarily be the route by which vulnerability is 
reduced.  By building on the resilience of society and strengthening positive 
factors, vulnerable communities may become more empowered to minimise 
the impact of future hazard events. Such empowerment mainly involves 
organisational and social change at the community level.  Awareness and 
preparedness empower people to deal with their own situation and location.  
The two most direct influences on awareness and preparedness are direct 
experience and education.  Education often begins with media accounts and 
images of disasters in other places – the news.  News accounts initiate 
awareness, but awareness in itself can run into the arid wastes of fear, unless 
it is backed up by preparedness behaviour that is based on the strengths, 
capacity and resilience of communities.  The media goes part of the way in 
taking some responsibility for preparedness by informing people of actions 
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they can take, but shortcomings of media coverage are their needs for drama 
and for stories that are piecemeal and often not at all reflective of the real 
situation of a disaster.  The media also lacks an interest in hazards when 
there is no immediate threat, unless this can be personalised by events like 
scientist and politician confrontations. 
 
The greatest advantage of media coverage it is that it is potentially free 
education. Every other education and awareness campaign costs emergency 
management organisations money.  However, a major inexpensive and 
highly effective route to awareness and preparedness action is through 
education in schools (Finnis et al., 2004; Izadkhah & Hosseini, 2005). The 
effective cost of hazard education in school is a transfer of attention away 
from other subjects, but generally hazard modules are well integrated into 
social and environmental studies education.  Apart from well taught hazards 
education being exciting and interesting to children, it is effective in laying 
down knowledge and action that may be absorbed by the child for life and 
which are also communicated to family, relatives and friends in the broader 
community through homework, projects and explanation. 
 
Beyond the school, public awareness involves complex and costly strategies. 
O’Neil (2004) illustrates a range of individual social attitudes to hazards that 
may form the basis for specific targets and approaches of warnings and 
awareness campaigns.  O’Neil’s summary table below highlights different 
attitudes within the community. 
 
Table 3.2 Hazard awareness targets 
 
Concerned with the same 
hazard as the agency 
Target this group with hazard specific 
information & messages & focus on how 
they will manage their response to the risk 
(i.e. what to do in a cyclone) 
 
 
 
Risk averse 
Concerned with different 
hazards to the agency 
Target this group with non-hazard specific 
safety initiatives (What to do in an 
emergency) 
Agency partnerships 
Risk tolerant Ambivalent about the 
hazard or the effect upon 
them 
Target this group with general information 
about the hazard.  Highlight the risk from 
the hazard and how it will affect their 
family. 
Risk deniers Denies that the hazard will 
occur or that it will affect 
them. 
Target this group with messages that build 
the credibility and authority of the agency. 
Risk seekers Sees a disaster as an 
opportunity to become 
involved in rescue efforts or 
to pursue their interests 
During event, warn of dangers & penalties 
for interfering with work of emergency 
agencies. After the event, target with 
specific messages relating to safety for 
individuals and families. 
Source: O’Neil, 2004 
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Research into disaster impact on communities shows clearly that direct 
experience of a disaster is a particularly powerful awareness education event 
(Paton et al., 2001; Comstock & Mallonee, 2005; Anderson-Berry & King, 
2005).  It is common sense to expect hazard impacted communities to have 
developed greater awareness and to have responded by adopting appropriate 
preparations.  Research shows that this happens as predicted, but not to 
such a high level as might be expected.  The average community response is 
greater, but direct experience of a disaster does not transform all people into 
active community emergency managers.  Rather, it results in a significant 
improvement in awareness and preparedness that may reduce, but not 
eliminate vulnerability to future hazards.  Perhaps acceptance of people’s 
limitations and an ability to respond appropriately to a crisis are resilience 
characteristics that communities rely upon. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Understanding, constructing and moving on to improved preparation are 
processes in learning from disasters that are influenced by a kind of distance 
decay effect. Distance decay is a gravity model (based on Newton's law of 
gravity) in which the influence of another place upon any given place is 
contingent upon the size of the other place and its distance away.  This 
influence may be measured in such processes as migration or trade and flow 
of goods.  Disasters outside our local community influence us in the same 
way.  The further away the event is, the bigger it has to be to attract our 
attention.  In distance decay models (used in human geography and 
economics) there are controlling elements in the formula, such as a factor of 
distance and a global constant.  Qualifying factors are consequently things 
like the type of disaster, and the information technology.  The community 
that experiences regular flooding or cyclones, pays greater attention to 
similar events elsewhere because of the commonality of experience, and 
would be much less interested in earthquakes or volcanoes.  Yet, as shown 
above, the experiences of different disaster types can be transferred in terms 
of knowledge and experience.  The Indian Ocean Tsunami demonstrated 
impacts that could be transferred to storm surge, as well as the general 
vulnerability of the coastal zone, tourists, critical infrastructure and 
buildings.  The other qualifying factor, information technology, means that 
well-connected places are more visible.  Researchers learn far more of 
hurricanes in the southern United States than of cyclones in much closer 
areas such as India and the Philippines because of the more ubiquitous 
technology and media of the developed world. 
 
With these qualifying factors modifying the level of knowledge of other 
disasters, the basic rule is that the further an event is from our location the 
less is learnt about it or less attention paid, unless it is bigger, more 
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spectacular, deadly or destructive.  Therefore the following disaster learning 
problems can be summarised in relation to households and communities: 
 
• There is the lack of transfer of knowledge and awareness between 
different types of hazards; 
• Information technology gives emphasis to places, and events, that are 
better connected; 
• Distant events that are learnt about are the biggest, and in a sense, the 
easiest to ignore because they are extreme; 
• Most information is received on the most local events that, most of the 
time, are not extreme disasters - thus communities remain unprepared 
for a truly catastrophic event. 
 
Consequently most communities receive hazard knowledge that reinforces 
complacency.  Most disaster declarations experienced by most communities 
have not involved absolute devastation.  Other local events are similar and 
communities being essentially resilient, they muddle through, prepare 
moderately well for survivable events and are further reinforced in their 
lower-level awareness.  This is quite acceptable for the regular and 
predictable hazards that cause sufficient damage and disruption to warrant a 
disaster declaration, but do not result in devastation or significant loss of life.  
Unfortunately the distance decay effect reinforces the community view that 
terrible things happen a long way away, that our hazards are part of the way 
of life and the pattern of the seasons, and locals cope reasonably well.  Thus 
until the terrible disaster happens locally, most people learn only selected 
lessons from other disasters.  Communities are completely unprepared for 
the catastrophic disaster even when, as in New Orleans in 2005, they knew 
how vulnerable they really were. 
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4 
 
Transport and evacuation planning 
 
Douglas Goudie 
 
At the conceptual level, disasters can be divided into those with a warning of 
more than a few hours, and those with a warning of less than a few minutes.  
This chapter considers disasters with sufficient warning periods to be able to 
evacuate vulnerable people away from the expected high impact areas.  The 
chapter also develops lessons and recommendations based on actual 
preparation for a major cyclone storm surge in Cairns, resulting in planning 
recommendations and conclusions based on ecologically sustainable 
development (ESD) principles and practicability.  All the case studies 
explored on evacuations are related to community safety and capacity 
building: involve the community and provide effective information and early 
warning to the community at risk. 
 
In all disaster risk reduction work, the core goal is to minimise loss of life 
and injury.  Reducing loss of expensive or highly sentimental items is also of 
some importance.  Planning and community involvement can prepare people 
to minimise loss through precautionary evacuations.  Case studies from 
north Queensland form the basis of recommendations developed here.  
 
A cyclone storm surge and evacuation network modelling project conducted 
over three years for Cairns in far north Queensland forms one end of the 
spectrum of study – in the worst case, about 54,000 people in Cairns would 
need to be evacuated to shelter higher and safer than their own homes, 
ahead of an extreme cyclone storm surge.  However, land-based flooding 
would block most of the exit roads from the low coastal suburbs. 
 
This chapter considers a range of threats with some warning time, and issues 
and strategies to maximise the mobilisation of people out of the most severe 
danger zones. 
 
Threat types 
 
There are both ‘sudden threats’ – land slide, earthquake, tsunami; and 
‘signalled threats’ – cyclone, major winds, fire, flood. Threats, with or 
without warnings, form the basis for the evacuation matrix in Table 4.1 
below.   
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Table 4.1 Evacuation matrix of safety responses 
 
     Sudden Threats: Virtually no warning 
 Land slide Earthquake Tsunami 
Safety response Stay in strong 
structure 
Stay in strong 
structure 
Flee to higher 
ground at 
outflow of sea 
 
 
     Signalled Threats: Usually some warning  
 Cyclone/major 
wind 
Fire Flood 
Vulnerability of 
present 
environment 
If likely in surge, 
must evacuate; if 
weak shelter, 
must evacuate 
House material, 
surrounds, water 
available.  If poor, 
leave early. 
May be 
inundated, 
may be cut off 
Vulnerability of 
individuals 
High = earliest Weak and young leave 
early 
Judgements of 
flood height 
Distance to secure 
shelter 
The further, the 
earlier 
The further, the earlier The further, 
the earlier 
Present safety of 
route/vulnerability 
en route 
Know in 
preparation 
Know in preparation Know in 
preparation 
Means of travel Reliability and 
suitability 
Reliability and 
suitability 
Reliability and 
suitability 
Community 
cohesion 
Help available Help available Help available 
 
The key issues for disaster planners are the extent of expert warning there 
may be, and the extent of public warning for a given threat.  Also, it is critical 
to know who is vulnerable, where the safest shelter is and how vulnerable 
people get to shelter.  Disaster managers attempt to balance the politics of 
calm or panic as it relates to public safety: how much should the public 
know? 
 
With virtually no warning hazards such as landslides, earthquakes and 
tsunamis, the Prevention and Preparedness components of the Integrated 
Emergency Management System model of Prevention, Preparedness, 
Response and Recovery is to have strong structures in landslide or 
earthquake areas.  In tsunami scenarios, the ideal situation is to have a 
public education program which advises that if the sea is observed to be 
withdrawing that this is an immediate signal to escape to high ground in all 
haste.  This discussion considers threats with warnings, making 
precautionary evacuation possible.  
 
Case studies explored include Cloncurry, Magnetic Island and Cairns.   
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Floods 
 
The following discussion considers some lessons learned from major floods 
in north Queensland.  Flooding and storm surge due to cyclones are signalled 
threats. 
 
In Cloncurry in March 1997, floodwaters two metres higher than any flood in 
the hundred years prior were experienced. People did not believe it possible, 
so tended to under prepare (King & Goudie, 1998). By interviewing flood-
affected people in Cloncurry, it was learned that there was disbelief, support 
from neighbours, a need for a better warning system, and a need for more 
public awareness and involvement.  People would generally move themselves 
or their possessions ahead of potential flood damage earlier, if faced with a 
similar threat (see Figure 4.1 below).  
 
Occupation category
Other
Professional
Homemaker
Pensioner
Outdoor
Transport
What would you do differently next time
Other response
Evacuate early
Raise possessions
Watch more closely
Nothing
No response
Nu
m
be
r o
f R
es
po
nd
en
ts
14
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
 
 
Figure 4.1 Lessons learned by Cloncurry flood victims 
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Figure 4.2 Cloncurry resident showing height of flood waters through a 
ruined storage shed. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 Force of the Townsville flood, 1998 
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All the rock in Figure 4.3 was transported by high-energy water flow in the 
January 1998 flood, described as a 1 in 200 year flood.  The implied force of 
the water shows why driving into floodwaters may lead to major safety 
problems. The experience of fieldwork on Townsville’s Magnetic Island 
showed that well-intended thoughts of travel during heavy rain may not be 
possible because of flooded roads. Considering land-based flooding ahead of 
a cyclone and storm surge may be the single most important factor in 
survival for people in low-lying costal areas which are prone to cyclones. 
 
Cairns, cyclone surge and the road network 
 
The goal of the three-year study reported below was to define the role and 
implications for the road network’s weak points ahead of a cyclone storm 
surge in Cairns, and produce recommendations. 
 
The cyclone storm surge research approach was to establish the following: 
 
• The nature of the hazard;  
• Public vulnerability and awareness;  
• Likely maximum surge height;  
• Implications of land-based flooding;  
• Who is vulnerable, and where and when they should go; 
• Preferred movement of people;  
• How the preferred movement could be implemented. 
 
The most obvious weakness is the many flood points in the Cairns road 
network (indicated by the numbers of stars in Figure 4.4 below).  The 
following sections of this discussion consider the road network flooding in 
some detail, then strategies to help achieve an early and precautionary 
evacuation.  These strategies, as detailed below, include local inundation 
maps, definition of a maximum total flood contour, billet brokers, flood 
spotters and mobile sirens. 
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Figure 4.4 Main flood points in the Cairns road network 
 
The proximity of the spring tide to the height above sea level of much of the 
Cairns central business district shows how vulnerable much of the Cairns 
central area is to even a small storm surge (figure 4.5 below). 
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Figure 4.5 Cairns building near foreshore during spring tide 
 
Summary outcomes 
 
• The road network will impose severe restrictions on last minute 
evacuations.  
• Flood waters may cut evacuation routes days before a cyclone strikes. 
• An evacuation spread over many hours to safe local shelter will 
minimise traffic congestion as the threat heightens. 
• Accumulation of vehicles on the ‘threatened’ side of floodwaters 
normally garaged in the vulnerable northern beaches will make further 
arrivals transferring to ‘high-clearance’ vehicles increasingly chaotic.  
Hence the need for early departures and marshalling points on highest 
ground within the vulnerable communities. 
• The evacuation procedures developed are likely to form the basis of 
response in Cairns for many years to come. Consideration of the likely 
increase in frequency and severity of cyclones caused by the enhanced 
greenhouse effect should be included (Minnery & Smith, 1994).  
Further, sustainable urban development should include explicit cyclone 
preparation and response strategies in all areas of ongoing urban 
growth. 
• Prior to a surge, about 6,000 vehicles and 25,000 people (ABS, 2002) 
will be located on the main Cairns floodplain.  About 2,000 households 
in that area do not own cars.  
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Figure 4.6 Detail of land-based flooding in the Cairns northern beach roads. 
 
In Figure 4.6 the stars indicate the local flood points, the dark lines would be 
the 5m temporary coast and the light lines the 2m temporary coast.  This 
figure indicates that early evacuation would be needed in most of the 
northern beach suburbs.  
 
For the Cairns central area, Figure 4.7 below there are five components: local 
land-based flood areas; ‘dry’ exit routes; and three coast line levels at one 
metre, two metres and five metres.  The stars show the local flood areas in 
central Cairns. This flooding may occur days before the cyclone and storm 
surge. The dark continuous lines show the ‘dry’ exit routes around the 
flooded areas (traffic lights are adjusted to help exit flow).  After flooding and 
evacuation, the heavy dotted lines show the ‘temporary coast line’ at one 
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metre, two metres and five metres surge above Highest Astronomical Tide 
(HAT - king tide).  
 
 
Figure 4.7 Detail of temporary coast lines and ‘dry’ inner Cairns exit routes. 
 
The temporary coast lines and the following information are all based on a 
digital elevation model (DEM), with a general accuracy of about 250mm for 
elevations for every building in Cairns.  The methods developed through the 
Tropical Cyclone Coastal Impact Program (TCCIP) process have relied 
heavily on the DEM.  This elevation data has allowed for the mapping of 
ground contours at ½ metre intervals.  Transport planning will be successful 
if no-one is trapped and drowned.  Transport planning is fully dependant on 
an informed public undertaking early and voluntary response. 
 
Evacuation layers 
 
Generation and study of hundreds of such maps above implies that 
evacuation should be conducted at the one metre, two metre and five metre 
extreme surge height (see Figure 4.7), erring on the side of early and 
precautionary evacuation. 
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Examination of Figure 4.7 shows vulnerable buildings on: the coastal edge 
and low points (to one metre); the broad coastal plain of inner Cairns and 
lowest parts of all the northern beach suburbs, including Trinity Park (to two 
metres) and progressively more of the beach suburbs; and a relatively 
narrow upper edge at the beginning of the mountainous base of the Cairns 
flood plain. Thus there are three basic evacuation layers. 
 
The Figure 4.8 below provides an example of pockets and areas of one 
community vulnerable to surge at heights of one metre, two metres and five 
metres above HAT. These layers were selected because of the shelf-like low 
coastal topography in the Cairns area. 
 
The only viable evacuation strategy to best minimise loss prior to or during a 
significant cyclone storm surge in Cairns is early, precautionary ‘self 
evacuation’ to relatively safe domestic shelter on higher ground, mainly 
within Cairns.  Precautionary evacuation is recommended because cyclones 
have erratic paths (Lourensz, 1977), and their effects are not fully predictable 
(JCUNQ, 1972).  
 
Increased political and community involvement are necessary parts of 
successful evacuation.  Roads to the south and west are likely to be blocked 
by land-based floodwaters.  The primary objective is for vulnerable people to 
move from low-lying, threatened areas to the homes of friends, relatives or 
networked contacts living on higher ground. Destination shelters would 
ideally be strong, and away from large trees and major debris sources, with 
socially similar households. The whole community should be involved in 
storm surge preparation.  Early public involvement will help clarify 
community needs and encourage cooperative behaviour.  This will minimise 
direct and formal demands on the disaster response when the next major 
cyclone threatens Cairns. 
 
The following issues are critical for successful pre-surge road use: 
 
• Knowing the flood areas in the road network;  
• Commitment to precautionary evacuation;  
• Well known evacuation zones;  
• Political support and community preparation;  
• Fully pre-arranged private billets.  
 
Loss of life and loss of portable valuables will be minimised by developing 
the following features: 
 
• Strong political support for public education;  
• Sponsorship and public involvement;  
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• Local inundation maps in retail outlets;  
• Local ‘billet brokers’;  
• Local ‘spotters’ placed at known flood points to report as waters rise, 
their information may trigger evacuations if a large cyclone is in the 
vicinity;  
• Local siren warnings;  
• Local maximum urban flood contour;  
• Self-organisation in the tourism industry for their staff and guests. 
 
The aim is to encourage early self-evacuation to pre-arranged private shelter 
on higher ground. Along with work being done by the Cairns Disaster 
Management Group, this may be best achieved by the following:  
 
• placing maps like Figure 4.8 in every convenience store in the 
vulnerable areas of Cairns; these maps would be specific to the usual 
‘catchment’ of each store;  
• placing maps in shopping mall displays in the Cairns area, which could 
be organised through sponsors and the displays could be posted from 
October to March inclusive. 
 
A legend could be developed so that each dot, in Figure 4.8 below, represents 
a business or house, for example, red dots could mean people must evacuate 
up to 0.75m above floor level; yellow might mean water over property; and 
white could mean relatively surge free. 
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Figure 4.8 Kewarra Beach at a 1, 2 and 5m (above HAT) surge  
 
‘Billet broker’ details 
 
For the many residents of low-lying areas of Cairns who do not have their 
own informal networks to arrange overnight billeting, there is a clear need to 
have ‘billet brokers’ (Goudie, 1996).  Interested and active members of 
various community groups in Cairns could fulfil this role.  Such activities 
would need seed funding to cover phone, newsletter printing and mailing 
costs, plus, perhaps, a little support for the parent groups involved.  In this 
way, people in the vulnerable, low-lying areas would be facilitated to form a 
contact with a welcoming household on higher ground, well before land-
based flooding or gale-force winds prevent safe passage from lower to higher 
ground.  A major cyclone threat would trigger an early, ad hoc response, 
engendering an attitude of a ‘practice’, an ‘overnight picnic’, rather than a 
‘false alarm’. These ideas are at the conceptual stage only.  
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Mobile or fixed sirens 
 
Research in Cloncurry and on Magnetic Island found that not enough people 
listen to the radio and the television information is just not localised or 
specific enough.  Development and implementation of an effective siren-
based public warning system is recommended to avoid people being ignorant 
of danger which could cost lives.  It could be argued that luck played a 
significant part in saving four people from drowning on Magnetic Island 
during the 1998 floods.  The use of a mobile siren system could be piloted in 
a small population area like Magnetic Island, and developed for all areas of 
Queensland which are flood or fire prone.  
 
For sirens to be effective there would need to be widespread information as 
to what they meant, and what should be the individual responses.  Radio and 
local talks, along with local letter drops would help prepare residents and 
managers for the practice runs.  It is suggested that the siren signals (see 
below) are sounded at 11 am on the first Sunday of October and November 
(before the wet season), to familiarise people with the sound, and the 
preferred response.  Further, mobile sirens already exist in the community 
on police and emergency vehicles, thus the infrastructure costs are near zero. 
 
The sirens could have the following three levels of alarm, and one all clear 
signal:  
 
• Danger looming, stand by, or respond in a precautionary way (perhaps 
three short blasts, repeated periodically);  
• Respond to danger (equivalent to an order to evacuate, perhaps one 
short and two long blasts); 
• Danger imminent, prepare for impact (perhaps three long blasts);  
• An all clear signal may be useful as well (perhaps long, well-spaced 
blasts). 
 
Selected evacuation details 
 
To maximise community safety in the ways outlined, it is recommended that 
seed funding be provided to establish community storm surge groups and 
billet brokers.  To maximise tourist safety, logically the tourism industry 
should take full responsibility (under the direction of Emergency Services 
authorities) for the safe relocation of their own staff and guests (Drabek, 
1994).  The industry has many buses, ‘adequate’ shelters, and an accurate 
record of visitors in the area at any given time. 
There is a clear need to establish staggered evacuation procedures for all 
vulnerable people requiring an ambulance. It is suggested that various health 
authorities provide a mapped database (e.g. MapInfo or Latitude) of people 
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in their care who may need special attention (updated each October).  If they 
live in the low lying-areas of the beach suburbs, they will need to be moved 
before exit routes are compromised. 
 
More vulnerable people: the elderly; the infirm; the disabled; tourists; and 
those without cars or rides with friends or neighbours in the lowest areas, 
should be the first to be moved.  This should occur in sequence: when a 
‘recommendation to evacuate’ is given, evacuees without use of private 
transport should board evacuation buses at specified marshalling points 
within vulnerable communities.  It is important to note that people may 
leave earlier if a strong police anti-looting presence is provided.  Local 
government, guided by federal consistency, should consider the development 
of appropriate signs to identify routes and destinations.  Finally, vertical 
evacuation utilising sound high-rise commercial buildings, could be 
designated as ‘shelters of last resort’ for people trapped in the inner city area 
(Smith, 1995). 
 
Other general recommendations 
 
• There is a need for effective communications for SES personnel.  For 
example, many had difficulty contacting each other on Magnetic Island 
in 1998.  
• More detailed public education should be provided about the dynamics 
of flooding specific to each catchment, and the link roads between 
catchments. 
• In line with current government policy, fully involve the community in 
‘urban segments’ to ensure ‘safe’ upslope shelter.  For example, the golf 
club rooms in Picnic Bay, or the Sports Club rooms in Horseshoe Bay 
on Magnetic Island.  What extra items are needed?  Who will help the 
infirm?  
• In Cairns, debris and weak points in the road network immediately 
after any cyclone flooding would be identified and checked by 
Queensland Transport/Main Roads Department/Road Transport 
Construction Services and Cairns City Council, aiming to allow the 
maximum number of people to return to their properties as soon as 
possible.  Initially, the Main Roads Department would work on 
problems north of the Barron River and Cairns City Council to the 
south. 
• Community service television announcements and footage of Cairns 
road flood-points may help encourage early self-evacuation of 
vulnerable people to ‘safe’ shelters. 
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• Modelling of a cyclone category 5 storm surge of five metres, with 
funnelling, wave reach and flooding should be used to define a ‘local 
contour of safety’ - the local maximum flood height, which could be 
prominently indicated where it crosses major roads.  People can be 
encouraged to negotiate their own billets with friends, relatives, work-
mates or other contacts above that line, but within their own sector of 
the city (e.g. discouraging people in low-lying areas in the south waiting 
until danger is imminent before travelling to friends on high ground in 
the far north of the city). 
• Use the roads early when the decision to evacuate has been made. 
 
• Education, community involvement, billet brokers, mobile sirens and 
ad hoc precautionary evacuation are likely to minimise the social 
impacts of major cyclone storm surges in vulnerable coastal centres. 
 
• Research methods which combine computer modelling, interviews, a 
planning team, literature search and guided by sustainability principles 
and community involvement may be used widely in preliminary 
planning. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Research from other locations in north Queensland illustrate the potential 
problem to be faced by people in the region and unless lives are to be placed 
at risk, effective strategies for self-evacuation of households must be 
developed in cities such as Cairns which is clearly vulnerable to storm surge 
flooding. 
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5 
 
Tourism, disasters and 
vulnerability 
 
Scott K. Cunliffe 
 
“Like a ticking time-bomb, the tourism industry represents an  
enormous catastrophic potential” (Drabek, 1994, p. 25). 
 
The main objectives of this chapter are: to describe some of the natural and 
anthropogenic hazards which have an impact of the tourism industry in 
tropical coastal areas; and to highlight the importance of vulnerability 
reduction to assist communities to cope with all potential hazards to their 
livelihoods. The discussion takes a global view of hazards and vulnerability 
while pointing out specific aspects of vulnerability and the exposure of 
tourism destinations in the Asia-Pacific region. The chapter takes a general 
view of hazards and vulnerability issues related to tourism. 
 
Early on the morning of 17 January 1995 an earthquake centred on Awaji 
Island, 20 kilometres off the coast of Japan, devastated the city of Kobe and 
other parts of the densely populated Hanshin region. The quake lasted just 
fourteen seconds, and there were no warnings. The earthquake was Japan’s 
worst since 1923, claiming more than 6,400 lives and leaving more than 
300,000 people homeless. The damage to homes, buildings, and 
infrastructure in the area was a colossal US$150 billion. In the longer term 
tourist visitor numbers were substantially reduced, negatively impacting on 
the tourism sector (Kippo News, 1996).  The government was criticized for 
its slow response in the aftermath of the earthquake and later acknowledged 
serious flaws in the country’s emergency management system. 
 
This event illustrates the following pertinent points: 
 
• Despite the recognized vulnerability and exposure of many parts of 
Japan to massive seismic activity, this, one of the most technologically 
advanced and economically wealthy countries of the world, was poorly 
equipped to respond to this catastrophe; 
• Insured versus total economic losses illustrated an underinsured 
private market; 
• The structural instability of vast areas of ground floor residential 
accommodation only became evident after the earthquake had killed 
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many older residents who favoured ground level access because of 
their limited physical motor skills, building codes have since 
undergone significant revision to remedy this failure; 
• The preparedness of emergency assistance teams and the coordination 
of response mechanisms (emergency relief, medical facilities, food, 
water shelter etc.) were critical to the saving of lives in the immediate 
aftermath. 
 
The example of the Kobe disaster is used here to illustrate a likely and 
plausible outcome (conceptually, not literally) of the impact of a major 
natural hazard in any number of large tropical coastal tourism areas 
throughout the world. The potential for a major crisis due to a single natural 
hazard, compounded by anthropogenic inefficiencies, thus causing 
significant loss of life and property, has a high probability. In the case of 
Kobe, the long-term response of the Japanese authorities has been to 
strengthen all aspects of disaster planning and risk management in Japan, 
not just in vulnerable seismic zones. In addition, community representatives 
now actively participate in the policy and planning processes. 
 
Unfortunately, human societies have a tendency to act curatively to 
catastrophic events rather than employing a preventive approach, using 
disaster as the primary incentive to policy change, rather than proactively 
planning for future uncertainties. This chapter therefore argues for the 
substantive strengthening of proactive disaster planning and risk 
management for tourism in tropical coastal areas. 
 
Disasters for the general observer are usually referenced by location, hazard 
agent, and time, with the focus on the hazard agent in the case of natural 
disasters. The perception communicated, and therefore the dominant 
paradigm, is that disasters are caused by hazards. This has been a traditional 
geographers’ perspective (Salter, 1995). Heathcote (1979) in a description of 
natural disasters in Australia, focuses on the extreme event, avoiding any 
mention of vulnerability, and describing risk in terms of the quantification of 
probability and consequence; “… [disasters are] extreme geophysical events 
greatly exceeding normal human expectations in terms of their magnitude or 
frequency, and causing significant material damage to man (sic) and his 
works with possible loss of life” (Heathcote, 1979, p. 3). 
 
There is a vast range of potential hazards that can have significant negative 
impacts on communities, tourists, and businesses in coastal tropical areas 
including those listed in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Hazards to tourism in tropical coastal areas 
 
Atmospheric Earth Biological Human 
Tropical cyclones Landslides Human epidemics Industrial accidents 
Tornadoes Earthquakes Plant epidemics Transport accidents 
Storm surges Tsunamis Animal epidemics Crime 
Floods Volcanoes Plagues Political conflicts 
Frosts Erosion Bush fires Structure failures 
Droughts Ground failure  Structure fire 
Severe storms   Contamination 
Source: After Granger (2000, p. 25). 
 
Although the tourism industry represents a disaster vulnerability of 
catastrophic potential, the situation need not worsen. The industry needs to 
respond proactively to a rapidly expanding vulnerability, and failure to do so 
will keep an expanding tourist population at risk (Drabek, 1994). The costs of 
settling liability costs, together with “the marketing costs of offsetting 
customer ill will” (Drabek, 1994, p. 88) after a disaster or crisis, are massive 
compared to the minimal costs of investment in disaster planning and 
tourism risk management. Recent global crises that have had a massive 
impact on the tourism industry in virtually all parts of the world have 
provided impetus for the state of disaster planning and risk management for 
the tourism industry to improve greatly in the recent past. Clearly, the ‘do 
nothing’ scenario is not an option. 
 
Books, articles, media coverage, international meetings, specialist 
committees and other formal and informal groups representing many 
aspects of the tourism industry planning and management fraternity, have 
come to the fore in recent years to support the development of better, more 
efficient ways of coping with disaster and uncertainty in the future. The 
World Tourism Organization (WTO), the World Travel and Tourism Council 
(WTTC) and others at an international level, have led the way in recognizing 
the need to plan for catastrophe in the tourism industry, now, more than 
ever before in the history of tourism (WTO, 2001). 
 
Natural and Anthropogenic Disasters 
 
In our current world of uncertainty, it is all but certain that more disasters 
will be faced in the future in terms of frequency and impact (Quarantelli, 
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1999), due primarily to two worldwide social trends: industrialization and 
urbanization. Quarantelli argues that if the right policies and measures are 
put in place, “the future will not be the past revisited nor will it be only the 
present repeated” (Quarantelli, 1999, p. 9). There exists a very real sense of 
urgency to ensure much is learnt from recent disasters, and that the threat 
and impacts of repeat events of an escalating scale will be minimised or even 
avoided. The tourism industry has responded to this need, including the 
publication of a variety of disaster and risk management publications (WTO, 
2001; Glaesser, 2003; and Wilks & Moore, 2003). 
 
An important point to understanding why disasters and crises occur is that 
“it is not only natural events that cause them” (Blaikie et al., 1994, p. 9), but 
rather, they are also the product of the social, political, and economic 
environment because of the way in which disasters affect social structures, 
the people, communities, and their livelihoods that are destroyed or 
damaged. As Blaikie points out, there is often too much emphasis placed on 
doing something about the natural hazards themselves, “and not nearly 
enough on the social environment and its processes” (Blaikie et al., 1994 p. 
9). Similarly, Mileti (1999) points out that in the United States, short-sighted 
and narrow conceptions of the human relationship to the natural 
environment account for the nation’s failure to reduce the way in which 
natural disasters result in major catastrophic events. 
 
Natural disasters are also often thought to be one of the major instruments 
of catastrophic events. While this is true to some extent, statistically, in the 
nine decades 1900 to 1990 (using the death toll as an indicator), the ratio of 
deaths from natural disasters reported was less than 22% of the total. Civil 
strife accounted for 48.6% and famine a further 39.1% (Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance, 1990). The economic (and insured) costs of natural 
disasters are continuing to escalate alarmingly. Natural disasters, of which 
the major proportion was weather-related catastrophes, cost the world over 
$60 billion in 2003, up from around $55 billion in 2002 (United Nations 
Environment Program, 2003). 
 
Tourists are generally unfamiliar with many and often all of the places they 
visit, particularly with respect to potential hazards, and even more 
particularly with respect to natural hazards (Kuehlbrandt, 2000). The 
predilection of tourists for potentially hazardous sites, directly on the 
waterfront, or precipice with the best views or other scenically spectacular 
locations, resort hotels on the beachfront etc., places tourists amongst the 
most vulnerable of the entire community, alongside the old and infirm. 
Neither the tourism businesses nor the host community wish to frighten 
away visitors, with unnecessary warnings of pending catastrophe. There 
exists a need and responsibility, shared by local authorities and the goods 
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and services providers themselves, to adequately appraise visitors “of both 
potential dangers [of natural disasters] and appropriate life-saving actions” 
(Murphy & Bayley, 1989, p. 38). Safety drills on air and sea transportation 
services are commonplace, but the dangers of the impacts of extreme 
weather are not commonly delivered in an organized manner to tourists in 
tropical coastal areas. 
 
This paradox of not wishing to promote a potential danger for fear of a 
negative response from visitors (lowering arrivals numbers for instance) 
while at the same time not wishing to be irresponsible in terms of safety and 
preparedness, is all too common to tourism service providers in tropical 
coastal areas. Issuing disaster preparedness and response information to 
clients does not always have negative connotations. A survey of backpackers 
undertaken in Cairns, Australia (Kuelhlbrandt, 2000) indicated a high level 
of interest in these young tourists actually having the opportunity to 
physically experience the onset of a cyclone, despite an extremely low level of 
understanding of possible consequences, response actions, evacuation and 
procedures.  
 
Disasters, or at least potential disasters, can have an ‘attraction’ value, but 
this is rarely part of marketing campaigns apart from certain extreme 
adventure travel experiences designed for a small but important niche 
market. Murphy and Bayley (1989) go even further, suggesting that natural 
disasters can be positive free advertising.  
 
Media exposure and consequent public awareness would usually have 
cost the tourist industry vast sums under normal circumstances, but if 
it can capitalize on this free, sensational exposure it can increase a flow 
of visitors and revenue, that, in turn, can facilitate recovery and lead to 
a better landscape in the aftermath of a disaster (Murphy & Bayley, 
1989, p. 46).  
 
This would surely only occur in the most exceptional of circumstances. 
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Figure 5.1 ‘Great’ natural disasters 1950-1999 
Source: Munich Re, NatCat Service (2000). 
 
Tourism is affected by the largest natural disasters (great natural 
catastrophes or ‘NatCats’ as the insurance industry refers to them) even 
when the impacts are indirect, or the catastrophe occurs in apparently 
distant geographic locations. Natural catastrophes are classed as great if the 
ability of the region to help itself is distinctly overtaxed, making interregional 
or international assistance necessary, or when thousands of people are killed, 
hundreds of thousands are made homeless, or when a country suffers 
substantial economic losses. Figures 5.1 and 5.2 present the losses caused by 
great natural catastrophes since 1950. There are between 500 and 700 loss 
events registered every year around the world (Guha-Sapir, Hargitt & 
Hoyois, 2004). The tables below show only ‘great’ natural catastrophes, 
selected based on monetary and human loss. In 2000, there were ten such 
events. The vast majority of these massive natural catastrophes had direct 
and indirect impacts on tourism flows. 
 
The trend line on the Figure 5.2 below shows clearly the alarming trend 
towards rapidly escalating economic losses from these major events.  Insured 
losses are increasing at a much lower rate, reflecting the ability of primary 
and re-insurers to accept greater risk and greater potential losses.  It can be 
estimated that this general trend is equally applicable to the tourism 
industry; rapidly increasing economic losses from natural disasters with a 
much lower level of increase in insured losses. 
 
There were around 11,000 fatalities from natural catastrophes in 2002. The 
earthquake in Afghanistan claimed some 2000 lives, halting the meagre 
domestic and international tourist flows in that country for much of the year. 
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In 2002, a relatively ‘good’ year for the insurance industry, insured losses 
were US$13.5 billion, of which US$11.4 billion were from natural 
catastrophes (Swiss Re, 2003). Around 39% of global insured losses in 2002 
were in Europe, even though more than half of the total number of 
catastrophic events occurred in Asia, which also suffered 48.4% of total 
fatalities for 2002 (Swiss Re, 2003). 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Economic and insured losses for ‘great’ natural catastrophes 
Source: Munich Re, NatCat Service, 2000. 
 
In September 2001, terrorism took on a new dimension the world over with 
the aircraft being flown into the World Trade Center buildings. Insurers have 
responded by minimizing terrorism exposure (reducing policy conditions, 
increasing premiums and exclusions), changing the scope of coverage for 
terrorism-related losses. The USA, Germany and France have introduced 
new forms of terrorism coverage in which the state carries a substantial 
share of the loss. 
 
In 2002, the insurance industry registered 13,000 fatalities from man-made 
disasters, including more than 800 fatalities from terrorist attacks. Unlike 
2001 insurers did not have to contend with the scale of major losses from 
terrorism experienced in that year. The direct targeting of tourists in Bali, 
Indonesia, (claiming 190 lives) and Djerba, Tunisia in 2002 (19 lives) had 
devastating effects on their respective local and national economies, and 
indeed on global tourism figures in the immediate aftermath. The arson 
attack on a train in India in 2002 (59 lives) caused tourism to slow in the 
short-term only for India and the region.  
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Possibly the greatest threat to a stable tourism industry in tropical coastal 
area in the long-term is the effect of climate change. This phenomenon 
coupled with the current demographic patterns of change around the world, 
will have an impact of a dimension that is currently unknown, but is 
predicted to be significant. 
 
Vulnerability Reduction 
 
The long-term future of the viability of tourism in tropical coastal areas is 
dependent upon the active development of vulnerability reduction and 
mitigation measures. These are broadly accepted as the highest impact and 
most cost-effective mechanisms to reduce losses from catastrophes, the 
ensuing reconstruction debt, and other adverse consequences (Evans, 1996). 
Beachfront tourist resorts are especially prevalent examples of the need for 
effective vulnerability reduction, as are population centres sited at coastal 
and seismic-risk locations. 
 
The Asian Development Bank (2002) in its poverty reduction initiatives has 
recognised the vulnerability of communities to a variety of uncertainties that 
have a significant impact on the livelihoods of those communities. Figure 5.3 
below illustrates the assets of a community and the vulnerabilities at risk. 
 
 
Figure 5.3 Community assets and vulnerability  
Source: Adapted from Asian Development Bank 2002 
 
Although the fundamental value of vulnerability reduction to catastrophe-
prone coastal tropical areas is not in dispute, the adoption of an effective 
policy is hampered by complex behavioural, political, and institutional 
Natural and
man-made
hazards
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factors. The following basic principles could initiate the process of 
establishing a vulnerability reduction approach for tourism facilities in 
coastal tropical areas at a national and regional level: 
 
• A National Strategy: Vulnerability reduction should become a 
committed national strategy covering not only the tourism sector, but 
also all sectors of the economy (a long-term and non-partisan 
strategy).  
• Leadership and Partnership: With the tourism ministry as the lead 
agency (headed by a cabinet-level chairman), the strategy should be 
institutionalised through the creation of a council of the nation's 
leaders from all sectors. This office, with technical and financial 
support from international development funding agencies, could act as 
a clearing house serving all sectors, providing best practice 
information, and monitoring and publishing plans, performance 
criteria, and results of its activities.  
• Education and Training: School curricula at all levels should include 
specific content covering vulnerability reduction and tourism 
development. Institutions of higher education should be encouraged to 
establish departments focusing on the advancement of vulnerability-
reduction technology and its effectiveness, in conjunction with natural 
and anthropogenic hazard mitigation. Tourism schools have a 
particular responsibility in this regard, but the current situation is not 
positive. For example, in a recognized authoritative university-level 
text titled “Tourism Analysis: A Handbook” (Smith, 1995), there is no 
mention of risk analysis, risk management, disasters, or catastrophic 
events in the index, and only passing mention of these topics within 
the text itself.  
 
Any effective strategy to manage disaster risk at tourism destinations must 
begin with an identification of the hazards and what is vulnerable to them. 
This involves information on the nature and extent of risk that characterizes 
a particular location, including information on the nature of particular 
physical hazards obtained through hazard assessments, as well as 
information and data on the degree of exposure of businesses, the 
population, and its infrastructure and built environment to those hazards. In 
this way, informed decisions can be made on where to invest and how to 
design sustainable tourism developments that will withstand the impacts of 
potential disaster events. 
 
Regulatory controls, when developed and implemented with community 
(stakeholder) approval can protect tourism infrastructure developments and 
reduce vulnerabilities to natural hazards. Local approval must be stressed. 
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Top-down regulations are less likely to succeed than those developed with 
and for stakeholders (Inskeep, 1998).  
 
Simple regulatory measures seen as capable of encouraging vulnerability 
reduction can be divided into the following categories: 
 
• Non-Structural: 
○ Identification of hazard-prone areas and limits on their use; 
○ Land-use allocation and control, including building-line 
distances; 
○ Use of incentives; 
• Structural: 
○ Use of building codes and materials specifications; 
○ Retrofitting existing structures; 
○ Use of protective devices. 
 
Communities and the families who comprise those communities are 
especially vulnerable for reasons indicated in the ADB diagram in Figure 5.3 
above. 
 
By vulnerability we mean the characteristics of a person or group in 
terms of their capacity to anticipate, cope with, resist and recover from 
the impact of a natural hazard. It involves a combination of factors 
that determine the degree to which someone’s life and livelihood are 
put at risk by a discrete and identifiable event in nature or in society 
(Blaikie et al., 1994, p. 48). 
 
Blaikie’s definition is important as it describes vulnerability in terms of 
people’s capacity to avoid, cope with and recover from hazard impact. It 
illustrates two trends in explaining vulnerability that are reflected in the 
disaster literature. 
 
Firstly, the shift in focus away from the hazard event being the primary 
cause of loss (with people characterised as victims, passive onlookers 
that are subordinate to the hazard), towards a focus on the human 
community and people’s living conditions, social and economic 
resources, livelihood patterns and social power. Secondly, it includes a 
consideration of resilience, which is a more positive (empowering) 
concept (Berry, 2002, p. 45). 
 
Recognition of the significance of clearly understanding the vulnerability of a 
business or community is critical to a thorough and comprehensive risk 
management process.  Table 5.2 below is a list of the potential costs that can 
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assist with further defining where the vulnerabilities lie and their potential 
consequences. 
 
Table 5.2 Community costs of catastrophic events 
 
Categories of costs to communities of catastrophic events 
(the list includes direct, indirect, tangible and intangible cost categories) 
Loss of life Physical suffering Emotional suffering 
Damage to property Reduced productivity Degraded environment 
Loss of species and habitat Damaged infrastructure Weakened economy 
Loss of employment Associated loss to businesses Increased cost of insurance 
Reduced quality of life Destruction of livelihood Damaged social structures 
Source: Adapted from Department of Emergency Services 2001, p. 4 
 
The World Bank recognizes the potential dangers of ever-swelling urban 
populations that create conditions for more and worse environmental and 
social disasters. Of the estimated 511 mega-cities (with population over 1 
million) in 2010, most will be within 100 kilometres of the coast, and for the 
first time, the majority (51.8%) of the world’s population will be urban 
(Jones, 1992). The implications for tourism are widespread, particularly 
given the primacy or dominance of these large urban conurbations as both 
cultural centres and transportation hubs for travellers. 
 
Vulnerabilities are therefore increasing. There are more built-up areas for 
natural and man-made disasters to have a negative impact, particularly those 
tourism areas developed along the coast. Concentrations of population and 
infrastructure are increasingly vulnerable to the relatively sudden natural 
and man-made disaster agents such as tropical storms, hurricanes, 
earthquakes, forest fires, floods and landslides, explosions, transportation 
accidents, volcanic eruptions, structural failures, avalanches etc. The more 
slow-moving and insidious disaster agents of famine, drought, toxic 
poisonings, air and water pollution, epidemics etc., and other crises such as 
war, terrorism, riots, sabotage, political unrest, and other hostilities 
(Quarantelli, 1993) also apply to tourism destinations. Vulnerability 
reduction is therefore at the very heart of the risk management processes for 
tourism in coastal tropical areas. 
 
Hazard mitigation measures are working tools that can be used to minimise 
losses through lowering levels of vulnerability, increasing levels of 
preparedness, response, and recovery mechanisms, and insurance. Some 
general steps that can be taken are described below. Insurance, however, is 
not often understood as a mitigation tool, but rather something that is part 
of disaster preparedness, the value of which comes into effect in the recovery 
stage. It is also a potentially valuable tool to encourage vulnerable businesses 
and communities ‘to adopt cost effective measures voluntarily” (Kunreuther, 
1996, p. 184). Premium reductions, lower deductibles, and higher limits of 
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coverage are a few examples where the primary insurers could offer 
incentives to policyholders. This is an area where surprisingly, given the 
wealth of information and resources available to insurers and reinsurers, 
much more could be done by making incentives available to assist businesses 
and communities help themselves to minimise vulnerability to catastrophic 
loss. 
 
Steps that can be taken to reduce and weaken the negative effects of the 
tourism disasters of the future include the following: 
 
• Recognizing disasters as events which affect society with negative 
social impacts that can be minimized with social policy; 
• Moving towards an all-hazards approach away from the distinction 
between natural and man-made disasters; 
• Ensuring that disaster mitigation is given at least equal priority in 
planning and application as emergency preparedness, response and 
recovery; 
• Integrating disaster planning and risk management strategies to the 
development planning processes of the social systems involved; 
• Addressing both disaster issues and environmental issues concurrently 
where there are similarities by clarifying their similarities and 
differences.  
 
For real property (tourism infrastructure, plant and equipment), specific 
hazard mitigation measures that can be undertaken include the following: 
 
• Hazard mitigation measures and mechanisms such as developing and 
enforcing building-code regulations; 
• Disaster planning through cautious land-use management and the 
establishment of legal restrictions for building on exposed locations; 
• Hazard mapping of vulnerable areas to determine the intensity of risks 
from all natural hazards (hurricanes, other winds, flooding, 
earthquakes, etc.), and to use hazard maps to assist in proper land use 
management; 
• For insurers or other hazard experts to conduct (underwriting) 
assessments of asset and property values, resistance to wind or other 
hazards, and likelihood of damage (as reflected in probable maximum 
loss estimates by insurers), based on probability data on the 
occurrence of such natural disaster events;  
• Given the importance of disaster data, additional compilation of event 
frequencies and estimated probabilities, as well as covariance and 
correlation studies among regions and between events, to feed into the 
valuations of property risk. 
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The above suggested areas for reducing vulnerability and exposure is not 
comprehensive, but this view from the insurers provides a useful starting 
point for recognising that understanding vulnerability and exposure to risk is 
critical to future business and community sustainability and good business 
practice. 
 
Natural Disasters in Developing Countries 
 
A World Bank report describes natural disasters in the following manner: 
 
natural disasters are a tragic interruption to the development process. 
Lives are lost; social networks are disrupted; and capital investments 
are destroyed. When development plans are laid and disaster strikes, 
development funds are diverted to the emergency. Additional aid is 
directed to relief and reconstruction needs to get the country ‘back on 
track’ toward economic and social development (Kreimer & Arnold, 
2000, p. 12). 
 
In recent years, development agencies including the German bilateral aid 
organization, Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) 
GmbH and the World Bank have recognized the important links between 
disasters and development.  This was inevitable given the disproportionately 
high costs that developing countries pay for disasters and their impacts. In 
addition, natural disasters in developing countries can and often do have 
more disastrous impacts than in developed countries.  Freeman (1999) 
estimates that because of the enormous disparity in the GDP, the per capita 
cost of natural disasters in relation to GDP in the developing world is 20 
times higher than in developed countries. The Centre for Research on the 
Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) in Brussels has this figure at a more 
conservative six times higher than developed countries (Guha-Sapir et al., 
2004).  Either way, the disparity is significant (see Figure 5.4 below).  Figure 
5.4 indicates the significance or value of tourism receipts to the overall GDP 
of countries in the APEC region, which is in some cases, the main industry 
contributor to GDP. 
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Figure 5.4 The contribution of the Travel and Tourism (T&T) sector to GDP 
in APEC countries  Source: WTO, 2002 
 
In GTZ’s Technical Cooperation projects, disaster risk management 
comprises: action (programs, projects and/or measures); and instruments, 
whose intended impacts are expressly aimed at reducing disaster risk in 
endangered regions and mitigating the extent of disasters. Disaster risk 
management is the generic term for the operational areas of risk assessment, 
disaster prevention and mitigation and disaster preparedness (GTZ, 2003).  
 
Despite the awareness raised by the United Nations’ International Decade of 
Natural Disaster Reduction (IDNDR), disaster risks have continued to 
accumulate in most developing countries. The vast majority of national and 
international efforts by bilateral and multi-lateral development agencies 
remain fundamentally focused on preparedness and response, seen as the 
most urgent needs. Isolated successful experiences at ‘piloting’ risk 
management approaches have however begun to build a substantial body of 
knowledge, particularly in the Asian region (Kishore, 2003). On a more 
positive note, Evans (1996) suggests that “the use of mitigation as a primary 
strategy in facing the consequences of natural disasters is slowly, but 
increasingly, gaining acceptance in public and private sectors around the 
world” (p. 5). 
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Not all views of the decade of work of the IDNDR were as positive, evidenced 
in a critical editorial in the New Scientist (1989): 
 
All the aims of the IDNDR will cost money, and, in particular, money 
for things that appear to have no immediate benefit … for 10 or 20 
years, let alone a century. Add to this the fact that many of the 
measures that would cut (sic) death toll from disasters will disrupt 
people’s lives, and you have a very good excuse for doing nothing 
(Anonymous, 1989, p. 2). 
 
This says nothing of the short-term political horizons of most governments 
in developing countries and their subsequent capacity and willingness to 
create and pay for long-term strategies to deal with natural catastrophes. 
 
In the Caribbean with its intense coastal tourism developments, the 
development agencies’ responses to assist the region to manage natural 
hazard risks fall into the following basic categories: 
 
• Hazard mitigation and vulnerability reduction measures adopted prior 
to a hazard event to optimise protection from damage; and  
• Economic mechanisms aimed at pre-financing the repair of the 
damage caused by disasters (the mechanism of insurance is in this 
category). 
 
The former can be considered ultimately more efficient than the latter, which 
does not prevent or minimise the impact of the damage. This distinction is at 
the heart of cost-effective natural hazard risk management in developing 
countries. 
 
An important finding of the UN-IDNDR, was that global data sets are 
missing substantial numbers of disasters at the national level due to 
deficiencies in international reporting.  
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Figure 5.5 Disaster losses in Asian LDCs  Source: CRED/OFDA database, 2004 
 
National datasets capture a greater proportion of the total losses but most 
developing countries do not maintain consistent and comparable records.  
There are immeasurable variations in methods and standards making 
comparison difficult, if not impossible.  Economic losses are inadequately 
captured and recorded. For instance in Jamaica, of disaster events with more 
than 10 persons killed and/or 100 persons affected, around 11% of these are 
not captured at all by international reporting, and for disaster events with 
less than 10 persons killed and/or less than 100 persons affected, around 
84% of these events are not captured at all by international reporting 
(UNEP, 2003). The figures are similar for Chile, Columbia and many other 
developing countries. 
 
In the developed world, the insurance companies and national emergency 
management agencies fill that gap more thoroughly. The insured loss 
potentials ensure that insurers have a good grasp of the necessary data for 
modelling and underwriting. Developing countries are well behind in the 
sharing of risk through insurance. 
 
In 1998, catastrophes claimed the loss of around 50,000 lives, and estimates 
of economic damage are in the range of US$90 billion, the second highest 
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financial loss in history (Munich Re, 1998). The rising worldwide costs of 
catastrophes and disasters can be explained mainly by increasing 
concentrations of populations and capital, and fragile infrastructure in 
hazard-prone areas (Linnerooth-Bayer, 1999), particularly in developing 
countries. Obviously, the hazard-prone coastal tropical areas with 
concentrations of both tourists and infrastructure development are 
increasingly vulnerable for the same reasons.  
 
The impacts of natural disasters in coastal tropical areas of developing 
countries are often devastating, given the reliance on tourism in the overall 
GDP of many less developed countries (LDCs), particularly the small island 
states of the Asia-Pacific region. As Figure 5.5 indicates, disaster losses as a 
percentage of GDP are significantly higher in developing countries, but not 
as high as Freeman (1999) suggests.  
 
Disaster losses include not only the spectacle of direct impacts reported in 
the news, such as the loss of life, housing, livelihood, and infrastructure, but 
also indirect impacts such as the foregone production in utility services, 
transport, labour supplies, suppliers, or markets. Secondary losses include 
impacts on such macroeconomic variables as economic growth, balance of 
payments, public spending, and inflation. The process of recovery from 
disaster in developing countries is more difficult because of by poverty at the 
community level, and the lack of emergency resources and strategies at 
government level.  Climate related disasters in the Asian region over the last 
100 years account for around 68% of all disaster events, many of which 
occurred in coastal areas having significant impact on tourism business and 
disruption. Total economic losses, and those individuals and families 
affected by natural disasters were climate-related in the vast majority of 
cases as Figure 5.5 above indicates. 
 
Asia remains the region with the most catastrophes. For example, in 1996, 
Asia suffered about half the catastrophes registered around the world, with 
about 70% of the fatalities. The low insurance density in Asia meant the 
region had only a 6.3% share of the global sum insured (Swiss Re, 1998). The 
situation is however improving as disaster response and preparedness 
improves (stockpiling of relief goods, warehouses, contingency planning), 
and with the increased applications of engineering solutions (dams, 
embankments, early warning systems etc.). Vulnerability however remains 
as a central theme to address necessary improvements to integrated, 
comprehensive risk management. 
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Figure 5.6 Disaster losses, total and as share of GDP, 1985-1999 
Source: Munich Re, 1999; Abramovitz, 2001 
 
The strongest demand for insurance worldwide comes from medium-sized 
businesses and homeowners. Since most developing countries do not have 
either a substantial middle class (with large numbers of homeowners) or 
many medium-sized businesses, there is a small natural clientele for 
insurance, and thus a lack of demand for catastrophe insurance. Although 
the situation of underinsurance, particularly in Asia, is likely to change 
considerably in the coming decade, effective risk reduction cannot be carried 
by insurance alone, and should involve mitigation measures in hazard prone 
developing countries.  
 
Such measures include land use planning, structural design and construction 
practices, and disaster warning systems. In addition to employing scientific 
and technical knowledge, risk reduction may also involve overcoming the 
socio-economic, institutional and political barriers to the adoption of 
effective risk reduction strategies and measures in developing countries. 
Tools have to be developed to assist the very poor to be able to more 
effectively manage risk of disaster. This includes micro finance mechanisms 
that can respond to a variety risks and disaster hazards, and that builds 
social capital and encourages risk mitigation for the very poor. In addition to 
that, measures may include safety nets and calamity funds, and other 
informal risk sharing mechanisms. The World Bank and the Asian 
Development Bank in particular, have in the last five years developed a 
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strong focus on poverty alleviation in all aspects of their technical assistance 
and lending programs to developing countries. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Risk management for the tourism industry is an on-going process that is 
critical to every aspect of business including the viability and sustainability 
of the support community, the reputation of the destination and its local and 
national tourism leadership, and to the safety and security of the tourists 
themselves. Risk is a part of virtually every aspect of the tourism industry 
from accounting practices, to client satisfaction, and from health and safety 
needs to terrorism and fraud. It cannot be avoided, and to fail to recognise 
the value and significance of tourism risk management is perhaps the 
greatest risk of all. 
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6 
 
Tourism crisis: Management and 
recovery in tourist-reliant 
destinations 
 
Yetta Gurtner 
 
Tourism and travel for leisure are by no means new pursuits. With 
technological innovations and increased discretionary income over the past 
sixty years, such activities have rapidly generated a global industry. 
Renowned for stimulating social and economic growth tourism has also 
become a motivational force for development in many diverse locations.  As 
a destination or specific host-community becomes more reliant on the 
opportunities and revenues generated from the tourism sector, it 
exponentially increases its vulnerability to a potential tourism crisis. Given 
that the successful tourism enterprise is based on both physical and 
intangible qualities, the associated hazards are innumerable.  Recent events 
such as the violent terrorist attacks in Bali highlight the relevance of crisis 
management strategies in facilitating the process of both community and 
destination recovery. 
 
Tourism and Development 
 
With growing access, services, opportunity and demand, tourism has rapidly 
become a prosperous and dynamic global industry.  The World Tourism 
Organisation (WTO, 2002) defines tourism in the following manner: 
 
…comprises the activities of persons travelling to and staying in places 
outside their usual environment for not more than one consecutive 
year for leisure, business and other purposes not related to the 
exercise of an activity remunerated from within the place visited (p. 1).  
 
Although such a definition establishes the capacity of a tourist, it fails to 
elaborate on the business or occupation of tourism, including, the 
economics, the infrastructure and even the role of associated stakeholders. 
As an industry, tourism encompasses much more than the activities of the 
visitor. 
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McIntosh and Goeldner (1986) describe tourism as an interactive process, it 
is “the sum of the phenomena and relationships arising from the interaction 
of tourists, business suppliers, host governments, and host communities in 
the process of attracting and hosting these tourists and other visitors” (p. 4). 
Tangible elements include transport, accommodation, food, environment 
and entertainment facilities, while the more intangible elements may involve 
culture, hospitality, ambience and relaxation.  With increasing foreign 
exchange earnings and revenues over the past few decades, tourism has 
become the world’s largest growth industry, comprising over 10.6% of global 
GDP and generating the equivalent of one in every twelve jobs (World Travel 
and Tourism Council, WTTC, 2005). 
 
Given such lucrative fiscal and employment potential, tourism has been 
widely promoted as a catalyst for economic and social development.  As a 
labour intensive industry, a successful tourism endeavour can create 
significant income and job opportunities in both the formal and informal 
sectors.  Associated investments often stimulate new and improved 
infrastructure, including transport networks, utilities, sanitation and medical 
facilities.  While many facilities are intended to advance tourism prospects, 
such services may also improve the general standard of living for proximate 
residents.  Governments can also profit because of related trade 
opportunities, foreign receipts and tax revenues generated through travel 
and tourism.  As a source of such opportunities, the promotion and 
development of tourism has proved attractive to many destinations – 
whether at the country, state, region, city or town level (Bierman, 2003). 
 
Tourism-reliant destinations 
 
While the nature of tourism in any locality depends on both dynamics and 
scale, much of the industry appears to have been developed with limited 
consideration to long-term sustainability (UNEP, 2002). In many 
destinations, particularly within developing nations, rapid and uncontrolled 
growth of the tourism sector has already resulted in significant social, 
cultural and environmental consequences. Although tourism enterprise may 
generate tangible financial prosperity for many stakeholders, growing 
dependence on such trade can actually increase the risks of experiencing 
future adversity. 
 
Lured by the apparent economic prospects and incentives, individuals, 
businesses, service providers and even the governments within host 
communities often realign activities to conduct and openly support tourism. 
More traditional pursuits such as agriculture and manufacturing may be 
abandoned in favour of tourism-related employment, and consequently the 
economy becomes increasingly less diversified.  Pertinent resources, both 
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natural and cultural, are often appropriated as a consequence of tourist 
demands, with limited public consultation or future recourse.  The more a 
destination becomes contingent on the demands and fortunes of the tourism 
industry without consideration to sustainable development, the greater the 
level of socio-economic vulnerability (Glaesser, 2003). 
 
The vulnerability of tourism 
 
Historically, tourism development has proved to be a sensitive, erratic and 
precarious undertaking. It is in its capacity to offer so many options and 
easily accommodate changes in consumer desires, that the fragility of the 
tourist market and the vulnerability of dependant destinations are revealed. 
As a voluntary activity, travellers have the discretion to simply cancel plans, 
postpone trips or opt for alternative destinations.  The motivations behind 
variations in market demand can be diverse as economics, trends or even a 
shift in demographics.  However, the research conducted by numerous 
academics and industry professionals (Cavlek, 2002; Pizam & Mansfield, 
1996) have clearly established that sudden and radical adjustments to travel 
plans are regularly instigated by a change in destination image and public 
perceptions of safety and risk.  
 
In their book Tourism, Crime and International Security, editors Pizam and 
Mansfield (1996, p. 1) reassert the popular premise that “safety, tranquillity 
and peace are a necessary prerequisite for prosperous tourism”. While there 
are many elements that may influence destination choice, consumer 
decisions are strongly based on an assessment of the level of personal risk 
(Bar-On, 1996).  The perceived risks may entail the chance of disruption of 
planned activities, crime, property loss and/or damage, exposure to danger, 
injury or even death. A variety of external factors including media coverage, 
travel advisories, business, economics, peer pressure and insurance policies; 
may also help persuade or prejudice the subjective process of risk 
assessment and evaluation. The more a destination is publicly associated 
with an adverse threat or hazard, whether real or perceived, the greater the 
likelihood of consumers making alternative arrangements.   
 
Tourism and hazards 
 
There have been numerous typologies regarding the sources of risks for 
tourism businesses and destinations (WTO, 2003; PATA, 2003; Shaluf, 
Ahmadun & Said, 2003; Faulkner, 2001), however, much of the popular 
literature employs the generic classifications of natural, human induced and 
technological hazards.  A natural hazard may be climatological (e.g. flood, 
drought, extreme cold, hurricane, cyclone, wildfire) or geophysical (e.g. 
earthquake, volcanic eruption, landslide, avalanche, tsunami).  Human-
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induced events are as varied and diverse as transport accidents, crime, 
political instability, terrorism, war, industrial action and epidemic diseases.  
Although not as widely covered in tourism studies, technological hazards 
may entail mechanical/systems failure, industrial and even nuclear 
accidents. If it had been substantiated the Y2K (millennium bug) had the 
potential to disrupt computer travel and booking procedures, transport and 
navigational equipment and even the supply of amenities on an almost 
global scale.  
 
While the threat of any such hazard agent may generate public 
apprehension, a hazard does not necessarily result in a definitive “event” or 
incident. With adequate warnings, preparation and contingency plans it may 
be possible to avert or eliminate a prospective hazard, or to effectively 
minimise the level of actual damage sustained.  Irrespective of the level of 
awareness or planning however, experience consistently demonstrates that 
not all hazards may be accurately forecast or avoided (Faulkner, 2001). 
 
Given the complex social, economic and environmental context in which a 
host community fosters tourism development, the impacts and consequence 
to a hazard-afflicted tourist destination can be highly unpredictable and 
highly differential.  An environment of physical exposure, poverty, high 
urbanisation, poor social dynamics and unsafe conditions (vulnerability) 
typically enhance both the degree and severity of adverse impacts 
(WHO/EHA, 2002). 
 
Tourists themselves are often more susceptible to direct danger due to 
reduced alertness, limited local hazard knowledge and less familiarity with 
the resources that can be relied upon to ensure their personal safety 
(Faulkner, 2001). In an emergency situation, immediate response and relief 
efforts are generally determined by the extent of local coping capacity and 
resources.  
 
Direct hazard impacts may include injuries, fatalities, evacuation, extensive 
damage (physical, environmental and social) and substantial economic costs 
(Shaluf, Ahmadun & Said, 2003).  The scope may be localised to a single 
business, destination, or affect an entire geographic region. Beyond the more 
apparent physical effects, many hazard agents also generate indirect and 
‘ripple effect’ consequences which can lead to longer-term issues. Associated 
reconstruction costs and travel market instability has the potential to 
generate significant social and economic repercussions for any tourist-reliant 
operatives. Depending on the variables measured, evaluative criteria, and 
conceptual definitions applied, such hazard events have been variably 
referred to as accidents, emergencies, disasters and/or crises (Shaluf, 
Ahmadun & Said, 2003).   
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Tourism crisis 
 
Rather than employing a definitive scale or quantitative approach, the WTO 
(2003) defines crisis (as it pertains to tourism) as “any unexpected event that 
affects traveller confidence in a destination and interferes with the ability to 
continue operating normally” (p. 1).  Sonmez, Apostolopoulos and Tarlow 
(1999) utilise the more comprehensive term of ‘tourism crisis’ to describe 
circumstances: 
 
which can threaten the normal operation and conduct of tourism-
related businesses; damage a tourist destination’s overall 
reputation for safety, attractiveness, and comfort by negatively 
affecting visitor’s perceptions of that destination; and, in turn, 
cause a downturn in the local travel and tourism economy and 
interrupt the continuity of business operations for the local travel 
and tourism industry, by the reduction in tourist arrivals and 
expenditures…  
(pp. 13-14). 
 
Given such definitions, it becomes evident that unlike an accident, 
emergency or disaster, a tourism crisis is not necessarily precipitated by the 
threat of a real and imminent danger, or the direct physical impact of a 
hazard agent.  While natural and human-induced incidents seem to be the 
most abundant instances, tourism crisis may be triggered by external and 
less tangible factors that adversely affect destination image, such as 
proximate regional instability, rumour and bad publicity. As it remains 
feasibly and logistically impossible to insulate against every such 
contingency, no tourism destination can ever be completely immune from 
crisis (Bierman, 2003). 
 
While the repercussions of the tragic terrorist attacks of September 2001 and 
outbreak of SARS (Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome) confirm that the 
entire tourism industry is sensitive to the turbulence and instability of crisis, 
some destinations and host communities remain more disposed to 
experience adversity. Although it is impossible to eliminate every risk, it is 
apparent that to minimise susceptibility to such crises, such destination 
stakeholders need to implement greater initiatives towards vulnerability 
reduction, consistent with effective crisis management. 
 
Developing tourism crisis management strategies  
 
The relative frequency and high profile of such recent international events 
has resulted in increasing industry and academic attention towards the 
promotion of tangible tourism-based crisis management strategies.  Based 
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on an amalgam of disaster and business management principles such 
initiatives are intended to minimise any negative destination impacts and 
help retain the confidence of both travellers and the travel industry (WTO, 
2003; Bierman, 2003; PATA, 2003). As with an integrated disaster 
management approach, a tourism crisis management framework is generally 
premised on the continuum of risk reduction and response (refer to Figure 
6.1).  While the terminology often varies, the proactive phases before the 
‘crisis trigger’ include assessment, prevention/reduction, mitigation and 
readiness/preparedness. Post-event stages include response/relief, 
rehabilitation, and recovery/reconstruction.  
Ideally, the experiences and lessons learnt from any preceding crisis would 
be used in mitigating future contingencies.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 The crisis management continuum   
Source: Adapted from WHO/EHA, 2002 
 
Founded on extensive industry experience PATA’s (2003) generic planning 
guide Crisis: It won’t happen to us! reveals that in the case of tourism, the 
nature of the event/issue, visibility, the number, age and prominence of 
people involved, and the level of associated media attention commonly 
influences the extent and duration of subsequent crises. Given the 
importance of maintaining a low risk perception and positive image, similar 
popular destination crisis management plans also highlight facets of 
communications, safety and security, market research and promotion (WTO, 
2003).  While formal crisis management initiatives are often resourced and 
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planned at the business, government or organisational level, a holistic 
approach suggests that the development of a comprehensive strategy for the 
tourism sector be co-ordinated between all relevant stakeholders (Sonmez, et 
al., 1999; Cavlek, 2002).  
 
Cavlek (2002) and Sonmez et al. (1999) counsel that at a minimum, a 
destination management task force should include government officials, 
relevant travel, tourism and hospitality professionals (domestic and foreign), 
and community leaders.  They further elaborate that an effective and 
operational plan requires dedication to destination improvement/recovery, 
the ability to exercise appropriate authority, and access to adequate 
resources and financial assistance. While disaster researcher Quarantelli 
(1998) proposes that this process of active cooperation and preparation is 
inherently more valuable than the production of a written plan, some 
tourism proponents recommend the creation of a tourism specific crisis 
management guidebook detailing relevant contacts, responsibilities, agreed 
terminology, useful sample/templates and communications strategies 
(Sonmez, et al. 1999).  Irrespective of the preferred methodology, most 
researchers agree that crisis management endeavours are best instigated 
before the advent of a significant hazard.  
 
Crisis risk reduction and mitigation 
 
Based on the experience of countless complacent and ill-prepared 
destinations that have faced a substantial tourism crisis, the majority of 
tourism scholars and industry authorities now promote a proactive approach 
to crisis management, beginning with risk assessment (WTO, 2003; WTTC, 
2003; Gee & Gain, 1986; Sonmez et al., 1999; Glaesser, 2003).  Employing 
various methodologies and means of data analysis, mapping and monitoring, 
such an assessment generally involves an evaluation of risk relative to hazard 
probability and destination vulnerability.  With the existing context as a 
foundation, such calculations should also deliberate on any potential 
physical (environment), social and economic impacts, including anticipated 
losses. 
 
In distinguishing and prioritising all conceivable hazards that may have a 
negative effect on a destination, the risk management process is intended to 
generate strategies and initiatives to minimise potential impacts. Proposed 
structural measures (WHO/EHA, 2002) may involve enforced compliance 
with minimum building standards, effective zoning and infrastructure 
redevelopment, such as transportation networks, airports and medical 
facilities.  Other policies may include partnering with law enforcement 
officials (Sonmez et al., 1999) (e.g. tourist police and foreign intelligence 
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sharing), coordination with media outlets and improved community 
awareness and education. 
 
Sonmez et al. (1999) again propose that the development and dissemination 
of a clear, comprehensive, crisis management plan/guidebook is one of the 
best visible indications of a destination’s preparedness. The essence of 
proactive risk reduction, mitigation and preparation is that all feasible 
contingencies, including appropriate training, warnings and evacuation 
plans need be regularly addressed and practised.  Less formalised procedures 
may include public education and enhancing local response capabilities, 
flexibility and confidence. Where written documents may exist it is advised 
that details are consistently monitored and reviewed for both relevance and 
accuracy.  Even though such crisis management planning may be developed 
within the context of the tourism sector, it is important that any measures 
and actions undertaken are consistent with broader scale 
emergency/disaster management operations. 
 
Crisis response  
 
Contrary to the recommendations made as early as the mid-1980s (Gee & 
Gain, 1986), the majority of popular tourist destinations still don’t appear to 
have adequate or effective crisis management planning (Faulkner, 2001; 
Beirman, 2003). Many places, particularly in the developing world, continue 
to lack the skills, resources and capacity to efficiently deal with the onset and 
impacts of any major hazard.  In such cases, the reality of a crisis often 
becomes the catalyst for developing inexperienced, reactive strategies.  
 
While emergency relief and response prioritises the protection of life and 
property in dangerous situations, activities undertaken by the tourism sector 
in the first 24 hours of a crisis are considered crucial (WTO, 2003; WTTC, 
2003).  Irrespective of the level of perceived damage or destruction, 
responsible management requires the maintenance of credibility. Most 
destination case studies support the assertion that honesty, transparency, 
professionalism and good communications with both public and media can 
facilitate faster recovery (WTO, 2003; PATA, 2003; Ritchie, 2004). To 
minimise uncertainty, it is recommended that authorities establish a 
respected spokesperson to immediately address any concerns regarding 
safety and security, and effectively relay both the facts and pertinent issues. 
Beyond any negative imagery and sensationalism by the popular media, 
competent public relations can help provide balance and direction. 
 
When triggered by a tangible hazard agent, the duration of the subsequent 
emergency period is determined by the context, type, scope, speed of onset, 
and direct impacts of the event (WHO/EHA, 2002).  If the situation is 
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beyond a community’s capacity to cope, the destination may require the 
urgent assistance of external agencies and organisations.  Standard response 
strategies include the establishment of an emergency operations centre with 
an adjunct media/public relations facility. Less critical rehabilitation 
strategies, which may include clearance of debris, utilities restoration, 
facilitating job returns and resumption of commerce, can take weeks or even 
months.  Disputed issues of insurance, liability, ownership and jurisdiction 
also often cause delays.  
 
Beyond the immediate concerns regarding physical infrastructure, direct 
losses or operational capabilities, to retain visitor numbers and expenditure 
a significantly damaged tourism sector is likely to require rapid and 
extensive recovery strategies (Cavlek, 2002).  Without tourism, many 
destination stakeholders will struggle to resume pre-crisis operational 
capacity and productivity. If an afflicted destination’s tourism sector is to 
remain viable it must restore consumer confidence. 
 
Recovery from crisis 
 
The length of any particular crisis and associated recovery period can vary 
substantially.  Impacts are multidimensional and can be difficult to quantify 
or assess including, medical and emotional recovery of victims, economic 
and social losses and physical/environmental damage (Cuny, 1983).  When a 
hazard has compromised public risk perceptions, effective recovery for the 
tourism sector and associated stakeholders requires extensive image 
rebuilding. 
 
The WTO (2003) suggests that at the most fundamental level, the 
management of information and related media should continue to address 
consumer concerns about safety and security.  Subsequent investigations, 
improvements to operational practices and systems, law enforcement and 
preventative measures should similarly be reported on in a timely and 
objective manner. Experience reveals that the diversion of major transport 
carriers, insurance restrictions, and the introduction of international travel 
advisories can be particularly damaging to a destination. 
 
Reliant on good public relations, an adversely affected tourism destination 
typically needs to embark on new, improved and often aggressive destination 
marketing and promotional campaigns (Bierman, 2003; Glaesser, 2003).  
 
Negative publicity such as media coverage conveying loss of life, human 
suffering, broad scale disruption and/or extensive damage should be 
amended to provide positive images and impressions. Confidence building 
measures such as celebrity visits, journalist familiarisations and staging 
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international events are often employed to influence the subjective opinions 
and attitudes of potential consumers.  Supplementary actions include the 
diversification of product base, targeting new market segments and 
improving the levels of both quality and competitiveness. (UNEP, 2002)  
 
While restoring faith in the destination is considered essential for the 
recovery of the tourism sector, it traditionally requires substantive co-
operation, direction and fiscal collaboration.  Without adequate support 
from government, private enterprise and relevant stakeholders, there is no 
guarantee that a damaged tourism sector will be fully rehabilitated.  Given 
the diversity and choices afforded by the industry, it is unrealistic to rely on 
customer loyalty or the natural assets of a destination to re-establish 
conditions following a significant crisis. While discounting and incentives 
may afford short-term gains, commitment and substantial investment are 
considered necessary to ensure that such strategies also produce medium to 
long-term benefits. Effective recovery strategies need to be focused on more 
comprehensive and sustainable outcomes. Consistent with the ISDR (2004) 
definition of disaster recovery the process implies “decisions and actions 
taken after a disaster with a view to restoring or improving the pre-living 
conditions of the stricken community, while encouraging and facilitating 
necessary adjustments to reduce disaster risk” (p. 7). 
 
In holistic crisis management terms, the recovery process can also provide 
opportunity.   The experiences and lessons learnt should be evaluated and 
utilised to develop improved strategies to mitigate future crisis. For 
destinations that are heavily reliant on tourism, such reforms imply 
significant economic, social and structural investment. Susceptibility may 
also be reduced through improvements to existing facilities, institutions and 
an increase in self sufficiency. 
 
Sustainable development and tourism 
 
While a crisis may highlight the underlying vulnerability of any destination 
strongly focused around the tourism industry, the restructuring necessitated 
by crisis recovery can provide the opportunity to adopt a more holistic and 
sustainable approach to tourism and development.  Sustainability implies an 
integrated, participatory process which fairly balances social, economic and 
environmental interests (WTO, 2004; UNEP, 2002).  
 
Traditionally, tourism development has been driven by governments, 
businesses, corporations and large scale organisations, with limited public 
input or consultation.  While communities may benefit from associated 
infrastructure, employment and income, such enterprises and investments 
are often focused on realising a financial agenda.   Sustainable tourism 
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development ideally accommodates and empowers all interested parties in 
both formal and informal tourism structures. Through an inclusive, 
consultative and coordinated approach to development, it proposes that it is 
possible to secure a more equitable distribution of benefits for all segments 
of the population.  
 
Such development and restructuring within the tourism sector may be 
guided by representative decision making forums including participants 
from the national tourism structures, the police, the public, the business 
community, vendors, tourist information agencies and any other pertinent 
stakeholders.  In achieving effective horizontal and vertical integration, 
resolutions regarding delegation, responsibilities and subsequent 
implementation need to be consensus-based and compatible with 
community goals.  Control, transparency and accountability are considered 
integral to an open process. In addition, construction and/or maintenance of 
an integrated tourism crisis management strategy would be essential. 
 
Many of the social and economic impacts following a crisis are indicative of 
the extent to which a destination has become reliant on tourism.  When 
committing significant recovery resources into destination marketing, 
promotion and restructuring it is necessary to consider the inherent 
vulnerability of the industry. Adversity resulting from any tourism crisis may 
actually be reduced by less direct dependence on tourism generated income 
and revenues.  Assistance and funding provided to help a destination recover 
may alternatively be used to accomplish other community aspirations and 
priorities, such as improved education and social conditions.  Recommended 
strategies include enhanced self-sufficiency, resilience and diversification of 
the economy (Bloom, 1996). 
 
Achieving the ideal of social, economic and environmental sustainability 
needs a committed and democratic approach to both development and 
governance.  Extensive understanding, awareness, training and education 
are required at all levels.  The successful operation of sustainable strategies 
and practices in both community development and the tourism sector should 
ultimately reduce a destination’s vulnerability to crisis. 
 
From theory to practice 
 
While neither tourism crises or destination vulnerability are new 
phenomena, Robert and Lajtha (2002) assert that crisis management, as a 
science, is still in its infancy largely due to the difficulties in measuring, 
standardising, and comparing one crisis situation with another.  Each hazard 
situation and destination is unique, and as such circumstances may never be 
effectively simulated or replicated.  In developing improved strategies to 
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facilitate destination crisis management, recovery and sustainability it is 
necessary to understand both the relevance and application within a real 
context.  Case studies of afflicted destinations may similarly provide many 
tangible lessons of utility to other vulnerable host communities. 
 
Bali – a case study of a tourism crisis in a tourist-reliant 
destination 
 
Bali, often referred to as ‘Paradise on Earth’, is a small island located in the 
tropical Indonesian archipelago.  Renowned for its vibrant indigenous 
culture, diverse natural attractions and capacity to cater for almost any class 
and budget of traveller, it rapidly grew into a popular and well patronised 
international tourist destination.  The impact and subsequent events 
triggered by the terrorist bombings of 12 October 2002, rapidly and 
effectively undermined this burgeoning tourism industry.  As the 
vulnerability and socio-economic significance of this sector became more 
apparent, the community of Bali has been faced with a long and difficult road 
to recover from tourism crisis. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2 Location of the terrorist attacks in Kuta, Bali, 12 October 2002 
Source: Bali SOS, 2002 
 
The context – tourism reliance and vulnerability 
 
While travellers’ interest in Bali is not a new phenomenon, the island only 
gained popularity as an international destination during the late 1960s 
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(Kalla, 2003; UNDP, 2003). To further encourage visitor growth, the 
Indonesian government actively pursued tourism-specific development 
plans that included the construction of an international airport.  However, 
through a subsequent lack of public consultation or regulatory control most 
urbanised areas in southern Bali rapidly expanded beyond government 
influence. Locations such as the former fishing village of Kuta/Legian, grew 
to be overcrowded and over-commercialised.  Many rural Balinese and other 
Indonesians enticed by the social and economic prospects of anticipated 
tourism earnings chose to abandon traditional pursuits and activities to 
migrate to such areas.  Through the supply of food, natural and cultural 
attractions, arts, and other commodities and services, most of Bali came to 
benefit from development of this industry.  An increasing reliance on these 
social and economic gains however, also established a significant level of 
dependence on commercial tourism. 
 
Whether as a legacy of its geographical location or predominant belief in 
karma and harmonious balance; Bali had always been perceived as safe, 
tranquil and immune from the problems and instability that have affected 
other regions (World Bank, 2003).  Residents (with the exception of some 
persistent touters and hawkers) are renowned for their calm friendly attitude 
and easy smiles.  Travel features display images of religious and cultural 
festivities, rice fields, sunsets and extensive accommodation and tourist 
facilities. 
 
While tropical climate conditions and a diverse terrain mean the island is 
susceptible to natural hazards (including landslides, drought and volcanic 
eruption) it had never been perceived as a high-risk destination.  The 
possibility of travel accidents, disease and transportation delays were 
generally accepted as common hazards of overseas travel. Similarly as the 
island’s residents, businesses and government authorities conducted their 
various daily activities little thought or investment had ever been given to the 
idea of significant crisis. 
  
Bali in crisis – the trigger and response 
 
At approximately 11:20pm the night of 12 October 2002 the peace and 
ambience of Bali were shattered by two explosions at crowded nightclubs on 
the popular tourist entertainment strip of Jalan Legian (Legian Street), Kuta.  
In the chaos and destruction that followed it became apparent that the 
emergency services of Bali were ill-prepared and ill-equipped to deal with 
such a disaster (Bali Recovery Group, 2003).  There was no operational 
emergency/crisis management plan - either generic or tourism related.  
Immediate response actions were focused on the basic instinct to protect life 
and property.  Even with the dedication and efforts of available emergency 
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response crews, hospital staff and volunteers, there were numerous fatalities 
(a final death toll of 202), mass casualties of varying severity, and extensive 
physical damage.  With victims from 22 countries and rampant speculation 
of terrorism, this incident quickly gained a high profile and global media 
status.  Images and stories of the carnage, the extensive devastation, 
inadequate medical facilities and raw emotion were rapidly and prominently 
presented on television, radio, in print and via the Internet. 
 
Overwhelmed Indonesian government authorities were quick to express 
sympathies and reassure visitors of personal safety, but were unable to 
successfully control or direct the ensuing media reports. Lacking a singular 
spokesperson or media centre any credibility was effectively undermined by 
instances of confusion and contradiction. Local community groups instituted 
street patrols while official safety measures and crime investigations were 
implemented by both the police and military. As financial aid, medical 
expertise and technical assistance was made available from around the 
world, the Bali Recovery Group (a coordination committee of existing local 
non-government organisations), was created with the aim to deliver the best 
services, collect data and minimise duplication of effort.  With most of the 
immediate medical needs soon assuaged, official strategies began to focus on 
the clean up and restoration of vital functions of the community. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 Aerial view of the damage caused by the explosions at Paddy’s 
Bar and the Sari Club 
Source: courtesy of Steve Palmer, November 2002 
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Rehabilitation: short-term initiatives 
 
While formal efforts were made to remove and analyse the structural debris 
it became quickly apparent that the explosions were planned by terrorists, 
intentionally and specifically targeting tourism in the area. International 
travel warnings/bans were immediately upgraded as most of the remaining 
tourists abandoned the island and surrounding region.  Already affected by 
the economic slowdown caused by the 1998 election riots and the 11 
September 2001 attack on the World Trade Center, Bali was effectively 
plunged into a tourism crisis (Kalla, 2003; Karyadi, 2003; World Bank, 
2003).  In a period that traditionally coincided with peak season, direct 
tourist arrivals dropped, occupancy rates decreased to single figures and 
associated earnings plummeted.  Residents struggling with the emotional, 
psychological and even physical effects of the bombing were now faced with 
the disruption of their livelihoods. 
 
In the days and weeks that followed all stakeholders were genuine and 
concerted in their efforts to minimise the socio-economic impacts.  
Government measures focused on a commitment to security and law 
enforcement, tourism promotion and the provision of a social safety net 
(World Bank, 2003). The Bali Recovery Group (2003) worked 
predominantly towards direct victim and family support – medical, financial 
and educational.  Most hotels and businesses laboured toward the 
resumption of services and the restoration of Bali’s tourist image, although 
efforts were rarely coordinated. Meanwhile, individuals and families within 
the community were forced to implement short-term coping mechanisms 
such as return migration to the villages, selling assets, reducing household 
expenditure and accessing savings. While there were growing concerns about 
reprisals against Muslims and related ethnic tension, few incidents were 
reported.  Special non-denominational religious ‘cleansing’ rituals were held 
to help restore balance to both the physical and spiritual world. 
 
As foreign visitor arrivals remained low in early 2003, successful marketing 
strategies led to an increase in domestic visitors and an expansion of the 
Asian market segment (UNDP, 2003).  Air Paradise, a locally owned airline, 
commenced flights to Australia in an effort to help revive visitor numbers. 
Locally and regionally, security became the top priority as a new policing 
policy focused on greater visibility and upgrades to existing measures at all 
ports of entry. Several international events and tourist operator/journalist 
familiarisations were also presented to increase the profile of Bali and 
assurances of safety and security. Despite such strategies, businesses and the 
community continued to suffer. As operational costs surpassed income, 
hotels, restaurants, shop fronts and transport providers faced closure and/or 
bankruptcies.  
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Residents experienced job cut-backs, unemployment/underemployment, 
income reduction and diminishing social standards. As reduced business and 
tourism revenues resulted in less expendable income for the communities of 
popular resort areas, residents were forced to change their usage and 
consumption habits. The effects and influence of such reduced spending 
gradually spread throughout the island’s economy and conditions in the 
poorer areas of Bali deteriorated; this is sometimes referred to as the ‘ripple 
effect’.  
 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Tourism crisis – a deserted hotel pool-side in Kuta, January 
2003 
 
Reconstruction to recovery 
 
As mandatory work permits and hotel accreditation standards were 
introduced to improve accountability, international travel concerns 
regarding the risk of contracting SARS and the war in Iraq seem to have 
minimised any initial improvements in direct visitor arrivals. While the 
national government introduced new anti-terrorism initiatives and secured 
the convictions of the Bali bombers, the August 2003 terrorist bombing of 
the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta quickly undermined any progress regarding 
perceptions of improved safety. Despite such events and the continued travel 
advisories, by the end of the year visitor numbers were increasing and 
gradual improvements occurred in tourism business prospects.  The one-
year anniversary of the attacks and associated memorial services successfully 
attracted much international media attention and publicity, yet for many it 
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only revived the issue of terrorism rather than promoted the merits of the 
island. 
 
January 2004 was a record month for foreign visitor arrivals to Bali, but 
closer investigation of the associated socio-economic statistics revealed a 
different story.  Benefiting from the discounts, sales and bonus incentives 
offered by tourism providers, visitors were actually staying for shorter 
periods of time and spending less money, minimising business profit 
margins. The Indonesian Government’s controversial introduction of a new 
visa fee in February 2004 was met with further disdain by both consumers 
and operators.  As few of the post-bombing donor agencies remained 
operational in Bali, many community members were forced to sell more 
personal possessions and property as a means of coping. A large number of 
the programs introduced to increase economic diversification and social 
support eventually collapsed due to lack of adequate investment, 
commitment and finances.   Numerous reports have suggested that through 
this experience of shared adversity many traditional and familial support 
networks were strengthened (Hitchcock & Darma Putra, 2005).  While 
tourist numbers suggested a return to pre-crisis levels, a further bombing 
outside the Australian Embassy in Jakarta in September 2004, again added 
uncertainty to a delicate market.   
 
While the devastating Indian Ocean tsunami on 26 December 2004 did not 
directly impact on the island of Bali, many tourist operators reported that 
subsequent cancellations were caused by a geographical association with the 
Indonesian province of Aceh.  As former recipients of aid, the empathetic 
community and non-government organisations of Bali reactivated many 
support networks to provide resources and assistance for the tsunami 
victims. With a return of economic stability for many residents, programs 
were also established to support more local community health centres and 
improved access to public education.  Whether as a consequence of 
successful marketing and promotion, the inherent attributes of the island or 
a diminishing risk perception, in 2005 there were unprecedented numbers of 
direct visitor arrivals to Bali. Even the controversy surrounding several high 
profile ‘foreigner’ drug cases failed to dissuade most tourists.   While this 
new market segment consisted of less long-haul European and North 
American tourists, Australians had again returned to this popular 
‘playground’ supplemented with travellers from throughout regional Asia. 
For many Balinese this restoration of business and profits heralded the end 
of a difficult period. 
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Crisis revisited  
 
During September 2005 the highest ever number of direct arrivals was 
recorded (Table 6.1), but on 1 October 2005 the island was again subjected to 
the tragedy of tourist-focused terrorism.  Although the explosions in 
restaurants of Kuta Square and Jimberan Bay were significantly smaller (25 
fatalities) than the previous incident, subsequent international media 
attention was quick to surmise a pattern for premeditated violence against 
tourists.  Having learnt from past experience, medical personnel and 
authorities were quick to respond, establishing an emergency centre at the 
Sanglah Hospital with an effective media capacity.  The Chief of Indonesian 
Police General Made Pastika, who had been seen as responsible for capturing 
the perpetrators of previous bombings, was quickly presented as the official 
spokesman to address questions and make any formal statements.  Familiar 
with the potential needs of the victims and their families, community-based 
volunteer and support networks were assisting within the hour.  
 
While travel advisories were reinstated and large numbers of tourist chose to 
avoid Bali, cancellations were not as dramatic as following the 2002 attacks.  
Maintaining occupancy rates of between 40-50% many analysts have drawn 
the cautious conclusion that perhaps the travelling public are becoming more 
accepting of terrorism as a risk of modern day travel.  As visible safety and 
security again became a high priority, the Bali Hotel Association together 
with several other private enterprise stakeholders made substantial financial 
commitments to supplement security upgrades. Despite the level of 
destination loyalty, lower visitor numbers again precipitated socio-economic 
hardship for the host community, exacerbated by the subsequent collapse of 
the locally owned airline, Air Paradise.  With international uncertainty 
regarding the probability of further attacks, many have also been critical of 
Indonesian government’s slow commitment to Bali’s tourism recovery 
efforts.  With profits and revenues again lagging the Governor of Bali 
formally announced the establishment of a Bali Security Council in October 
2005 with membership including the police, military, academics, non-
governmental agencies, government bureaucrats, and community leaders.  
Part of this group’s responsibility is intended to support a wide range of 
tourism promotion, recovery and security issues. 
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Table 6.1 Direct foreign tourist arrivals in Bali 2001-2005 
 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
January 92,604 87,027 60,836 104,062 101,931 
February 104,083 96,267 67,469 84,374 100,638 
March 110,582 113,553 72,263 99,644 117,149 
April 109,634 104,960 53,726 111,021 116,272 
May 103,939 119,284 47,858 117,191 116,615 
June 122,352 130,563 81,256 131,685 136,369 
July 142,946 147,033 111,828 148,086 158,453 
August 144,324 160,420 115,546 155,000 157,229 
September 104,008 150,747 106,763 141,900 162,102 
October  129,932 81,100 97,435 128,297 81,109 
November 110,145 31,517 83,853 110,471 62,705 
December 102,290 63,393 94,196 125,376 75,877 
Total 1,376,839 1,285,864 993,029 1,457,107 1,386,449 
Source: BPS Statistics Indonesia, 2006 
 
Table 6.1 indicates the fluctuations in visitor numbers which reflect the 
market sensitivity to external events such as the 11 September 2001 attacks, 
the 12 October 2002 bombings, SARS, the Jakarta bombings and further 
attacks on 1 October 2005. 
 
Lessons in crisis management and recovery 
 
While Bali has a unique context, it presents many lessons of value to any 
popular tourist destination.  As Australian tourists comprised a significant 
proportion of victims in both terrorist attacks, the Australian Government 
and national tourism authorities have also been forced to face the reality that 
terrorism can happen to anybody, anywhere and anytime. The most 
apparent message from this experience is that no destination should 
consider itself immune to crisis and that preparation and proactive capacity 
building are more effective than complacency.  Irrespective of the type of 
hazard agent or crisis trigger, there are some universal tenets to effective 
crisis management.  Consistent with the recommendations of peak industry 
bodies such as the WTO, WTTC and PATA - safety and security, 
communication, promotion and marketing are integral to positive image and 
consumer confidence.  It may not always be possible to prevent a crisis yet 
the duration and adverse impacts may be minimised. 
 
In responding to the first terrorist attacks Bali had limited skills, experience 
or even adequate medical facilities.  Although the physical impact area was 
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small and security was rapidly improved, the media, officials and even 
tourism operators failed to convince potential consumers of their personal 
safety. Subsequent promotion and marketing based on discounts and 
incentives, while numerically successful, also reduced profit margins.   
Securing an increase in the domestic and regional market segment to sustain 
the industry through times of hardship was perhaps one of the most 
productive tourism strategies. While tourism arrivals gradually increased 
towards 2005, the influence of numerous external events served to reinforce 
the erratic and often fickle nature of tourism. Lacking the requisite 
infrastructure and resources for greater economic diversification the host-
community of Bali has been forced to become more adaptable, resilient and 
self-sufficient.  Although the level of tourism reliance remains high, obvious 
improvements in the response to the second series of attacks reveal a vast 
improvement in both management and coping capacity.  Consistent with the 
concept of enhanced sustainability further time will reveal the success of 
current endeavour towards greater stakeholder integration, participation 
and collaboration.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Like many destinations throughout the world, the tourism industry in Bali 
was developed in a generally unsustainable manner. While prosperity 
generated significant opportunities, limited consideration was given to the 
risks of market instability and growing levels of socio-economic reliance.  
Faced with the reality of tourism crisis and adversity, this unsuspecting host 
community was forced to adopt purely reactive response strategies.  Lacking 
the relevant experience, knowledge and skills, the popular tourist island Bali 
has experienced a difficult path to re-establish its market stability.  As 
unrelenting external events have reaffirmed the inherent vulnerability of any 
popular destination and its stakeholders, an improved resilience and coping 
capacity demonstrates the value of employing effective formal and informal 
crisis management strategies. 
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7 
 
Oral histories about weather 
hazards in northern Australia 
 
Douglas Goudie 
 
This chapter draws on a collection of stories by Australian Aborigines about 
extreme weather impacts, mainly floods, and contrasts the embedded lessons 
with detailed descriptions from more recent Australian events. In the 
Dreamtime Australian Aboriginal stories, the recurrent theme is that 
everyone drowns. The ways Indigenous Australians ‘read’ the weather from 
many natural indicators may pre-empt ‘technological’ signs of disruptive 
weather.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Cloud in the Kimberley – weather generally rules our lives, 
extremes can kill 
 
‘Safety’ weather warning messages are developed to encourage aware and 
prepared communities to respond in a precautionary and active way to any 
likely threat. In more vulnerable communities, make sure residents are 
informed, and preferably practised in either staying safely where they are, or 
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evacuating to safety early. Community safety is the umbrella under which all 
threatened individuals are encouraged to shelter. In Australia, infrequent 
extreme weather events are dealt with, and community value systems are 
important; safety weather warnings need to be credible. How people manage 
their own lives, their relationship with their local environment and their own 
community become central to good risk reduction. This is clear and current 
thinking to maximise community response and safety. People need to make 
and encourage choices which are robust and produce maximum safety.  
 
Old stories from across Australia 
 
The first two stories detail landscape and extreme events and are included to 
show the strong oral traditions of stories about weather in Australian 
Aboriginal culture. Some of the following stories long predate the rise of 
Egyptian culture; before Rome existed; and before other civilisations 
developed in other regions. 
 
Some of the flood stories are allegories illustrating how it is perceived 
appropriate to respect and care for old people; others are chilling tales of 
what can happen if children disobey their parents, or harm animals. 
 
First story group: stories about the distant past 
 
The Origin of Lake Eacham 
 
Robert Dixon (1991) recorded this story from the tablelands west of Cairns, 
in north Queensland. 
 
I first recorded an account of the origin of the three crater lakes on the 
Atherton Tableland (Lake Eacham, Lake Barrine and The Crater) from 
George Watson, in the Mamu dialect of Dyirbal. The story he told was 
very similar to the Yidiny one given here – how two newly-initiated 
men broke important taboos and so angered the rainbow-serpent.  
This spirit then caused the earth to erupt, bringing about the 
formation of several deep lakes.  Both texts (Dyirbal and Yidiny) 
provide a plausible account of volcanic eruption. 
 
After telling the story, in 1964, George Watson remarked that when 
this happened the country around the lakes was ‘not jungle – just open 
scrub.’  The volcanic eruptions that formed the lakes are said by 
scientists to have been at least 13,000 years in the past.  George was 
saying that at this time there was no rainforest on the Atherton 
Tableland.  In 1968 a dated pollen diagram from the organic sediments 
of Lake Euramo by Peter Kershaw showed that the rainforest in that 
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area is only about 7,600 years old.  This suggests that the story of the 
volcanic eruptions may have been handed down from generation to 
generation for something like 13,000 years (which is not implausible, 
since Aborigines are known to have been in Australia for at least 
40,000 years) (Dixon, 1991, pp. 41-42). 
 
How the Sea Level Rose 
 
Robert Dixon (1991) recorded this story from the Cairns area in north 
Queensland. 
 
… a legend which must have been taken down by E.R.B Gribble 
between 1892 and 1909, while he was at Yarrabah, published on pages 
56-7 of his The Problem of the Australian Aboriginal (Angus and 
Robertson, 1932) under the title ‘The Great Barrier Reef’: 
 
‘According to the natives on Cape Grafton, northern Queensland, the 
Barrier Reef was the original coastline of the country. Goonyah was the 
first man in that country.  One day with his two wives, he went to the 
coast to catch fish.  In some way he offended the Great Spirit Balore.  It 
is said, that he caught and ate a certain kind of fish that was forbidden.  
Balore in anger caused the sea to rise in order to drown Goonyah and 
his women, but they fled to the mountains.  The waters rose rapidly as 
the fugitives climbed to the heights of the Murray Prior range.  This 
range is called by the aborigines “Wambilari” [Moses said that this 
must be a reference to Wumbilgay, a baldy-headed mountain].  The 
two women became very tired, and stopped running. Goonyah, well 
ahead of them, stopped on a huge boulder of granite, and called upon 
them to hurry.  The natives took the author to this spot, and showed 
him the footprint of Goonyah.  It is a patch of very dark stone in the 
granite about fifteen inches long and very wide.  It is said that the 
mark was left by Goonyah’s muddy foot.  He must have been 
something of a giant.  They succeeded in reaching the top of the 
highest peak in the range, and there they made a fire, and heating 
large stones rolled them down the mountain side, and succeeded in 
checking the flood.  The sea, however, never returned to its original 
limits.  (Goonganjie tribe)’. 
 
Although Moses had never previously heard a story about Gunya the 
theme was familiar to him – many Yidinyji stories are concerned with 
rising seas and what olden times people did to try to stop them (Dixon, 
1991, p. 90). 
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Stories from northern Australia telling of weather extremes and 
impacts – often most people died 
 
Quite a few of the stories of major events seem to have a moral of either 
people not sharing food (a ‘sin’ for nomadic, subsistence people), or of 
children being disobedient and tormenting animals.  The latter is the case in 
Dumbi the owl (Utemorrah, 2000b).  Here, as is often the case, every-one 
drowns.  In Eye-of-the-sea (Utemorrah, 2000a), the vengeance of an old 
woman for her lost son seems to trigger a tsunami.  Nearly every one was 
drowned and she was speared to death. 
 
The introductory notes to Songs from Yarrabah (Moyle, n.d.) shows that the 
very skin or kin groups are categorised to wet and dry season groups of 
objects or animals.  People on north east coastal Queensland were steeped in 
weather as part of their spiritual existence. 
 
The accounts in The floodmakers of Langu Narnji (Trezise, 1993) record the 
living culture of the Mornington Island area, where legends indicate some 
individuals or groups were able to control storms. This was a source of inter-
group power, but also retribution when a great flood, unsummoned, wreaked 
havoc on other groups, who then sought vengeance.   
 
Weathermen – Rain-making, Thunder, and Lightning-making 
 
Walter Roth (1897), an anthropologist, recorded stories about rain-making 
in Queensland at Boulia, Roxburgh, Lake Nash and amongst the Kalkadoon 
people near Mount Isa and thunder and lightning-making by the Kalkadoon 
people. 
 
The Miorli men at Springvale or the Diamantina Gates execute a dance and 
song to bring rain. The rain-stick (koo-roo-mun-do) is made of a thin piece 
of white wood about 400mm long. Three pieces of white quartz are glued on 
the end. Beard hair is added and further embellished.  More than one stick 
may be used. Around midday the men go to a secluded water hole where 
preparations lead to the dance. When the rain falls the koo-roo-mun-do is 
removed. In the heavy floods of early 1895, Roth was later assured that all 
the rain and water was produced by the Miorli men. Roth notes variations of 
this ceremony at Roxburgh, Headingly, Lake Nash and in the Leichardt-
Selwyn district (Roth, 1897). 
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Superstition, magic, and medicine - Thunder, Lightning and 
Storms.  
 
Roth (1903) also recorded stories from far north Queensland when he was 
stationed in Cooktown as the first Northern Protector of Aborigines.  
 
Thunder can make lightning, men, and women - Thunder is the most 
potent agency known: lightning is considered to be the fire lighted by 
him, … 
 
At Cape Bedford thunder can produce lightning by the rapid exposure 
of his generative organ, … (Roth, 1903, p. 8). 
 
These stories from north Queensland show that the Aborigines in the early 
1900s often believe that men can make thunder and lightning. On the 
Bloomfield River storms are made by killing a particular kind of lizard.  
There are other ways of interfering with nature which can cause lightning 
and thunder.  Storms can be started and stopped by men. 
 
People from the Cairns area 
 
Anthropologist Ursula McConnel, worked in northern Queensland in the 
1930s and Alice Moyle, an enthnomusicologist, worked in the Cairns area in 
the 1960s. 
 
People of the Kurakulu or Kuraminya moiety occupied the shores of 
Mission Bay (mira wungala), Palm Beach (giriga) and Turtle Bay.  To 
the Wet Season division belonged water, cloud, rain, thunder, shark, 
“alligator” (crocodile), water snake, eel, wild duck, white timber, and 
other light-coloured things; to the Dry Season division belonged 
subjects such as rocks, clay, fire, grass, kangaroo, emu, pelican, sun, 
star and wind (McConnel, 1935 cited in Moyle, n.d., p. 2) 
 
The power of the Mornington Island Weathermen - The 
floodmakers of Langu Narnji 
 
This story is about the Lardil people of Mornington Island (Langu Narnji).  
The stories were gathered by Percy Trezise in 1964. 
 
The tidal influences in the Gulf of Carpentaria are similar to those in 
the Gulf of Mexico, there being usually only one high and one low tide 
in each twenty-four hours.  During certain phases of the moon the tide 
may ‘double’, and may also remain high or low for longer than the 
average period.  Strong winds also have a marked effect on the tides; a 
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strong persistent south-easterly may create an abnormally low tide in 
southern reaches, whereas a strong northerly wind, usually associated 
with a cyclonic disturbance, may cause the tide to back up in southern 
reaches and cause extensive flooding in low-lying areas. 
 
The Lardil have many legends of great floods that occurred in the past.  
One story relates that during one great flood only the trees on low 
ridges of Forsythe Island remained above water, and the Jungarl 
people survived by tying their rafts to the trees.  On Langu Narnji only 
the top of a twenty-metre-high sand ridge could be seen. 
 
In 1948 a tidal surge which rose three metres above king tide level was 
said to have been caused by Shilling, a Lurrumbanda man, who, after a 
quarrel with the missionary, had gone to Langu Narnji to make a flood 
in revenge. 
 
The Lurrumbanda say they were blamed by surrounding people for 
every flood which occurred, whether they had made the flood 
ceremony or not, and united war parties often came to attack the 
Lurrumbanda after disastrous floods.  The Lurrumbanda exacted 
tribute from adjacent island and mainland clans by promising not to 
cause any more floods. 
 
The floodmakers do not speak as they rejoin their families to prepare 
for the coming flood. 
 
The flood may come in different ways, it may come as a giant tidal 
wave in clear weather, or as a series of tides, each mounting higher and 
higher; but it usually comes with a cyclone.  The first sign from 
Dewallewul may be a large ring around the sun by day, and the moon 
at night. 
 
Then the air becomes hot and still.  The clouds become denser and 
darker, and the wind begins, soft and sighing at first then becoming 
stronger and more gusty by the hour.  The rain commences and 
increases to a steady downpour.  Gusting winds get stronger, then 
cease abruptly and the moaning roar of the next gust can be heard 
coming far off.  Finally a distant roaring is heard, getting louder and 
louder until a powerful wind engulfs the whole island with horizontal 
rain and a thunderstorm roaring as it smashes all the trees.  It may last 
for many hours and all the people can do is roll up in paperbark and 
huddle together on the ground until it is over. 
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Due to a much lower barometric pressure, the main flood surge is 
contained within the central eye of the cyclone, and if its arrival 
coincides with a king tide it produces a flood from which nightmares 
and legends stem. 
 
When the people consider they have caused enough trouble they have 
a meeting and ask the flood men to stop the storm.  They gather up 
stones on the beach, make a big fire and heat them.  When the stones 
are very hot the flood men rake them out, and using bark to protect 
their hands, pick up the stones one at a time and run down the beach 
to cast it into the tunnel of a wave as it curls over to crash on the 
beach.  They continue until all the stones are gone and the waves know 
they must go back (Trezise, 1993, pp. 71-75). 
 
There are or were many Aboriginal groups which could exercise control over 
the weather (e.g. Mornington Island), but the following story gives one of 
many spiritual or Dreamtime explanations of the weather, particularly heavy 
rain.  With much time for contemplation, and the human desire to explain 
everything (the modern approach it through ‘science), there are Aboriginal 
stories explaining just about everything. 
 
Making humans, getting children and causing flooding rains 
 
The Mowanjum Mission has collected many stories from the Kimberley 
region of Western Australia including The Spirit Water by Elkin Umbagai 
(1980). 
 
Wandjina, or Ngarjaia (spirit beings) made the world and everything in it 
including man and woman whom he made from two of his own ribs, one 
large and one small, which he threw into two separate pools in which they 
were created.  Man went back to the pools in his dreams to get children, to 
give to woman, to bring into the world. Wandjina protects the child spirits of 
the pools. 
 
When the child is stolen from the pool, both the Snake and Wandjina 
are angry, and the water is stirred up to form clouds.  Then there are 
always big rains and floods during which Wandjina and Wundgudja, 
the Snake, think they might find the spirit child and bring it back to 
the pool (Umbagai, 1980, p. 77). 
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Second story group: extreme impacts and older people 
 
The Flood - Ngawarra-kurlu 
 
In this story by Napurrurlarlu and Jakamarrarlu (1988) an old Aboriginal 
man has a dream of a big flood.  He tells all his people of the dream and that 
they should not sleep in the creek, but they don’t listen to him. He leaves to 
escape the flood.  When he comes back after the flood there is no one around. 
During the night it rained heavily a long way up river.  When the flood waters 
reached the camp all the people in the creek bed had to run to higher ground 
in the middle of the night leaving all their belongings behind.  If they had 
listened to the old man they would not have lost all their possessions.  
 
So the old man went back to his camp feeling so upset. He then picked 
up all his things and went far away where his brother was. Other 
people saw him coming and asked him, ‘What’s the matter? Why are 
you looking so sad?” 
 
Then the old man said, “There is a big rain coming. I’ve seen it my 
dream. I told my family about the flood but they wouldn’t listen at all.” 
 
Then the next day the old man went back to the creek bed to have a 
look and he didn’t see anyone there. Then he looked around. He could 
see the smoke on the hill. The people told him what had happened to 
their food and all their things they lost in the flood. People were crying 
for their things they lost during the flood (Napurrurlarlu & 
Jakamarrarlu 1988, p. 19). 
 
Tsunami or Cyclone? - Maambulbarda: Eye-of-the-sea  
 
In this story by Utemorrah (2000a), a long time ago a woman lived in the 
Montgomery Islands with only one son.  She was persuaded to let her only 
son go fishing with others. The son was washed overboard in a storm and 
drowned.  She was very distressed and sought vengeance. 
 
“Karraai! Karraai!” she cried. “My only son, why did they let him die?” 
Then she thought, “So what can I do to them?”  
She thought to herself for a while. “I’ll stab the Eye-of-the-Sea,” she 
said. “Wait until they’re all asleep.” 
She stabbed the eldest of the eyes first, then she stabbed the middle 
eye. Only then did she stab the big one, the Eye-of-the-Sea. Away she 
went, paddling hard away from there. Then the sea rose boiling up 
after her, and it followed hard behind her (Utemorrah, 2000, pp. 99-
100). 
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She climbed a mountain while nearly all the others were drowned by the 
rising sea.  Some escaped and climbed the mountain too.  When it was all 
over they stabbed her with many spears.  Then they left and she is still there, 
on top of Mount Wundamarro. 
 
The Woman Who Destroyed the Old World 
 
In another story collected by the Mowanjum Mission, Jean Wungunyet 
(1980) provides a further example about Lake Gregory (Paruku) which is a 
version of the previous story, to show how the telling may be different, but 
the message is the same for oral history. 
 
Near Montgomery Island, north of Broome in Western Australia, now with a 
large Aboriginal Reserve on the mainland to both east and west, people could 
live all year round as there was plenty of food. An old woman and her people 
lived there hunting and fishing.  
 
Her husband would share his turtles or fish with the group but not with his 
wife so she vowed to: 
 
destroy these people, because they don’t give me any of their meat. 
 
So she set out in her canoe to live alone on the coast. Out on the reef 
were two blow-holes, one big and one small. She picked up her wooden 
spear and stirred and poked the waters with it. Immediately the waters 
started to bubble and rise.  She walked across the reef and climbed the 
highest hill she could see.  The water rose and rose and flooded over 
the land.  
 
Some of the men saw the woman on the hill and decided that she was 
causing all this trouble.  They chased her with their spears and killed 
her.  But they were too late - everyone was drowned. 
 
And that is the story of the great flood.  Even today our people are 
afraid to go near that place where the waters boil over (Wungunyet, 
1980, pp. 90-91). 
 
Flood - The Flood and the Bird-men 
 
This story from the Northern Territory was related by Kianoo Tjeemairee 
(1968) of the Murinbata tribe. The story was translated by Roland Robinson 
and it tells how heavy and continuous rain fell day and night until the land 
was flooded by the rain waters and the rising levels of the sea. 
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In the time called Kardoorair which means At first all things were 
blackfellows, a big rain began to fall. It fell all night, all day, all night, 
all day. The water began to cover all the Murinbata country called 
Darimun. The rain did not stop. The water filled up the creek and the 
sea came up and covered all the country, the hills, the trees, 
everything. There was only water (Tjeemairee, 1968, p. 87). 
 
The flood and its result 
 
This story by David Unaipon (2001) is a flood story of the Berrwerina people 
of the Darling River area. 
 
A long time ago there were so many families of animals they found it difficult 
to live together and so they had a great conference to try and address the 
situation. One particular tribe related to the reptiles had rainmaking abilities 
and their totems were: 
 
the elements Lightning, Thunder, Rain, Hail, and Wind.  They were 
becoming important.  They resolved that they would not consult 
anyone, but act as they pleased.  This selfish family was the Frilled 
Lizard.  They sent representatives to various parts of the country with 
the instruction: ‘On days and evenings of the week preceding the new 
moon, let every Thunk cum bulli (Lizard) begin the singing of the 
Storm Song.’ 
 
And when the time arrived, they took their flint knives and cut the 
body, causing the blood, and then they smeared the body with fat and 
red ochre and daubed the face with pipe clay, and then began chanting 
their prayer song, pleading that the Great Spirit of the Lightning, 
Thunder, Rain, Hail, and Wind should grant this their humble request: 
‘Come oh Thildarrin (Lightning), come oh Rroararund (Thunder), Pa 
noondi and Miyundi, come with all thy force and destroy the Platypus 
family, they have become too numerous and they are more easily 
overtaken in the flood than any other tribe.’ 
 
And they sang and sang their song of the Storm until the last few days 
and evenings before the appearing of the new moon.  Then great dark 
clouds began to mantle the clear sky, and out of the black cloud the 
lightning flashed and rent the darkened sky and earth, and struck 
terror into the hearts of the Animals, Birds, and Reptiles.  And the 
thunder roared its reply to the angry lightning flash, and the winds 
came hurrying, all in response to the thunder’s voice, tearing the limbs 
from the huge towering gum trees, uprooting smaller trees and shrubs, 
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strewing them along its path, driving the rain and hail into every 
hiding place of Animal, Bird, and Reptile. 
 
When the Bird tribe saw what was coming, they took to their wings, 
and mounted upon the wind, up and up, until they were far beyond 
cloud and storm, into lands beyond the sea.  The Animals struggled 
into the blinding storm, seeking shelter up and up, dodging behind the 
trees and rock boulders of the mountain-side, until they reached the 
summit, seeking a place of safety.  Thus ended the conference with no 
satisfaction but desolation and death.  
 
It rained and rained.  The valleys and low-lying countries were 
deluged, all life living therein was nearly all destroyed in the great 
flood (Unaipon, 2001, pp. 28-29). 
 
Kalpartu the Dreamtime Snake 
 
This flood story from Gracie Greene, Joe Tramacchi and Lucille Gill (1992) is 
from Billiluna country south of Halls Creek. 
 
The Willy Wagtail man came for a visit but the people tried to keep 
him out of the dances.  They teased him and made him feel 
unwelcome. 
 
So Willy Wagtail man went for help to his cousin brothers, who were 
Dreamtime snakes. 
 
The snakes surrounded the dancers.  They made a big flood, which 
killed all of the people except for one, who changed into a white 
corella.  Now you can see these white corellas.  They stay near the 
rockhole.  They are the people who lived there in the Dreamtime 
(Greene, et al., 1992, pp. 27-28). 
 
Flooding of Sturt Creek and Lake Gregory 
 
Readers are invited to compare this following story from George Nunkiarry 
(1996), a flood story from the time before the arrival of non-Aboriginal 
people, with a version by Rex Johns as related to the author in 2003 which is 
presented following the Nunkiarry story.  
 
In the Dreamtime there came a huge flood from the east.  It brought 
my ancestors from the east to Lake Gregory.  It came downstream 
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straight for where Inverway Station now stands.  The flood came from 
Gulbulundu and headed down towards Birrindudu.  It filled Sturt 
Creek to overflowing.  Just the tips of the river gums along the bank 
stuck out of the water.  White people, if they had seen it, would have 
said it was just like a tide coming in.  From bank to bank it swept down 
to where Gordon Downs is today, to the south of the river.  As it ran it 
met up with other floodwater from the north and west.  That was 
where the crocodile and the goanna fought over their teeth. The 
crocodile stole the goanna’s sharp teeth. 
 
The flood kept sweeping downstream and met smaller floods at Bindi 
Bindi or Sturt Creek Station. It filled up all the big waterholes along 
the river as it passed by Sturt Creek Station.  As it went, the flood 
swept up birds of all kinds, ducks, guluyu – bush fowl, white people 
call them.  It swept them all downstream towards Lake Gregory in the 
south, where two pelicans saw the flood and all these birds 
approaching.  One of the pelicans said, ‘I’ll go north and meet all these 
birds and bring them into the lake.’  We say dabarunga but white 
people say pelican. 
 
The two pelicans came up from the south and met the duck, and the 
bush fowl, and the brolga, and all the other birds caught in the flood.  
And that is how tribal laws from the south and the north met at Lake 
Gregory.  In the Dreamtime the two pelicans brought all the birds 
together at Lake Gregory. 
 
Billiluna used to be beside the lake; Billiluna old station, which we call 
Warngu.  They moved Billiluna north to the higher ridges, and they 
built new houses.  It used to be much closer to the lake.  From Warngu, 
in the Dreamtime, two white dogs started to chase an emu.  They 
chased it for along way to the west.  White people might say they 
chased it for twenty or a hundred miles.  We just say that they chased 
it for a long way west. 
 
After some time, the emu started to swing around and run back the 
way it had come.  Back towards the lake which is called Barugu.  
Finally, at the lakeside, the dogs caught the emu and cooked it and ate 
it.  You have to remember in all these stories that the animals in those 
times were like people.  After that the lake began to fill up from the 
south bank to the north.  Barugu is huge.  It might stretch as far as 
from Old Town to Palm Springs.  To go around it is like going from 
Halls Creek to Fitzroy or perhaps to Wyndham. 
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Well, the whole lake started to fill up.  White people would say it is like 
an ocean.  We went round it once and it took us two nights camping to 
get around.  My grandfather, grandmother and my father lived there 
and that is where they are buried (Nunkiarry, 1996, pp. 10-11). 
 
Mulan Dreamtime story – The two dingoes 
 
This story is from Rex Johns, Mulan elder and founder, as related to the 
author in 2003. 
 
There were two emu up north from around Inverway Station, from 
Nungaroo Creek who were chased by two dingo. A big distance away 
at Nungaroo.   
 
People were walking south.  The emus were in front.  The people were 
singing and dancing, and they were in between the dingoes and the 
emus.  There were floodwaters behind the dingoes. 
 
When people were camping the flood would stop.  There was one old 
man, he had a string line and he would cut the water while they 
camped.  He would hold the waters back while they camped.  While 
they would sing and dance. Where they camped the water was held 
up.  That is where the billabongs in Sturt Creek are now. Like at 
Bindalaorro.  The black and white water bird, the one with the long 
legs, the little bird was with the people.  Birds and other animals 
joined the people as they moved south, singing and dancing. 
 
They were coming down, straight down to the lake on the Sturt River 
side. But the dingo chased the emu round the other side.  Around to 
number 51 well (water bore) around to Gillang-gillam. 
 
The dingo chased the emu back and forth on the main lake.  One 
dingo was chasing one emu and the other dingo was chasing the 
second emu.  Back and forth. Each dingo grabbed an emu when they 
passed but they each grabbed the wrong emu. They grabbed ‘em and 
killed ‘em and ate ‘em. 
 
The people on the other edge of the lake, in the main channel, camped 
again.  In that main camp they sung and danced, that was where we 
call Lera Yard. 
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Figure 7.2 Two dingoes - the story of the great flood of the Sturt Creek 
 
When the two dingoes were full they walked up the other channel to 
Mulan.  There was a soak there and they dug in. They’re still there.  
 
Then the water came in from both sides and all the people got 
drowned. 
 
One old man walked off and sang them (he put a deadly curse on 
them all). They all drowned because they hadn’t shared some food 
with him.  But when he walked off, another old man spat on him, 
cursed him, so that first old man who walked off died too (personal 
communication, Rex Johns, October 2003). 
 
The Sturt Creek and Paruku (Lake Gregory) are central links for the desert 
communities in the East Kimberley.  It is now common knowledge around 
Mulan that if the early floodwaters are a milky colour passing through the 
Balgo Hills area, it means a major flooding rain north, about five days 
 
116 
earlier, and the creek levels would probably stay high for months. If the 
water was red, it means local rains from the smaller, near catchment, so the 
creek level would probably go down in a few days. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 Sturt Creek, subject of a Dreamtime story of flood and loss, 
which includes moral teaching. 
 
Floods and discipline lessons for children 
 
How the people were all drowned 
 
In another story collected by the Mowanjum Mission, Daisy Utemorrah 
(1980) provides a flood story How the People Were All Drowned. In 
Aboriginal Dreaming a tribe called Dillangari from north west Australia had 
huge dogs as big as calves. Wandjina didn’t want the dogs to talk and if they 
did he would drown everyone.  
 
So parents were very careful to tell their children never to tease a dog. 
 
The tribe went to hunt at a place with plenty of food, the men telling 
the women to make sure the children didn’t tease the dogs, “and the 
women gathered the children together and warned them,  ’First of all, 
you must not hit any special bird which belongs to Wandjina, such as 
Tumbi, the Owl.  If you do, the Wandjina will send rain and storms 
and we all will be drowned.  And the second thing is that you must not 
tease the dogs.  Don’t try to make them talk like us because Wandjina 
has told the dogs that they are only allowed to bark.’ 
 
The children asked why they couldn’t play with the dogs, and the 
women answered, ‘If you do, and a dog answers you, we will all be 
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swallowed up by water. No one will survive.  The Wandjina will cause 
the water to rise and drown us all.’ So the children agreed to leave the 
dogs alone. 
 
Some of the women went off to look for berries and wild honey and 
yams. The remaining women were told to keep an eye on the children, 
but instead of doing this, they went down to the river to gather 
waterlily roots.  
 
A group of children started to play with the dogs, calling and yelling to 
them. The women were so busy with the waterlily roots that they didn’t 
hear the children, who continued to tease the dogs. Suddenly one of 
the dogs answered back, speaking like a human. 
 
As soon as that happened, Wandjina caused the whole tribe to 
disappear under the ground and under the water. Only the Wandjina 
themselves were left (Utemorrah, 1980, pp. 46-47). 
 
Dumbi: The owl  
 
In another story by Utemorrah (2000b) young children were told not to 
torment the owl.  One of the boys decided to kill the owl.  Others tried to stop 
him but he climbed into the tree, grabbed the owl, pulled out all his feathers 
and threw him down. They stabbed the owl and tormented him in many 
ways.  The Wandjina (spirit being) wanted to know from the owl what 
happened.  When the Wandjina found out he decided to punish the children 
by getting rain. He got the dragon lizard to go out into the plain and wave his 
arms around to bring all the clouds.  The dragon lizard did that. The rain and 
lightning came. That scared the children.  Their parents came back and 
asked why was all this rain falling and discovered what had happened.  The 
children said they were only playing with the owl. 
 
 “Well, we told you and told you, when you see the owl you mustn’t 
hurt it.  But you just wouldn’t believe us. 
 
The rain kept falling. The rain fell and lightning flashed all around 
them. They swam about in the flood waters, trying desperately to climb 
up into the highest hills. But the flood rose up higher and they all 
perished. 
But there were two children standing up on a hill, a boy and a girl. And 
a kangaroo came hopping towards them. “Let’s climb onto this 
kangaroo,” they said to each other. 
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… the Wanddjina destroyed all the other people.  They all drowned and 
the land was left empty (Utemorrah, 2000b, pp. 9-11). 
 
A moral story with dire weather consequences 
 
In Daisy Utemorrah’s story above the torment of an owl resulted in a great 
flood in the Kimberley. The Wandjina got the dragon lizard to go out into the 
plain and wave his arms around to bring all the clouds. The dragon lizard did 
that and the rain and lightning came and the children were frightened. 
 
During a disaster risk management study conducted in Eidsvold, inland from 
Gympie, southern Queensland, the author learned from Neville, of the local 
Wakka Wakka group, that he spent time with traditional men in the 1950s.  
He was shown a local lizard (moos moos in the Wakka Wakka language) 
slowly waving one ‘arm’, then the other in front of its face, while standing on 
a high piece of a fallen branch.  These lizards are smooth skinned, not very 
common, and about 200 mm long.  The old men said that event meant there 
would be rains soon after.  The younger blokes laughed and thought that was 
not going to happen.  According to Neville, “storms came from all over the 
place that night.  It rained a lot” (personal communication, Neville, 2003). 
 
From an ancient story of a prior major flood in the Kimberley to living oral 
traditional knowledge of reptile behaviour preceding flooding rains in 
southern Queensland, there would appear to be an early, observable warning 
or forecast of rain.   
 
Lightning 
 
Jean Ellis (1991) collected this story The Lightning Man about the legend of 
Wala-Unayua who lived deep in a waterhole in the Liverpool River in 
Arnhem Land.  Local people knew he was easily angered and would strike 
people down with lightning.  
 
He was at his most dangerous, however, during the wet heat of the 
monsoon season. As soon as the monsoon rain began to fall, Wala-
Unayua would fly into an uncontrollable rage.  In that rage he would 
travel across the sky, hiding in thick clouds, and his angry voice would 
thunder, crashing and echoing across the land. 
 
Flashing the lightning of his long arms and legs he would savagely 
attack the earth, throwing down the trees and leaving a stricken 
landscape in his path. As soon as the monsoon season came to an end 
he would gradually become calmer, eventually returning quietly to his 
own waterhole.  There he would stay, always on the watch, ready to 
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strike out again if anyone or anything dared disturb him (Ellis, 1991, p. 
106). 
 
This section shows that old stories, Dreamtime stories for Australian 
Indigenous people, can help make real the rare and unusual threats of flood, 
fire or destructive winds which may impact upon people’s lives in the future.  
It should be possible for these old ways of reading the weather to be 
communicated into the technological and ‘hard data’ systems employed by 
the Australian Bureau of Meteorology to help predict flooding rains. 
 
Readable weather warnings, direct from nature 
 
The following compilation of traditional weather predictors results from a 
team of researchers from James Cook University’s Centre for Disaster 
Studies visiting many northern Australian remote Indigenous communities 
in late 2003.  With the core business of finding out from communities about 
how to maximise the safety of communities ahead of disruptive weather, 
researchers also asked community members: ‘What natural indicators tell 
people that there is going to be, or likely to be, a bad or dangerous weather 
event (including bushfire, flood, severe storm, cyclone, surge, cold snap, 
drought etc.)?’  They were also asked: ‘What are the natural indicators for the 
onset of the wet, and the dry season?’ and ‘What kind of traditional ways do 
people have of recognising or predicting a change in the weather and an 
increase in a hazard?’  Some ‘weather reading’ techniques are explained 
below. 
 
Yarrabah 
 
From Yarrabah, near Cairns, in coastal far north Queensland, people can tell 
if storms are coming because ants are more common indoors, and cockroach 
behaviour is erratic before a big wet.  Certain plants and flowers are used to 
indicate seasonal changes.  The behaviour of the storm bird, a type of tern, is 
erratic.  This bird flies low or circles in the sky and flies off in the direction of 
the coming cyclone just days/hours prior to the event.  Also, increased 
numbers of crocodile tracks and drag marks heading up the mudflats/beach 
indicates that it is going to be rough weather at sea for about the next week, 
possibly due to storm or cyclone.  A dark, shadowy ring around the moon 
means that bad weather is coming.  Unusually high tides means a storm is 
coming - conversely ‘blue’ sea water close to shore is said to indicate good 
weather for the next couple of days. 
 
When the bush creatures are quiet, it means the birds have left for the 
mainland, and there will probably be a big storm or cyclone.  This may 
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happen before the formation of a storm has become clear by way of 
electronic means. 
 
Palm Island 
 
From Palm Island, near Townsville, major storm indicators include large 
amounts of cloud and fine mist. A red sunset probably means major rain and 
crabs moving inland may indicate cyclones. Similar to Yarrabah, major 
storms are signalled when birds gather in flocks and fly around quickly 
before leaving the area. It is known that when you are in the path of a big 
storm it all goes quiet – all the birds have left.  That kind of quiet will tell you 
where the worst of a cyclone is going to hit. 
 
 
 
Figure 7.4 Main settlement, Palm Island 
 
People of different cultures know that cockroaches and ants become very 
active before bad weather. Sudden changes in wind patterns may indicate a 
storm is on the way and cloud types may indicate approaching storms. 
 
All the bush animals breed up ahead of a good wet season, but they would 
not breed much if there was not going to be much of a wet.  With the 
traditional fruits – when all the trees were in fruit, one tree may start to fruit 
again.  People would know that something unusual was going to happen, that 
different weather was approaching. 
 
Old Mapoon 
 
In Old Mapoon, on the Cape York Peninsula in northern Queensland, 
traditional ways of reading the weather are much the same as all 
communities in northern Australia.  A period of continuous very hot and still 
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conditions precedes monsoonal rains or a cyclone. Indigenous elders state 
there are certain natural indicators for different types of weather events, the 
most important predicting cyclones. 
 
Many local people indicate the manahawk (Aboriginal name for a large black 
ocean going frigate bird) when seen in large numbers in the coastal areas 
indicates that strong winds, possibly cyclonic, are expected within two to 
three days. Bad weather can mean severe storms or a cyclone.  In normal 
weather conditions, these birds can be seen circling in a group, high in the 
air along coastal areas.  When conditions are extremely rough, in the case of 
an approaching storm or cyclone, they move inland to seek shelter, flying low 
to avoid wind gusts.  
 
Crocodiles building their nests higher than usual above the high tide mark 
and long stalks on the mango fruit indicate that a big wet with greater than 
average seasonal rainfall is expected. The wet season is heralded by a gradual 
build-up of clouds over weeks, high tides, and very hot conditions. When the 
dry winds start to blow from the south east, causing the grass to lose all 
moisture, turn brown and die off, winter is beginning.  
 
Kimberley region 
 
At the Kimberley settlement of Ringer Soak, ants are observed about 6 weeks 
before the wet to start building tubes up from the ground about 2 inches (50 
mm) high.  The ants close off the top of the tubes just before the rain starts – 
a day or two before. Just before the wet the bees gather pollen then seal off 
the combs with wax, just leaving a tiny breathing hole.  Budgerigars and 
goannas come out with the lightning and thunder near the start of the wet, 
while the budgerigars breed at the end of the wet. First there are rains, then 
there are the flying ants.  If there are more flying ants there will be more 
rain. It is known that most of the weather comes from the north east.  Bush 
trees start to flower after a cold snap, and the Sturt Desert Pea stops 
flowering at the end of the wet.  
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Figure 7.5 The Kimberley region of north west Australia [map by Adella 
Edwards] 
 
In Mulan in the Kimberley, the days are hotter before the rain, in October or 
November.  The cicadas are heard and then there are big rain clouds and 
goannas become active.  There is some rain, a dust storm, rain, then 
lightning strikes then the wet.  In Balgo Hills, the ants store food night and 
day indicating there will be heavy rain in about three days.  Jaum is the local 
name for the rains that come after Christmas. The weather seems to follow a 
four or five year cycle. Clouds go round in circles just before the rains come.  
In Billiluna, the start of the wet is indicated by ant activity, big cloud banks 
and the general humidity and temperature build-up. 
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Figure 7.6 Forrest River landscape at Oombulgurri in the Kimberley 
 
In Halls Creek in the Kimberley the onset of the wet season is heralded when 
the leaves have fallen off the trees and they’ve begun to grow back.  The 
clouds building up, days getting hotter, and hot, dry wind blows.  The boab 
trees will flower and when these flowers fall it means the rain will be coming 
soon. Echidna will walk, looking for ants.  Green frogs start making noise, 
before it starts raining.  Sugar bag or wild bee hives are full of honey, and 
rain can be predicted by the tilt of the quarter moon: if the quarter is on its 
back, not much rain; if the quarter is standing tall, it should be a good wet.  
When there are rings around the moon at night, the more rings the bigger 
the wet. 
 
The onset of the dry season is signalled when cockatoos and blue mountains 
parrots lay eggs. Nights get colder and flies are a major pest until the weather 
starts to get cold. The sugar bag flies come out and start laying eggs, and 
sugar leaf grows on the leaves of trees.  If there has just been a big wet, there 
is more chance of having a colder winter. 
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Traditional ways of recognising or predicting weather change can include: 
looking at the sky for clouds or lightning in the distance; following the 
direction of the wind, especially if rain or lightning are near; and watching 
insects, birds and animals, the known indicators of imminent rain and wind.  
The abundance of bush fruits and animals which should be in season is also a 
way of recognising the change in weather. 
 
In Oombulgurri (the former Forrest River Mission) in the Kimberley people 
say they can smell the onset of the wet.  There are flowers before the wet, like 
the kapok and the gelay.  Boab trees start shooting leaves.  You get the 
‘knock-down’ rain at the end of the wet, the rain that knocks down all the 
dead grass stems right before the dry starts. The wet is known to have 
finished when the fast moving cloud is observed.  
 
 
 
Figure 7.7 Boab trees in Oombulgurri in the Kimberley 
 
Conclusions 
 
This chapter has shown that there are knowable threats from extreme 
weather, recorded in the oral traditions of Indigenous peoples, and in more 
recent western accounts.  It is also clear that some of the learned indicators 
from widely separated areas are good predictors of disruptive weather, from 
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lizards waving their front legs about, to sea birds wheeling in unusual 
groups.  Simple observations such as: ‘the bush goes quiet because all the 
birds have left’ could save lives ahead of a cyclone impact, if the traditional 
knowledge had remained widespread, respected and used.  It is still possible 
for much Indigenous weather knowledge in Australia to be used in this 
manner.  
 
Making the threat real to endangered listeners is the core to effective ‘safety’ 
weather warnings. The old stories provided in this chapter, call them 
‘Dreamtime’ or ‘folklore’, tell of extreme weather events, while the living 
cultural knowledge gained and passed on over thousands of years tells, how 
to ‘read the weather’ locally.  A long-term outcome of technological weather 
predictors testing could be to respect and learn from Indigenous weather-
reading methods. Indigenous weather stories and readings could be 
incorporated into education about weather patterns.  To maximise safety, 
credible warnings and action statements from reliable sources need to be 
received and responded to appropriately.  This is central to the purpose of 
safety weather warnings: use of material in this chapter may help save lives.  
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Lardil weather stories and 
experiences from Mornington 
Island 
 
Eddie McLachlan 
 
Mornington Island is an isolated community, located in the Gulf of 
Carpentaria, off the south western coast of Cape York Peninsula, 
approximately 125km northwest of Burketown, 200km west of Karumba and 
440km north of Mount Isa. It comprises an area of about 700 square 
kilometres, and is the largest of the twenty-two islands, which form the 
Wellesley Islands group in the Gulf.  
 
After the end of the Ice Age, approximately 6,500 years ago, rising sea levels 
reached their current height. Before this change, the Wellesley Islands 
formed a peninsula that was part of the Carpentaria mainland. The 
Mornington Island landform comprises a prominent sloping plateau, and 
low, rounded and flat-topped ridges, separated by broad, shallow valleys. 
The highest parts, which feature the Mornington Plateau, are between 
twenty and forty metres above sea level.  
 
Streams which often flood during the wet season, flow down to the coast 
forming wide inlets. In the dry season, the mouths of large streams and 
creeks of the island dry out to form clay-pans or salt-pans. Larger streams 
have permanent waterholes. The vegetation is mainly grassland, open 
medium to dense scrub, and low open forests and woodlands (Memmott & 
Horsman, 1991). 
 
The original Indigenous inhabitants of Mornington were the Lardil 
Aboriginal people. They formed the largest tribal group that formerly 
occupied the North Wellesley Islands, which included Mornington, Sydney 
and Wallaby islands. The Lardil believed that long ago, in the Dreamtime, 
their ancestors came over from the Australian mainland. The link with the 
mainland constitutes an important legend for the people. It involved three 
characters, Maarnbil, his wife Jirnjirn, and Diwaliwal, who was Jirnjirn’s 
mother’s brother. It is believed the trio travelled across from the west when 
the Wellesley Island group was still part of a peninsula, which extended from 
the mainland. As they passed through the land, which is now the islands, the 
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three beings created rivers, hills, animals, trees, fresh water wells and stone 
fish traps. The legend tells that while Maarnbil was away, Diwaliwal and his 
niece, Jirnjirn had wrongful sexual relations, triggering catastrophic events, 
which would later have cultural significance for the Lardil people. The 
revelations of this particular section of the legend contains a range of 
connotations relating to the basic elements of traditional Lardil law, 
including incest taboos, moral obligations, and kinship relationships. Many 
of these concepts have since been ingrained into the Lardil world view, and 
traces can be seen in the society today. As an example, in the Gununa 
community, the uncles are responsible for teaching their nephews Lardil 
traditions essential to their developing into men. A very important aspect in 
this procedure is that from an early age the children are taught the 
importance, and meaning of their family totems (Ahern, 2002). 
 
The association between the Lardil and their natural environment has always 
been a close one; the people-environment relationship is a cohesive one. 
Although the people have adopted most of the elements of western culture, 
they still maintain strong links with the bushland and surrounding seas of 
Mornington Island, and as part of their continuous relationship with nature, 
most have a strong understanding of the local weather system.  
 
Before colonisation, each Lardil group was separated into four tribal areas 
(see Figure 8.1). These boundaries were set by the four winds in accordance 
with traditional Lardil beliefs. The Balūmbanda were the West people, 
Leelūmbanda were East people, Larūmbanda were South, and 
Djigūrrumbanda were people from the North. Natural features such as 
creeks, ridges, a line of trees, or a cluster of rocks, formed boundaries for 
each group. Clan groups were also generally known by reference to their 
location, associated with the influence of the island’s primary winds, the east, 
and south-easterlies. The Leelūmbanda and Larūmbanda, who were directly 
exposed to the winds, were known as the Windward people, and on the 
sheltered side, the Djigūrrumbanda and Balūmbanda were named the 
Leeward people, (Binnion, 1987). 
 
These days, residents from Gununa visit their homeland sites for short 
periods on weekend camping trips, and hunting and fishing expeditions. At 
some of those places where there are reliable sources of fresh water, 
outstations have been established, and are occupied by members of 
traditional owner’s families. The island has a population of about 1,200, 
most of whom are Indigenous, and reside in the township of Gununa. 
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Figure 8.1 Lardil clan boundaries 
(Source: Binnion, 1987, p. 2) 
 
Since the early part of this century, Mornington Island had been managed 
under the provisions of various Aborigines Acts, by the Uniting Church. 
Since 1978 the island has been managed by the Mornington Shire Council. A 
few of the original missionary buildings are still standing, a prominent one 
being the guesthouse (see Figure 8.2 below), which was in fact the old 
missionary’s residence.  
 
 
 
Figure 8.2 The old mission house, now guest house, Mornington Island 
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The community library is housed in what was originally the old church 
building. The library contains many people-related tales about being part of 
the missionary system, or living on the island at the time of the mission, 
while other stories are of their parents who were ‘mission children’. Many 
stories of Mornington Island relate to the weather. 
 
Lardil people and cyclones: some personal stories 
 
I grew up here…and I been through a lot of these things. I know how 
this cyclone season, this crisis of cyclone…if a severe one come, and if 
it isn’t a severe one, you gotta be prepared-act ready and be prepared, 
at all times. It’s life or death, you gotta be prepared (Melville Escott, 
personal communication, 2001). 
 
These words spoken by an elder member of the Lardil people of Mornington 
Island, signified the knowledge held by the Indigenous inhabitants, about 
natural hazards in the region. He indicated his experience of cyclones by 
stating people have to be prepared for the cyclone season, and they know 
nature is unpredictable, so they have to be ready regardless if it is a small 
storm or a severe tempest. An unprepared community risks leaving itself 
vulnerable to the fury of a cyclone. This essential survival knowledge for 
Lardil Aborigines has been accumulated from a long history of experiences, 
and related stories, passed on from generation to generation. It is an 
important part of the traditional knowledge that exists in Indigenous 
communities in remote Australian areas. Though now the Mornington Island 
township of Gununa, consists of infrastructure that boasts modern buildings 
and contemporary facilities, Lardil residents maintain their connection with, 
and hold intimate knowledge of, the surrounding land and sea. That 
knowledge is essential in keeping their identity, and maintaining their 
culture.  
 
Personal cyclone experiences  
 
The following are personal accounts of several Lardil residents of Gununa, 
detailing their experiences of encounters with cyclones, and also provides 
insights into the Indigenous perspective of related events, and personal 
views. The narratives are in their own words, because it is important that 
people’s emotions and actions, are portrayed truthfully. Their stories contain 
Indigenous attitudes about cultural and environmental links, which 
symbolise the significance of local knowledge discourse in Australian remote 
communities (Sinatra & Murphy, 1999).  
 
Like many Indigenous residents of Gununa, Melville Escott’s parents were 
not from Mornington Island, but Melville, like others of his age group, was 
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born there. Melville is in his early sixties, and is a member of the Escott 
family, one of the oldest and well-known families on Mornington Island. He 
is an adept traditional and contemporary artist, and has spent time off the 
island when a young man, working as a stockman on various cattle stations 
in the Gulf of Carpentaria region. 
 
My parents originally come from the mainland, but I was born here. 
My father, he originally from Burketown, Gungullita tribe, and my 
grandfather been the king of that tribe. 
 
Melville said in his lifetime, he had experienced a few cyclones while on 
Mornington Island, but Ted is the cyclone that he remembers most clearly, 
chiefly because of the destruction it wreaked on the island and in the 
township, Gununa. His recollection of the event in December 1976, painted a 
picture of dramatic physical effects caused by the storm: 
 
I been here, yeah, I was here. I was young fulla, I was young man - 
Cyclone Ted - when we had Cyclone Ted. 
 
Like most Indigenous people of his age group, Melville recalled events that 
had a lasting effect on his life, and linked them to the stage of his life at the 
time. Hence he said he was, “a young fulla…a young man”, meaning he was 
probably more than twenty-one years old, because at the time, that was the 
legal age of consent, when young people were regarded as adults. So, 
although most of the Indigenous people interviewed, may not have known 
their exact age, or the year of their birth, if an event was dramatic enough, 
nearly all can remember some details. It is the event, and consequent effects, 
which are more important, not the age of the witness, or the exact point in 
time.  
 
In December 1976, Cyclone Ted hovered for some time off the northern coast 
of Mornington Island, a short distance from the Birri Fishing Lodge, before it 
impacted upon the island. 
 
He came direct, straight in, he was stationary out there for a while. 
Yeah, come straight from out the open sea, from out of the Arafura 
Sea” (Melville Escott, personal communication, 2002). 
 
According to Melville, the damage in Gununa inflicted on buildings and 
possessions left out in the open, was quite spectacular: 
 
We had old houses, old timber houses, never had steel frame 
houses…Yeah, that Cyclone Ted, he came straight in, directly, yeah, he 
came straight in, it just flattened all them old houses. He flattened all 
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them top houses, that video there, them old photos showing how, what 
disaster it made. How it wrecked this place-luckily no one was killed! 
Lost dinghy, lost boats and things what, you know-never been 
brought up, or flung from the land, out in (the) sea - what was 
wrecked (Melville Escott, personal communication, 2002). 
 
The ‘top houses’ mentioned by Melville, were the twenty prefabricated 
houses erected in the early 1970s, on the town ridge. The ‘old houses’ were 
undoubtedly the residences situated down on the old village beachside area. 
Reports by newspapers confirmed the extent of the damage to the township 
buildings, an indication that they were not constructed to withstand a storm 
of Ted’s ferocity. From accounts by those few who experienced Cyclone Ted, 
the consensus was that most Indigenous residents sheltered in the old 
mission house. They knew it would offer protection, because they either 
experienced occasions when they used it themselves, or they had been told 
by elders, of the building’s reputation as a safe haven from severe weather. 
These actions are testament of local Indigenous knowledge that was utilised 
by residents, in a crisis situation, as a method of survival. This was a Lardil 
lifestyle strategy, which was acknowledged by Melville: 
 
No one was injured, but then, you know they had to manage, to 
protect their own life (Melville Escott, personal communication, 
2002). 
 
Alma Moon, an Aboriginal woman in her forties, has lived and worked on 
Mornington Island for most of her adult life. Alma recounted her experience 
of the cyclone, saying her family had to move from their house to safer 
buildings. The former mission house, now the island’s guesthouse, was 
considered one of the sturdiest and safest structures, so it has been 
extensively utilised on occasions when shelter was needed in times of a 
natural hazard crisis. Alma remembered: 
 
We used to live down the old village, down near the waterside there. 
So we had to move up to my husband’s mother’s home. Then cyclone 
got really worse, they had cars moving people down to that old 
mission house, and the old canteen. And all under that old mission 
house, mission house was full of people, on top, underneath, we all 
stayed there (Alma Moon, personal communication, 2002). 
 
A couple of days later, after the danger had passed, those who had sought 
refuge in more secure buildings, moved back to their homes and proceeded 
to clean up their wrecked houses. 
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We run away, but when that cyclone settled down, we go down, look 
for all our things now. I had a lot of things, photos…everything was 
taken out to sea, even our boat’s motor was taken off. That’s Cyclone 
Ted (Alma Moon, personal communication, 2002).  
 
Alma also had an exciting experience on Bentinck Island during a cyclone. 
From her recollections, and a study of relevant records indicated the storm 
was probably Jason, a cyclone which struck Bentinck in 1987.  
 
Alright that night now, we sleep-rain been pouring in, we sleep (in) 
wet blanket. I had my daughter with me, my eldest. Morning time 
now, I said to old Luke “You go make cup of tea for us.” But when he 
went to make breakfast, he said “Oh the stove’s wet, where power, 
gonna cook?” So we went round to the kitchen, we were sitting down-
he said “What cyclone look like?” Soon as he said that, iron been rip 
past the side, and I just grabbed Beatrice, my daughter, (and said), 
“Come darling me-two go die together”. And that house, been lift off-
the whole frame-right up. We was just sitting there (in the house), 
and (then) we all ran behind the (water) tank. We had to lead each 
other, hold hands, so if one drift away, we all go. Some one said “Oh, 
let’s stay in that freezer there, that big freezer,” And I said, “No! We 
can’t stay in that freezer, that wind go (will) come back, and that 
freezer go (will) fall down, and then we’ll be dead!” So that freezer 
went, (did blow over) that big freezer, all our food, the gas stove, 
everything went (was lost) there la (on) Bentinck. So we had to start 
building again, build it up again (Alma Moon, personal 
communication, 2002). 
 
Alma’s account contained details of an Indigenous person’s personal view of 
a cyclone, and the actions taken to preserve their lives, in the face of a 
natural hazard. Strong family ties are extremely important to Indigenous 
culture, a fact stressed by Alma, as she expressed that at the height of the 
storm, she hugged her daughter and was content to perish, as long as she 
was with kin.  
 
From the same incident, Alma described the Kiaidilt people’s methods of 
survival on Bentinck Island in a cyclone situation. Similar to the Lardil, 
Kiaidilt Aborigines had their traditional strategy of constructing shelters, as 
protection against severe weather conditions.  
 
Old Bentinck Island people, they had this special grass, for little 
humpies. Luckily we had them old people that been grow up there. 
My cousin, and my brother-in-law now, we sitting down, watching 
now - soon as he been stop now, (cyclone passed), them boys had to 
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go and break them big grass, but we never hide, we been make, like, 
little  breaks, like a wungura (Lardil small shelter). And we all sit 
down in that. All these boys, been go look for freezer (that had blown 
away), because we lost all our tucker. We had tinned stuff, but we 
needed flour, tea and sugar, and something fresh to eat (that was) 
nutritious (Alma Moon, personal communication, 2002).  
 
This once more, emphasised their ingenuity in converting a natural asset 
into a cultural element, conducive to the group’s survival. The scenario on 
Bentinck, also accentuated the fact that as a matter of survival, when modern 
building technology failed them, Aboriginal people had to employ a 
traditional survival strategy.  
 
Cecelia Reid, an Aboriginal woman about fifty years old, whose family has a 
long association with Mornington Island. She acknowledged that the old 
mission house has been used on numerous occasions, as a refuge, for people 
who had to evacuate unsafe dwellings.  
 
We all had to move out of our homes. They had to put us all in safe 
homes. I went from my parent’s place, to my aunty’s place, and then 
ended up in the guesthouse. It was really bad (Cecelia Reid, personal 
communication, 2002). 
 
Cyclone Ted? Struck in 1976, but there was many more in the 1960s. 
The worst one that struck here was when all these buildings were 
down, was ‘round about ’76, December ’76. That’s the worst one we 
had here (Edna Hills, personal communication, 2002). 
 
Edna Hills, a Lardil woman in her forties, has lived on Mornington Island 
most of her adult life. Like most residents her age, she had left the island to 
work on the mainland when she was younger. Her mother was Margaret 
Hills, an elder of Mornington, and was one of the few remaining people who, 
as a child, was a member of the earlier mission dormitory system. She talked 
about a cyclone that struck Mornington Island when she was a young girl 
during mission times.  
 
Two dormitories – senior and the junior dormitory. And during that 
time we were in the dormitory we couldn’t get out, you know, playing 
in the rain because that was the law that we might get wet and we, 
you know, we was under the missionaries and then we was playing 
and playing, never think of anything you know, going to happen. And 
as we were playing there this big cyclone wind came up and he lifted 
the building off the, off the, what you call it, foundation boy – it was 
on a block, not on a bricks. And it lifted up and when we saw it, we 
 
134 
ran up – we ran out - and instead of we running under the house, 
where them big house is, the mission house, we ran down to the beach 
at the point boy, at the point. But a older woman said “let us go back 
around else you might, the wind might throw you into the deep – into 
the sea with the waves and ah, so we all came back boy, and we ran 
under that building there, up there – see that old mission house? 
Yeah. We went there – missionaries was there with us – Reverend 
Wilson and his family, and we stayed there, and then stayed there 
overnight, because our dormitory was lifted off the block, and I think 
we stayed there for the night, and might be a week, and that was all. I 
wasn’t like I am now – I had no breasts, I was a young girl. That was 
all, boy. But a very serious cyclone it was. Brought down lot of 
housing on this mission. And that’s all I can tell you what had 
happened while I was in the dormitory and of course I can’t 
remember, they must have replaced, made the young dormitory get 
back to normal again. Yeah, they built it – and that was all (Margaret 
Hills, personal communication, 2002). 
 
Literature indicates the event was probably a cyclone that occurred in 
February 1936 which was recorded by Reverend R.H. Wilson. Wilson 
reported, “Most of the buildings were demolished and there was a storm 
surge estimated at 5 foot or so” (Callaghan, 2003, p. 4). Other Aboriginal 
elders also referred to the dormitory buildings that stood beside the 
missionary house, which still exists and functions as the island guesthouse. 
As several dialogues have shown, it is a sturdy structure that has withstood 
numerous cyclones, so it is understandable that it was used for shelter as 
Margaret had indicated.  
 
An interesting issue in Margaret’s interview, drew out the contrast in Lardil 
and western law, prevalent in the dormitory system of the era. Margaret 
remembered that as children, when the storm moved in on the mission, they 
were not allowed to venture out into the rain, as they would have done before 
colonisation. The cultural differences were further extended, as she related 
that when their dormitory succumbed to the cyclone’s destructive winds, the 
panicked children fled to the beach, instead of the missionary’s residence, 
which was still intact. However, after they realised the peril of their action, 
and at the insistence of an older girl, they did move back to the shelter of the 
standing mission building. Arguably, the children’s action indicated their 
natural Indigenous instinct, to get away from a dangerous situation to a 
context more familiar to them, namely the natural environment. 
 
Yeah. Tide came right in boy. People down there – all water came up 
into them little creeks, and up to this creek boy. And knocked down all 
of the vegetable trees, our garden, and made our well there – they 
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used to pump the water from the well there up to the tank and then – 
and we got salt water in it… (Margaret Hills, personal 
communication, 2002).  
 
 
 
Figure 8.3 The wharf and channel at Gununa, Mornington Island 
 
The creek Margaret referred to was the narrow waterway which ran from the 
Appel Channel to the east of Gununa, and snaked along the bottom of the 
town ridge, to the west, where it flowed into a small swamp. The mission 
garden was situated in the small valley that was alongside the creek, which 
meant that when there was an unusually high tide, salt water from the 
channel was forced along the creek, up to the swamp. When this was 
combined with the heavy rains of a cyclone, the swamp would eventually fill 
and overflow, and consequently, the creek burst its banks, flooding the 
garden. The well that provided fresh water for the mission’s use was also dug 
in the valley, so was subjected to inundation by the rain and sea water.   
 
The effects of cyclones 
 
The devastation caused by Cyclone Ted triggered a number of major changes 
in the Gununa township. It resulted in the shifting of the old village from the 
vulnerable beach site on the Appel Channel, to the ridge, where one hundred 
and twenty new prefabricated homes were erected. The natural landscape 
was also drastically altered, the most talked about among those who were 
there, was the spectacular effect on the trees.  
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… come direct, straight in, straight in the pocket, full blast! When it 
hit, he burnt all them trees! - top, with the wind pressure. I don’t 
know what it was, but it just burnt, all that oak tree ay. Threw most 
of them seeds (oak tree) right up on dry land. Today, you go look 
there, you see oak trees growing up there right up the coast-inland, 
right up, up here, where this main highway going! (indicating the 
road to Birri Lodge, which is to the north of his house). Oak tree 
seed(s), trees growing, they were flung, taken by that wind (Melville 
Escott, personal communication, 2002). 
 
…Cyclone Ted was the one that made everything baldy, it took all the 
leaves, stripped all the leaves off the trees, and you could see for 
miles, because of the damage (Cecelia Reid, personal communication, 
2002). 
 
This appears to be a natural phenomenon remembered by all Lardil people 
who were there in 1976, when Ted tore across the island landscape. The force 
of the wind was so fierce, trees were stripped of leaves, and branches were 
snapped, and in the case of some trees, the bark was ripped completely off 
the trunks. Similar effects from cyclones have been observed in other parts of 
northern Australia, such as the Northern Territory (Skertchly & Skertchly, 
2002). From all accounts, the effect was similar in appearance to that of a 
bushfire, as described by Ossie Escott, when he awoke the morning after the 
cyclone. 
 
I get up now, and look, next day, it looked like big bushfire been go 
through, the trees had been burned. Burnt. Had no leaves on them 
trees eh, you could see right through them (Ossie Escott, personal 
communication, 2002). 
 
Ossie Escott is the younger brother of Melville, and a long-term resident of 
Mornington Island. He is in his late forties, and is partner to Alma Moon. 
Ossie has worked at various jobs, including time as a crewman on boats, and 
stock work on the island, and on the mainland. He also had an interesting 
cyclone experience which is related in detail in the following narrative. 
 
‘Good’ effects of cyclones 
 
On occasions after the storm had passed, the men would go down to the 
beach, and collect seafood that had been washed ashore by rough seas.  
 
They’ll find fish, fish in millions! Up along the tide (mark on the 
beach), where he chuck ‘em up…and where he sort of ease down, and 
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go back low (tide). And he look again, they might look-dugong! Still 
live one…kicking on the shore-side. Out here, you know, we used to do 
the same cycle how them old people used to do before – get up and 
go! After you feel that winds die down, no matter we got fresh beef in 
the fridge ay, people just want that fresh feed – that dugong or turtle, 
fish, crab, oyster, and them big prawn too. Big, ah, tiger prawn. They 
couldn’t survive that underwater current. Must’ve got caught, got 
drowned and washed up on shore (Melville Escott, personal 
communication, 2002).  
 
This is one activity that is still carried out, after a cyclone passes, by 
Mornington Island Lardil people, in much the same manner as their 
ancestors in times past. They take advantage of a natural event, which on 
occasions, also creates disastrous consequences. As well as providing 
necessary rainfall, the rough conditions result in washing seafood up on the 
shores. It is a positive method integral to their survival, within the context of 
a potentially dangerous natural phenomenon. 
 
I tell you, when we have real bad cyclones here, fish just get washed 
up and people go along the beach and they find fish kicking about on 
the beach. They just go and pick them all up and put them in buckets. 
They take buckets or they take bags and fill them up with fish (Clara 
Reid, personal communication, 2002). 
 
Clara Reid explained a food collection method using modern tools to 
continue a traditional gathering strategy, whereby they collect seafood 
washed ashore by rough seas, in plastic buckets and bags. Clara is in her late 
sixties and has a large family on Mornington Island, which includes sons, 
daughters, and numerous grandchildren. Some of her children work off the 
island but return for frequent visits. As an elder of the community, Clara had 
many experiences to relate regarding culture, community, and personal 
issues. 
 
Laws: old and new 
 
One point discussed by Clara, and which was prominent in interviews with 
other elders, was the issue surrounding the many elements of traditional 
Lardil law, and the Western legal system. Melville also spoke about how 
strict punishment by traditional Lardil law was, compared to the view of 
some people of today’s leniency of the Western judicial system, when people 
committed crime in the community. 
 
They knew laws, strict laws - they knew how to abide with it. You 
break the law, and that’s it! You don’t get punishment what white 
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men give you - punishment today, me and you - that punishment is 
(was) severe! You know what that severe is? – (long pause) - You get 
speared! Death penalty! Penalty is death! Me and you get jailed 
today for that, that penalty is twenty-five years imprisonment (Clara 
Reid, personal communication, 2002). 
 
The implication was that traditionally, punishment for breaking of laws was 
so severe, that people, especially the younger generation, were effectively 
deterred from any wrongdoing. The traditional laws as referred to by the 
people interviewed, included ordinary, every-day behaviour, as well as the 
more serious components. According to those who participated in the 
project, one prominent factor in the breakdown of present Lardil culture, 
appeared to be the attitude of the younger generation towards their elders.  
 
Clara further reiterated this issue stating that: 
 
In the old days, no children ever over-ruled an old person. If a child 
was ever caught doing anything naughty, it could be spanked by the 
aunty, or uncle, or the grandfather. That was the law of the land, of 
our days. No children were naughty in those old days (Clara Reid, 
personal communication, 2002). 
 
Traditionally, Lardil Aborigines were taught from a young age, to listen and 
learn from their elders. As Clara asserted, youngsters who transgressed the 
law, were punished by their aunt, uncle or grandfather, who in accordance 
with Lardil tradition, were responsible for overseeing the behaviour of 
nieces, nephews and grandchildren.  
 
Traditional law also encompassed the relationship between Lardil people 
and the Mornington Island natural environment (Binnion, 1987; McKnight, 
1999). Limited references of traditional Lardil law, indicated that there were 
rules that involved an association between people and nature that were to be 
followed, as a matter of survival. According to Lardil legend, the Dreamtime 
creator responsible for the weather is Dewallewul, who can punish the 
people by sending a cyclone if laws are broken (Trezise, 1993). In that 
context, Melville suggested that in the past, because survival knowledge was 
passed on as Lardil traditional law, it would be accepted, and adhered to 
unquestioned, by the next generation:  
 
Might be soft, he act strong too, and he gotta be strong - he naked, 
and he gotta survive to look after his family. He gotta look after his 
line - family tree. He don’t care about his own self, his life is nearly 
through. But them, them mob, their life is only starting. So he 
protect(s) them (Melville Escott, personal communication, 2002). 
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Melville’s statement meant, that the will, and the instinct to survive, were put 
into practice by his ancestor, to ensure the survival of his younger family, 
with the premise that they in turn, would carry on the family bloodline. This 
is in fact, the Lardil practising, “traditional Aboriginal Law and culture, and 
associated appropriate behaviours for coping with severe weather in tropical 
monsoon environments” (Skertchly & Skertchly, 2000, p. 43).  
 
Colonisation has meant that over time that traditional knowledge has been 
interfered with, resulting in changes, with which the Lardil had to cope. To 
outsiders, the knowledge and practice of adaptability and resilience, may not 
be visibly displayed by the Aboriginal residents of Gununa, but it is a key 
element of their survival.  
 
The effects of Cyclone Tracy, and other cyclones in the region 
 
There were also tales of the effects of other cyclones felt in the community, 
especially Tracy, which destroyed much of Darwin in the Northern Territory, 
on Christmas Eve 1974.  
 
Had that cyclone in ’74, we got half of that wind, and half of that tidal 
wave, sea. Imagine how far it is (from Darwin to Mornington 
Island)…it’s over the west coast-north western coast. I nearly got 
killed. I nearly got drowned! Well I was working on a boat up at 
Gove (on the north east of the Northern Territory coast). We (were) 
supplying petrol to Taiwanese vessels. And when I wanted to come 
back, the skipper asked me then, he said, if I’d love to spend 
Christmas with him-in Darwin. I said “No, I’d rather go home to my 
family”, you know? ‘Cause something telling me, “Go home, go home 
and see your family.” But I never really thought of dying, or getting 
sick, or them sort of things. He said, “Alright then, okay son”. So he 
brought me home - brought me out here (pointing towards the 
western coast of Mornington Island) - low tide, he was gonna throw 
me up, leave me at that new cemetery - but then, I seen a boat coming 
out - he my brother-in-law. Yeah, anyway he brought me back here, 
dropped me…then, coupla weeks after, it was New Year’s Eve - or 
Christmas Eve, it’s going into, going into Darwin, they couldn’t make 
it, they couldn’t make it. He tried to shelter, he couldn’t run, run to no 
shelter, because there’s no shelter there! He was caught! He was 
caught out in the open, that boat couldn’t go any (faster) - only ten 
knots. That’s all he done. I suppose he can go faster that, but, it was 
only a wooden ship - three masts, sailing - engine and sail. That’s fast 
enough though. Yeah, he got caught out - out in the open - and I been 
thinking about this a long time. You imagine how all his boat was 
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flung from the water - right up, on dry land! About twenty metres. 
Yeah, I lied down on the bed, and I turned the radio on…Yeah when 
that ah, I switched that radio on ay, right on time when that news 
came on, I heard, I heard that Cyclone Tracy struck Darwin. Right on 
the eve - Christmas eve of ’74. And I thought about my mates, I 
thought of my mates, “I wonder how they got on?” But they rang up 
to me, they knew that I was on the ship, and they had to contact me. 
So ah, one of them Tiwi Islands, ay? Melville, I think it was…That 
ship broke up there, smashed like a match box-impact of that cyclone, 
it was so severe, that instantly, the skipper and his crew just died 
(makes a whistling noise), in the blink of an eye! No warning, no 
warning whatsoever (Melville Escott, personal communication, 
2002). 
 
Following Melville’s description of the boat, and its duties, a search of 
literature indicated he was probably talking about the Booya. The Booya was 
a Dutch-built 35.8 metre, three-masted schooner, which was owned by the 
Denham Island Transport Company, and sailed frequently between Darwin, 
Asian ports and other remote Australian ports. The ship was built in 1917, 
and was probably one of the last of its type still sailing the seas at that time. 
Records say it had been sailing to Dili when it sank without a trace, during 
Cyclone Tracy, 24 December 1974, and four men and one woman perished. 
An article in the Herald Sun, dated November 1, 2003, stated that the wreck 
of the Booya had been discovered in shallow water in the Darwin Harbour, 
about five nautical miles off shore. It was believed that the vessel was due to 
sail from Darwin to Dili on Christmas day, and was carrying cargo, that 
included fuel and stores. 
 
These facts seem to agree with Melville’s description of the boat, “…wooden 
ship - three masts, sailing - engine and sail”, except of course, the Booya 
had a steel hull. The boat was familiar to people in ports in the Gulf, and 
western coast of the Cape York Peninsula, up to Thursday Island, and many 
older residents of Gununa recall hearing about its presence. Melville’s 
brother Ossie, related a story about when he was in Weipa at one time. He 
mentioned the boat by name, and also referred to its prominent feature, the 
three masts. 
 
Well, bulla, I was in Weipa - coast in Weipa, me and ‘nother island 
bloke, and this old sailing boat - he had three masts, we call it Booya. 
Big prawn factory used to be over here (pointing to Denham Island, 
that was visible across the Appel Channel) used to be doing the prawn 
season, and things…I was working in Weipa, that time - the three of 
us there, and the skipper said, “You boys ready to sail back, but - we 
have to sail up to Groote Island (sic)”, somewhere, you know, before 
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we came back to Mornington Island. And that time, the weather 
wasn’t too good, you know? That’s when Cyclone Tracy started, you 
know? Oh, that place been dark (because of cloud cover), three of us, 
we said, “Oh we’ll just go up the pub first, have a few beers”. And we 
thought that you know, it might calm down a bit - but, we didn’t 
really wanna go, you know? But we had something in us, you know? 
Like something wrong - something telling us. He went (the skipper) - 
So off that old boat went. Skipper said “Oh well, you boys can stay, 
next time we can pick you up again”. (He) went to Groote Island, then 
he went up to Darwin. That the time Cyclone Tracy…and all them 
mates mine, that’s on the boat, everything was…all gone! Skipper, 
and the boat…And we said to ourself, “We could’a been with that 
other mob!” You know…We felt Cyclone Tracy, you know? Yeah, it 
was inside…That’s my story now - Ossie, Escott. (Ossie Escott, 
personal communication, 2002). 
 
The premise of Ossie’s narrative was that he, and his two crew mates, could 
have been aboard the Booya on its fateful journey to Darwin. Luck or fate 
played a major role in why they did not take that voyage. In all likelihood 
though, it was probably their acquired abilities to read weather conditions, 
which caused them to forgo the trip. As Ossie expressed, at the time, they 
knew Cyclone Tracy had formed near Darwin, and the weather conditions 
over Weipa were unsettled, with heavy cloud cover producing a dark 
atmosphere. These facts, plus the knowledge that the skipper wanted to 
travel across the rough, open Gulf waters to Groote Island, was a deciding 
factor in their staying in port.  
 
It appeared that Ossie and his crew mates adjourned to the local hotel, where 
they discussed the weather conditions, after which a decision was reached to 
not board the Booya. According to Ossie’s narration, it was their experiences 
and knowledge of weather conditions with which they were familiar, that 
ultimately influenced their final decision. On reflection, years later, he 
surmised it was their weather knowledge, plus a certain spiritual feeling.  
 
Melville also went on to speculate about the effects of Cyclone Tracy. 
Whether this was based on his personal experience, or information he had 
picked up from media outlets - television and radio, or perhaps a 
combination of all three - it is an interesting narrative, nonetheless.  
 
It was about five category - five category cyclone, and I think he 
wiped, he even wiped aeroplane off the main runaway! Even at the 
hangar, big jets, tip ‘em over! Well that five category, ay, it be around 
about six or seven - about five - five hundred miles an hour! That’s 
fast! Two hundred is fast enough - two to three and a half - would 
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have been three - would have been three hundred and fifty kilometres 
an hour. How that cyclone lifted everything! Smashed poles - right on 
the old station, out there ‘bout ten, twenty miles away, iron flew from 
that main capital of Darwin. Yeah, right out in that ah, mustering 
camp and all that stations where they used to muster, ten twenty 
miles away - and that cyclone was severe (Melville Escott, personal 
communication, 2002).  
 
Melville’s estimation of the wind gusts was overstated, but from his 
perspective, it would have taken winds with that velocity, to cause the type of 
damage he described. The account of smashed telephone and light poles, and 
sheets of corrugated iron being found twenty miles away from Darwin, could 
well have been based on events he witnessed during Cyclone Ted, mentioned 
earlier. The effects of the winds on Mornington were similar, as he stated 
that high winds were responsible for seeds from trees on the island coast, 
being found some distance inland.  
 
Lardil weather signs  
 
Long before the technology available today, Lardil people relied on nature to 
tell them about weather patterns. The natural cycles were vital to their 
existence, because the availability of natural food coincided with the seasons. 
For the Lardil, the wet season was divided into two periods. Firstly, Mulung 
was for the period December, January, February (i.e. summer), and 
secondly, Lee-a-lin for the period March, April, May (i.e. autumn). This 
period traditionally, due to the rains, meant hard times for people, because 
food was hard to obtain, and living conditions were uncomfortable. Constant 
heavy and windy downpours confined families to shelters on the coast, and 
the inland areas were too wet to hunt for food. The Lardil diet through 
Mulung, was restricted to parrot-fish and mullet, captured from the reefs 
and creeks, and wallabies. Lee-a-lin was better, as salmon were in 
abundance, and other bush foods were in ample supply. Fresh water supplies 
were plentiful due to storms and the occasional cyclone (Binnion, 1987).  
 
My grandmother used to talk about cyclones. Always talk about big 
tides associated with cyclones. Big tide, strong winds – how they 
destroy, bring destruction with them. My mum always seems to 
know when there’s going to be a cyclone. I think it’s because of her 
experience in cyclones and from what she heard from my 
grandparents. My grandparents said if a cyclone was coming you 
couldn’t run – if you were to run, you would have to run in a zigzag 
line. She reckon because the winds were so strong, you would get 
blown away. But I couldn’t understand. Maybe she was in that 
situation where she had to do that. But the tide was always unusually 
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high just before a cyclone. No matter how many miles away from 
Mornington – kilometres away – it could be way up in Nhulunbuy. It 
could be over in Weipa – we always experience very high tides. We 
call them king tides. And they more or less – we get the idea there’s a 
low somewhere, you know (Cecelia Reid, personal communication, 
2002). 
 
The intimate details of the Mornington Island landscape and the sea, as 
indicated in Cecelia’s statement, were derived from centuries of knowledge 
about the natural environment, accumulated by the Lardil, which is 
traditionally passed on to the next generation. The local Indigenous 
knowledge is learned from individual observations and interpretations, plus 
the incorporation of traditional beliefs. Thus, Cecelia remembered the advice 
her grandparents imparted, about how to run if caught in a cyclone, but the 
observation regarding high tides, and the implications, were derived from 
her own experiences. 
 
And we noticed too with the weather going hot and cold – going to 
have a cyclone. And the formations of the clouds. But it’s when the 
clouds start moving and they pretty low and we get the real big king 
tides and it just gets so unbearably hot. But even before cyclone too, I 
think – fish – well, sea life – they sensitive to cyclones. Because before 
Justin (1997), a day before Justin, we went fishing in the channel and 
we just caught salmon, salmon, salmon. They were all hiding out in a 
jew hole. And we didn’t know. But after the cyclone we knew why 
they were there. Well, another thing too that tells us we may have a 
cyclone – the sea, the temperature of the sea. It’s very hot, really hot. 
You’re pulling fish in and you feel them warm – even bait. And you 
can tell when a cyclone is approaching too – when going to have a 
cyclone – the sea turns green (Cecelia Reid, personal communication, 
2002). 
 
The natural indicators mentioned by Cecelia were obtained by a process of 
observing changes in patterns of natural weather cycles. Cecelia knew from 
experience that when unusually high tides were seen on beaches at Gununa, 
there was probably a low system somewhere, in the Gulf of Carpentaria 
region. This is a reliable indicator, because the waters of the Gulf are shallow, 
and confined between the landmasses of the Cape York Peninsula, and the 
Northern Territory. When there are major disturbances in the height of tide 
phases, it is transferred through the sea, to other areas in a rippling effect. 
Therefore, as Cecelia explained, if a low developed in the waters even at great 
distances from Mornington Island, it affected the tidal levels at Gununa.  
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However, knowing if a cyclone was imminent entailed correlating a number 
of other natural weather indicators as well as tide levels. This is evident as 
Cecelia and others pointed out, that it was a combination of elements that 
forecast the presence of a cyclone. The common factors observed, were 
uncommon high tides, extremely hot weather, and low heavy clouds. To 
ascertain when the cyclone approached Mornington Island, Lardil people 
looked for further natural signs, namely frigate and booby birds flying over 
Gununa from Rocky and Manowar Islands to the north, and also seagulls 
from the other coasts, seeking shelter on the town airstrip.  
 
Local elder, Howard ‘Bluey’, Wilson, said he knew that a:  
 
…cyclone was getting closer when I saw the seagulls all flying in and 
landing on the airstrip (Howard Wilson, personal communication, 
2001). 
 
Howard explained it meant that conditions at sea, and along the coast of the 
island, were so rough due to the approaching storm, the birds sought shelter 
inland. From experience, he knew the storm was about one, to two hours 
away before it reached the Gununa township. Also, when birds referred to 
locally by the Lardil as manowar, or manohawk, are observed flying over 
Mornington Island, people know there is either a severe storm or a cyclone 
approaching. The birds nest on the small, outlying Manowar and Rocky 
Islands, which are located a short distance to the north of the Mornington 
Island coast line. 
 
Clara Reid confirmed this with further information regarding Rocky Island: 
 
…you can see it (Rocky Island) sometimes from Birri (Lodge) then, 
but you go further on, you see straight across. It got no trees – it’s 
just a big, high sand bank It got rocks there, and a big, high sand 
beach. Very rich country, oysters all around it, and turtle. But 
seagulls and pelicans and manowar and boobies live on that island. 
When we have cyclone, those birds come across to Mornington Island 
side, they stay along our side of the country (Clara Reid, personal 
communication, 2002). 
 
Every respondent emphatically asserted ocean tides are strong indicators of 
imminent severe weather conditions. However, it was not any single natural 
indicator from which they drew conclusions of impending weather.  
 
When this high tide – I know about this high tide – when it’s high tide, 
then you know the cyclone’s coming. And we see the booby and 
manahawk birds flying high. Them birds with bony wings, bent 
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wings, they start to come around, and the water get higher (Digger 
Adams, personal communication, 2002). 
 
Digger Adams, a resident of the Aged Persons Home in Gununa, at the time 
of interview was very old, stating he was born in 1936, and he provided the 
information with a degree of pride at being able to remember such things. 
 
Several people told of how past and present Indigenous Mornington 
Islanders read warnings from nature of impending ‘bad weather’, a local 
term applied to severe storms as well as cyclone conditions. According to 
locals, another reliable natural indicator of impending rain is the flying ant, 
which is attracted to light sources at night, and comes out in swarms a few 
days before the event.  
 
Traditional shelters  
 
Melville Escott described how his Lardil ancestors built shelters for 
protection from cyclones: 
 
They get that cane grass and they make a big, humpy too - shelter, 
like a, just like a anthill. But they, yeah create it, and make a big one 
– well, four or five family(ies) each, they help to create that thing. 
Might be a big one, you know, a large one to - (accommodate) like 
four families where it’s close to (their) relatives. They get together, 
they help one another - it’s just like them ants you know, how they get 
prepared waiting for rain? They gotta help one another, yeah, well 
like that. They get prepared! Preparation ready! Same like that. But 
them old people used to keep well away from - keep out in the open, 
or down where - where there’s wind-break. Not big tall trees, little 
scrub - they build that - it on a slantish area, on a hill. So that water 
don’t rise - it runs. Very clever ay? 
 
Smart. How they used to manage, you know? They used to get dry 
wood, get prepared - break ‘em up, stack ‘em up inside, and it was a 
big enough shelter. They have a stack load of wood there - lot of fish, 
meat, raw food waiting to be cooked, and they cook ‘em in there too. 
They take that stick by that water, where that water not far, so they 
can keep that clear distance between that rising tide-how far that tide 
comes, well they know how far the tide come in, they know where to 
build that thing. They just keep watching that rising tide-current. 
Yeah, we still do it today, we still, you know… 
 
Another way again how they used to survive, they used to get up on 
the top of the hill, where there’s no trees. If that cyclone coming on the 
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north side, they got to go on the south side - where they dig that - 
make a hole. They make a hole and put - make a little frame - and 
they make a little breathing hole too - to breathe air. But they wait for 
the right time - like you know? So, he just wait and watch, if it’s 
coming, he know that thing’s coming closer he (says) “Alright, time 
now, get in there”, and he put that bark over that hole. They lie down, 
belly-up, and he cover them with sand. Behind the hill, behind the 
wind break, that’s how they survived. The little air-hole too - but they 
used to put a rock, put a rock on that air-hole, (they’d sit up?) but 
they’d breath about that far off that hole (indicating with his hands 
about thirty centimetres), they can't breathe that far (indicating closer 
to hole) because they might be breathing grit and stuff, you know, 
coming in - they keep it about that far away - big enough hole. They 
get that bark, paper-bark, sticks too, just put the sticks up there on 
top, put the paper-bark on top, put the hole on that side - they lie 
down this side they just cover it then, with heavy sand. The weight, 
feel that sand heavy, on that bark there. When that cyclone, he over, 
they come out dry one (Melville Escott, personal communication, 
2002). 
 
The Kaiadilt people from Bentinck Island also had unique traditional 
shelters. Bentinck Island is south of Mornington Island, and is the second 
largest island in the Wellesley Island group. In missionary times, the small 
population of Kaiadilt was encouraged to move to Mornington Island, where 
they tried to keep their separate identity, as well as inter-marrying with the 
Lardil. In recent years, Kaiadilt descendents have moved back to Bentinck 
Island and established a small modern village. 
 
Old Bentinck Island people, they had this special grass, for little 
humpies. Luckily we had them old people that been grow up there. 
My cousin, and my brother-in-law now, we sitting down, watching 
now - soon as he been stop now (cyclone passed). Them boys had to 
go and break them big grass, but we never hide, we been make, like, 
little breaks. And we all sit down in that (Alma Moon, personal 
communication, 2002)  
 
Like a wungura (small shelter). Little grass-little thing! Cyclone lifted 
the whole building! And that grass (shelter), it hold all them… (Ossie 
Escott, personal communication, 2002). 
 
Melville Escott described the construction of the Kaiadilt shelters in more 
detail.  
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In them days they had no houses then…no houses. Well, I was told by 
an old person, old Indigenous person from Bentinck (Island) - well 
I’m married to a Bentinck girl - she come from here, she born here, 
but her mother from Bentinck. And ah, I was told by these old 
Indigenous people, how they survived, and I, you know, I think… I 
used to think - how they used to survive? You know? No cave there! 
Well they got here and there a bit of cave, you know, but - you gotta 
go down (to) the water. The, ah, tidal area - where there’s that, where 
(there is) rock. Where that wave he create the cave, to make a bit of a 
shelter…wave created that shelter. And every time it’s cyclone season, 
that tide he come up very high - and he cover that shelter.”  
 
But how, one old fella told me, how they used to survive too, they used 
to get this ah, cane grass - they used to get this cane grass, before, 
when, this sort of time now - they feel it, they feel it in them that there 
(is) gonna be a cyclone somewhere or (a) low. They get prepared, 
they get that, they get a double - they double that cane grass, and 
over Bentinck Island, that cane grass over there, (it’s) ohh, thick, 
thick, thick! especially along the creek. Yeah they got this grass, now, 
this cane grass, they get it woven - I don’t know how they do it - but 
they get it and double it, they double that grass. When they finish 
that, they make a sort of little window, to cover that too. They make it 
a double, so when that wind blow, they put that paperbark in 
between - like that, you know, that have it very closed - like two 
inches apart, or three - three inches apart. So that thin piece of bark 
just fit - thick piece of bark just fit in the middle, so when that wind 
blow, straight through that point, it won’t move, it’ll just lock on. 
Yeah with the pressure of the inside of the…yeah, you know how an 
aeroplane fly ay? You’ll be blown out if that …if there’s an opening on 
the side - suction, yeah. Well they make a little fire, to cook, and to 
keep warm too. And inside of that shelter, there they just sleep…sleep 
in peace, good, dry. But mainly old people you know, who really 
want to get out there and hunt, ‘specially after that cyclone (is) 
finished-when he passed through (Melville Escott, personal 
communication, 2002).  
 
Melville Escott expressed his thoughts regarding different survival methods 
of Aboriginal groups of the region, and elsewhere in Australia. 
 
Yeah, you go to another place, he the same, but he different again too. 
All tribes, they got different way of surviving cyclones. Alright the 
desert people, I don’t know how they… oh there…they already got - 
it’s created…caves and that. Not like we mob, we gotta build to 
survive, stay alive, build stronger things to stay alive. And then they 
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get that grass, that cane - grass, good thing that was - very handy 
one ay? Yeah… (Melville Escott, personal communication, 2002). 
 
These thoughts were given as a result of Melville having long, and numerous 
connections with Aboriginal groups from the Northern Territory, and the 
Queensland coast. Dance groups from Aboriginal communities from these 
areas frequently gather on Mornington Island for traditional dance festivals. 
During these events people renew acquaintances with relatives, as well as 
learn different dance methods, and participate in a general exchange of 
knowledge. 
 
Houses in Gununa today 
 
Lance Gavenor had a different experience of cyclones, saying he had not 
been in Gununa when severe Cyclone Ted had struck the township, in 1976:  
 
Cyclones? Oh, only two cyclones I been hit, in this (place) or three… 
about three I think, three cyclones. There’s one cyclone I wasn’t here, 
ah, 1976, I was in Sydney then. Cyclone Ted, yeah, I wasn’t here. 
About three, I was here. Ah, no nothing, nothing, no one lost their 
lives, but ah, few buildings got a bit bumped around, shaked up, 
(laughs softly) … yeah.”  
 
During those storms, Lance sheltered in relative’s homes, which were 
modern cement block dwellings: 
 
Oh, one of them, old type…them brick house, now. Yeah pretty safe, in 
a brick house, oh yeah, gotta be safe in a brick house. Corrugated 
roof-fly everywhere.  
 
Like most present Gununa residents, Lance intimated the ‘safe’ feeling that a 
solid building constructed of brick walls, provided to the people. When he 
was younger, there were different types of buildings in which he could 
remember Aboriginal families residing.  
 
Yeah, yeah, they used to have them old corrugated iron diners, water 
front, there, they had a big village there, they used to have ground 
huts, you know, to live in, sleep, houses with corrugated iron around 
them, that’s all they had. 
 
These homes were constructed down in the old village area along the Appel 
Channel shore. According to Lance, they were similar to the type of buildings 
they had when Cyclone Ted impacted in 1976. 
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Yeah, that’s when Ted knocked the whole village down, took ‘em all 
(the houses). Some of these new homes, they still stood up there, some 
of them fell down,… like old Clara Reid’s, them type of buildings…  
See, like what Anthony Jingles got, old mum and dad had one like 
that, but this only the front iron part went, and the two bedrooms left 
and the shower. That’s all lost - that’s when I came back from Sydney, 
then, that was 1976 (Lance Gavenor, personal communication, 2003). 
 
The new homes he referred to were the pre-fabricated houses built in early 
1970. They were the first residences that were erected on stilts, and 
contained several rooms. Electricity was also connected, and the new houses 
also featured kitchens and electric stoves (Binnion, 1987).  
 
Lance described where he lived now, and commented it was not a safe place 
to be in if a cyclone struck the island: 
 
Well I live in a house, yeah, in a house, family, relative’s home. It’s a 
little, low, upstairs one, it’s on the ridge up there…Yeah, one behind 
the power station there, fibro, fibro house. 
 
The house Lance indicated was one of the many that were probably built in 
the late 1970s, after Cyclone Ted, and were constructed of fibro walls and sat 
on metre-high stumps. Most of these dwellings were showing wear from 
years of exposure to general weather conditions, with the outside walls, roofs 
and wooden materials, in an advanced stage of dilapidation.  
 
I think he bit too old, now, I don’t think it’d be safe enough. Yeah, I 
think it might…see most the time, most people move out of there, 
some go to neighbours, or police station. I don’t think that house that 
I’m staying with a relative, I don’t think it’d be safe, not now. (It was) 
…built some time ago, now. Yeah, I’d rather go to a brick home. 
Another family’s home-relatives (Lance Gavenor, personal 
communication, 2003). 
 
Communications 
 
While the communications system for the island is sufficient, when there are 
severe storms in the area, television and radio signals are blacked out, as 
observed by Cecelia Reid: 
 
Yeah – go off, yeah…the antenna. We just get cut off. So we just cut it 
off, turn the TV off. The TV breaks up – picture breaks up. I don’t 
know why, but that happens to every TV on the island when there’s a 
cyclone. Yeah, it would be nice to know where the cyclone is. But you 
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can virtually watch it for the first – but once it’s almost here on us 
you can’t watch it. On TV they just show you a map of the Gulf, that’s 
all. But you can’t see the cyclone. I suppose you could watch it from 
elsewhere you know, outside of Mornington Island. It was – we were 
getting it from the satellite, our reports, because we weren’t getting 
much from the TV channels. We were trying and trying. Only ABC 
(Australian Broadcasting Commission) was pretty good – the next 
day we heard about Mornington being hit by a cyclone (Cecelia Reid, 
personal communication, 2002). 
 
This flaw in the communication system of Mornington Island has the 
potential for serious consequences. While early television and radio 
reception indicates to residents where a cyclone is located, and when it will 
probably impact, as it nears Gununa, these communication lifelines are 
severed. During this blackout, the cyclone can change course, or more 
seriously, intensify.  
 
The Lardil people possess knowledge about their natural environment, and 
the weather of their region, which is a result of thousands of years, residing 
in their particular surroundings. The stories recited by the people, indicate 
that knowledge of survival has been maintained, though both traditional 
strategies, and Lardil lifestyle which have been adjusted in relation to time, 
and Western colonisation. That is, the residents have had to adapt to an alien 
social culture imposed on their society, as well as keeping traditional 
methods of survival relevant, within the structure of their ever-changing 
culture. The information from the story-tellers, regarding these subjects, 
demonstrated that this knowledge was still passed on through generations. 
 
Clearly, Gununa long-term residents like Cecelia, have had many experiences 
with cyclones, and the associated effects. From their accumulated 
experience, these residents know that every wet season, there is a high 
probability of at least one cyclone hitting the island, or forming in the Gulf of 
Carpentaria region. Cecelia pointed out, that it is seldom the island that 
comes under siege from more than one cyclone in a year, although, that can 
also happen. She also stated that Gununa residents do not sit around during 
the monsoon period, worrying if a cyclone is going to come; it is simply not a 
priority. However, when there was a low system, or cyclone detected in the 
Gulf region, home-owners began pre-cyclone preparations. The cyclones that 
have passed over Mornington Island, in the last few years, have not posed 
any major problems for island residents, which prompted Cecelia’s vow that 
she would remain on the island, no matter how strong a cyclone may be. 
Because of its natural land barriers, any major disturbances to the seawaters 
in the Gulf region, brought about by a cyclone, affects areas within it, 
including Mornington Island. To most of the Lardil inhabitants on 
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Mornington Island, the place is their home in every sense of the word. Nearly 
all of the Aboriginal people over forty, who have been born and raised on the 
island, as they matured, have been taught essential traditional Lardil 
knowledge. Weather knowledge is a vital factor in their lifestyle, so elders 
tutored youngsters in reading various natural signs, which indicated changes 
in the weather pattern.  
 
Yeah, he got TV there at the house…used to have radio, but they bust 
that radio up, yeah, young children, teenagers. Yeah, still got the TV. 
That’s a good thing, that, look the news, and what’s happening round 
the world. Yeah, watch the weather, or you can do that too when 
there’s cyclone around, you know? (Cecelia Reid, personal 
communication, 2002). 
 
When conducting interviews and talking with Indigenous town residents in 
general conversation, there was a consensus that the weather maps shown on 
television weather broadcasts, were hard to understand, particularly synoptic 
charts. Although, like most of the Australian population, Gununa residents 
find stylised pictures of clouds, rain and cyclones depicted on television 
reports easy to grasp, they do not have a functional understanding of the 
lines, arrows and other characters featured in synoptic charts.  
 
Oh, yeah, they hard (to understand)…see most people don’t know 
about that… (Lance Gavenor, personal communication,2002). 
 
Cecelia Reid spoke about cyclone preparations:  
 
Yeah. The CDEP boys go around or men in the Air Sea Rescue, they 
get around and they pick up all the things that are possible missiles 
and put them away and people batten down their boats. Everything 
sort of gets looked into just prior to the cyclone. So everyone’s rather 
busy and people – the shop is – the shop caters too because it stays 
open and it even allows the people to get credit. Some people may not 
have food so they allow for them to get food and things like torches 
and candles. Get them because most of the time cyclones usually hit at 
night and everything else necessary, you know – like water. I always 
put a lot of water aside – 2 or 3 buckets of water. Ready for the 
cyclone because we know when the power goes off you have to – the 
water goes off. But this time, this last cyclone just this year, we didn’t 
need to because it was only a small cyclone – Category 1. I think it 
was a Category 1 – it could have been a Category 2, but it wasn’t that 
extensive. Yeah it just went past – and we still had the lights. We still 
had power on. 
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Cecelia stated some people would stay on the island, even if asked to 
evacuate in times of crisis, preferring to remain and look after their homes, 
and possessions: 
 
No. They won’t. You won’t move them. They’d stay. They wanted to 
send people off the island after Cyclone Ted because there was no 
water. Something like that. Or the damage that was done to the 
homes – homes were flattened – but they would not move. No, they 
love Mornington too much.”  
 
On refuge places in times of cyclones:  
 
Yeah there’s safe places. People go to the hospital, it’s good to go to 
the hospital because, well they’re prepared too, you’ve got doctors 
and nurses on hand. You got – even if there was a blackout they have 
their own generator to keep the hospital going, you know. So that’s 
one good place to go. Police station – you can go and wait in the cells. 
But I don’t think I’d want to do that. And they build houses today too, 
to, for cyclones. Yeah, ever since Ted, they’ve been building homes 
that suit cyclonic weather.”  
 
Referring to the guesthouse, Cecelia said: 
 
Even this one (the mission house) was built stronger. She had a really 
– you go underneath this place and you look at how they’ve screwed 
on things underneath and the timbers are hard – you know, very 
thick timbers. Yeah. And the roof. Cyclone Ted took a bit of roof off, 
but they put that back on and it hasn’t been moved since. Since 
Cyclone Ted. So the sheets are stable. I’d rather be here than 
anywhere else. I think this is the strongest building on the island, this 
house. I think this is the place I’d want to be. Guest house. Yeah, we 
get frightened. Mainly because of the wind that comes with it. The 
gale force winds – and you don’t want to be caught in a house where 
suddenly the roof goes off – iron lifts off – and you’re standing there, 
or sitting there, and you don’t know what to do next. Because if that’s 
happening you couldn’t possibly go out in the cyclone then. Be far too 
dangerous for flying objects, you know. Because that’s what 
happened I think in Darwin when Tracey hit. People weren’t 
prepared for it and that’s what – that’s our greatest fear because we 
learnt from what happened to Tracey – so we learnt to go out and 
find a safe place before it happened. And everything was in order for 
Cyclone Ted. People moved around, like, really helping everybody to 
get out of their hands if they didn’t feel their homes were safe enough 
and they were taken to safe places. All prepared and bedded down 
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before the cyclone hit. We were all ready for it – because we knew if 
we weren’t ready, we might get caught up like those ones did in 
Darwin. Yeah all this area down here was flooded – salt and fresh 
water mixed. Well, as soon as the cyclone is over everything’s sweet. 
The water just drops. The water inside just goes straight out into the 
ocean. But we’ve had weather in the past – growing up as a child, I’ve 
seen weather where we’ve had king tides and no cyclones, but we 
used to live down in the old area, the old village. And we used to come 
across, and just – see the ridge running along that way, high ride, 
and this flat area – that used to be full of water. Yeah. And we used to 
cross knee deep, as adults, knee deep. And us kids, it used to be up to 
our waist. Just to get across to this side. Not so much for schooling, 
but to do shopping. Yeah there were bad tides in those days. I don’t 
see that tide anymore, only when there’s a cyclone looming (Cecelia 
Reid, personal communication, 2002). 
 
Cecelia talked about the general attitude of the Indigenous people on 
Mornington, regarding cyclones:  
 
Yeah, I stay for cyclone any day. Once a year, yeah. You’re lucky to 
get a second cyclone. It may just come by, or you hear reports of a 
cyclone approach. But we rarely get two in one year. A couple of 
years – I think a couple of times we come close to having two in a 
year. People sort of just go about their own business until it happens 
and then they get ready, you know, but they don’t look in anticipation 
– “I wonder if we’re going to get a cyclone?” you know. They don’t 
look forward to it, they just accept it when it comes. And it always 
starts with a low pressure. 
 
This last Cyclone Bernie – Wednesday night, we were getting horrific 
winds coming from that direction and it was supposed to be up this 
way. We couldn’t understand. That’s why I moved from the back 
rooms to this side where Rachel is because the wind was just coming 
through to the toilet and bathroom and we were in and out and 
everything was just wet in my room, so we moved around here. And 
it was Thursday night when it was supposed to have hit and we didn’t 
get much out of it. You could hear the wind shaking the trees behind 
us here. Horrific. We didn’t have to move out of my back room. We 
went back into it and it was quite comfortable. And the wind was 
coming from this direction then, the actual direction that the cyclone 
was supposed to be in. Yeah, it was strange you know. Mum said 
“Well the cyclone’s on us now”, because the wind was very strong. 
Very gusty winds. Made those poor old trees – gave them something 
to shake for. But the next night when we were expecting the cyclone – 
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I think we may have gotten a bit during the day, but that night it 
settled down – was good. Cyclone was over – the next stage. The 
water still hasn’t quite cleared up… (Cecelia Reid, personal 
communication, 2002). 
 
The cyclone Cecelia referred to, Bernie, was a category 2 cyclone, which 
passed to the north of Mornington Island. Consequently, the island was 
battered with strong winds and heavy rainfall from the storm, for several 
days. The unpredictability of nature was emphasised, even to experienced 
individuals such as Cecelia and her family. During the event, in relation to 
the position of the storm, they were expecting strong wind gusts from one 
direction, but were surprised when the building was pummelled from the 
other side. At the time of the interview, Cecelia noted that water in the Appel 
Channel was still murky, as a result of the rough sea currents churning up 
the sand of the waterway. 
 
Lardil resilience  
 
The Lardil of Mornington Island have not only survived the invasion of their 
land and world by Western culture, they have managed to maintain and 
rebuild elements of traditional culture, which was destroyed during the 
upheaval of change. Although the Lardil culture now present in the Gununa 
township on Mornington Island is not the same as their forefathers knew, it 
is nonetheless distinctly Lardil. Many traces of the traditional features can be 
observed in the dances, craft making, and the Lardil language that has been 
preserved by elders, teaching the young and others who want to learn. 
Resilience has been a major factor in the evolution of Lardil culture, and 
linked to that is their environmental and weather knowledge.  
The Lardil’s traditional ability to adjust to changes was developed as a 
survival strategy, which they implemented to cope with seasonal 
environmental and weather conditions. Over generations, they learned and 
modified methods on how to live with normal weather seasons as well as the 
extremes, which on occasions affected the island with sweltering summers 
and bitterly cold winters. Particularly strong cyclones wreaked devastation 
on the Mornington Island natural landscape, and put the lives of the Lardil 
inhabitants at high risk to injury and death. 
 
When the missionaries arrived, the Lardil utilised their traditionally 
acquired skills of adjusting to different situations, to understand and devise a 
method to cope with the alien Western culture imposed upon them. This was 
an important phase in Lardil history, because it was at this point that 
development of a new form of Lardil resilience emerged. They constructed a 
system to contend with changes to their lifestyle. The prime instigation of 
major change to their way of life was the forced placing of their children into 
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dormitories, and the consequent moving of Lardil families to the mission 
area, to be near them. Ultimately, this action brought together four separate 
groups that usually did not associate with each other, unless it was 
necessary. Prior to the mission period, encounters between clans were brief, 
and were for trading resources, marriages, or seeking permission to enter 
another’s homeland. The act of having their young taken way had dramatic 
ramifications on a personal level for families, and for the clans, because it 
took away the next generation, which was the essential resource for their 
continual existence. Elements of resilience and adaptability were forged as 
parents dealt with their personal losses. The imposed situation made the 
Lardil face problems they had not experienced before, so they had to develop 
ways to manage. It was a unique strategy constructed by the Mornington 
Island Aboriginal inhabitants, as they received no guidance or assistance 
from elsewhere about how to cope with the foreign changes. Settling in a 
cluster of camps near the mission ground forced the groups to soon learn 
how to associate and cooperate with people from other groups outside their 
own. This process entailed adjustments to individual and group behavioural 
patterns, which the makeshift settlement needed to operate efficiently as a 
community.  
 
The Lardil developed their form of resilience by drawing upon internal 
resources and competencies, from within family and tribal groups to manage 
the demands, challenges, and changes, which they encountered. This 
highlighted the capacity of the traditional Lardil system to maintain its 
integrity, and the relationships and balance between elements in the 
presence of significant disturbances.  
 
In communities like those on Mornington Island, that are vulnerable to 
disruptive and destructive natural hazard activity, which temporarily 
incapacitate institutional resources, a focus on individual resilience and 
adjustment, is important. When such a disruption occurs, primarily it is 
individuals and families who will be responsible for their own safety and 
well-being until institutional resources recover. 
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Fire risk in Aboriginal peri-urban 
landscapes in northern Australia: 
Case studies from western Cape 
York Peninsula 
 
Jim Monaghan 
 
This chapter focuses on characterisation of the peri-urban areas of remote 
Aboriginal communities in northern Australia; fire behaviour and the fire 
risks associated with Aboriginal peri-urban landscapes; and the socio-
political and infrastructural aspects of remote Aboriginal communities that 
are relevant to fire hazard management. 
 
In particular, it focuses on Pormpuraaw and Kowanyama as these towns 
have been a subject of research by the author for more than 12 years; more 
than five years of this time having been spent living and working in both 
communities (Figure 9.1). 
 
The three main forms of Aboriginal settlement in rural northern Australia 
are Aboriginal towns, town camps, and Aboriginal communities.  
 
Aboriginal towns include places such as Fitzroy Crossing in Western 
Australia; Borroloola in the Northern Territory; and Coen, Normanton and 
Chillagoe in northern Queensland. They are small towns with populations of 
no more than 2,000 of whom the majority are Aborigines, and their 
economies are based largely on welfare payments. 
 
Town camps are features of the larger Northern Territory towns of Darwin 
and Alice Springs; their residents are people from outlying Aboriginal 
communities, and they come and go on an intermittent basis. Some residents 
are people who have been left stranded in town after hospital treatment or 
after having completed custodial sentences, others have been ostracised from 
their communities, and others are drug and alcohol dependant people.  Some 
camps are permanent and have their own services. Temporary ‘drinking’ 
camps arise in parks and other public urban spaces in Cairns and Townsville 
in North Queensland. 
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Aboriginal communities are settlements that commenced as church missions 
in the latter nineteenth and early twentieth century. The main reason for 
their establishment was concern about the effects of the pastoral, mining and 
fishing industries on the survival and well being of Aboriginal people in the 
north (Kidd, 1997; Loos, 1982).  The population of these settlements is 
largely of traditional owners of the country in which the community is 
located, and also of ‘historical’ or ‘diaspora’ people who have been relocated, 
mostly under duress, to these settlements by the implementation of 
Queensland Government policy throughout the twentieth century.   
 
Historically people may assert interests in ‘community’ country, even though 
they have no traditional affiliation to it, which are based on the precedent of 
their use of the country in recent generations and on the contingencies of 
State government legislation in the 1970s and 1980s which emphasised 
community land as a kind of generic ‘Aboriginal’ land rather than a domain 
which is subject to the traditional protocols of land allocation practice that 
are based on clan and kin affiliation. The influence of ‘historical’ people in 
community political life and community land management issues is greater 
on the east coast of Queensland in Aboriginal communities such as Hope 
Vale, Yarrabah, Palm Island and Woorabindah; their influence in the more 
remote areas of south-western Cape York Peninsula in communities such as 
Kowanyama, Pormpuraaw or Aurukun is negligible. 
 
The larger missions in Queensland received ‘Deed of Grant in Trust’ 
(DOGIT) tenure from the State government in 1968 and most of these areas 
came under State administration at about that time. There are 15 DOGIT 
communities in mainland Queensland whose occupants, other than some 
Council or Shire staff and service providers such as nurses; teachers or 
police, are entirely Aboriginal communities. The Queensland Government 
transferred trusteeship of the DOGIT tenure to locally elected Community 
Councils in 1987.  The Aboriginal Communities (Justice and Land Matters) 
Act 1984 (Queensland Government, 1984; previously the Community 
Services (Aboriginal) Act 1984) defines the roles and responsibilities of the 
Community Council and its powers to create byelaws. 
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Figure 9.1  Western Cape York Peninsula 
Source: Connell Wagner, 1989 
 
The Queensland Department of Communities (previously the Department of 
Family and Community Services) audits council finances each year. Each 
council is also a member of the Queensland Aboriginal Coordinating Council 
(ACC). The ACC comprises representatives of all of the Aboriginal DOGIT 
communities in the State and is a forum within which the Queensland 
government develops policy for these communities.  There are also 18 Torres 
Strait Islander DOGIT communities which are served by another 
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Coordinating Council. The Community Council comprises seven members 
who are elected every three years. They are served by a clerk who is also chief 
executive officer with a staff of about 30 people who provide financial 
administration, parks and environmental health, and building and 
engineering services that are typical of a local government authority. Unlike 
local government authorities elsewhere in Queensland, DOGIT councils do 
not have any legal obligation to the requirements of the Integrated Planning 
Act 1997 (Queensland Government, 1997) and hence do not have any formal 
planning function to deal with infrastructure, environment, or land use 
planning issues (Monaghan & Taylor, 1993).  
 
The geography of Aboriginal peri-urban landscapes 
 
Many DOGIT communities are experiencing considerable development of 
their hinterland since the Aboriginal Land Act 1991 (Queensland 
Government, 1991), the Native Title Act 1993 and the Native Title 
Amendment Act 1998 (Commonwealth of Australia; 1993, 1998) have 
provided mechanisms for traditional owners to make either land or native 
title claims to their traditional country, and are developing peri-urban 
characteristics.  Some townships are developing as centres around which a 
constellation of residential, smallholding and rural enterprise settlements 
are growing with the township providing retail store, fuel, and police, health 
and education services.  The geography of Aboriginal peri-urban areas is 
determined by a number of factors including historical land use trends and 
the location of the township in relation to the traditional country of origin of 
its inhabitants and the jural and proximal entitlements (Sutton, 1998) that 
are asserted by local people to urban hinterland country (Monaghan, 2005). 
 
Historical land use trends in Aboriginal northern Australia 
 
Most of northern Australia has a highly seasonal environment with marked 
wet and dry seasons. Prior to European colonisation, Aboriginal people lived 
a nomadic existence based on movement that followed socially and 
environmentally prescribed routes around the wet and dry season 
landscapes. The social organisation of these routes was based on primary 
and secondary rights of ownership or land use under the ‘clan estate’ and 
‘range’ systems of socio-spatial organisation respectively (Stanner, 1965). 
Each person had a distinct suite of rights of ownership or access to the 
natural and spiritual resources of particular tracts of landscape depending on 
their status within the local kinship and clan totemic systems that determine 
the distribution of primary and secondary rights. Primary or clan affiliation 
rights are based on patrilineal descent systems and embody notions of land 
ownership. Secondary rights are kinship based and relate to rights of natural 
resource use (Stanner, 1965). 
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With the arrival of European pastoralists and missionaries into Aboriginal 
country in the latter nineteenth century and early years of the twentieth 
century, a process of ‘centralisation’ took place with the movement of 
Aboriginal people into the missions or cattle stations that were established in 
their country. This led to the development of a set of socio-spatial relations 
amongst Aboriginal people which was based on whether their traditional 
country was ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ the newly established settlements 
(Anderson, 1988; Freier, 1999; Gribble, 1933; Monaghan, 2003a; Smith, 
2000; Strang, 1994).  Terms such as ‘myalls’, ‘station blacks’ and ‘mission 
blacks’ were used to refer to Aboriginal people on the basis of their origins 
and locations (Monaghan, 2005). These features are further reflected in the 
spatial and social organisation of households and neighbourhoods in 
Kowanyama and Pormpuraaw (Taylor, 1979; Monaghan, 2003a, 2005).  
 
Access to traditional country from the mission settlement was at least 
allowed and in many cases was encouraged by church missions which were 
often not in the position to be able to supply their residents with food rations 
because of their poor financial circumstances: hunting and gathering 
activities continued to be an important form of subsistence for mission 
residents (Kidd, 1997; Taylor, 1984). 
 
The years of Queensland State administration, from the mid-1960s to the 
latter 1980s, were characterised by a policy of ‘assimilation’ and a more 
enforced centralisation of what were now called communities, following the 
Aborigines and Torres Strait Islanders (Land Holding) Act 1985 
(Queensland Government, 1985); and land use and access to traditional 
country was actively discouraged by State administration officers (Kidd, 
1997). This prohibition was less so in the more remote communities such as 
Pormpuraaw and Kowanyama in western Cape York Peninsula where the 
distance from Brisbane led to the development of a more tolerant 
relationship between local people and the government officers who 
superintended their affairs (Monaghan, 2005). For instance, ‘holidays’ in the 
dry season landscape were still common in Pormpuraaw throughout the 
1970s and 1980s with families living in temporary camps out in the bush for 
weeks on end (Taylor, 1984).  Nonetheless, the Uniting Church was removed 
by the Queensland Government from their management of the Aurukun and 
Mornington Island communities in 1978 because of their active support for 
local groups who were setting up outstations in their traditional country 
(Kidd, 1997). 
 
DOGIT communities became autonomous with the transfer of DOGIT title 
from the trusteeship of the State to that of locally elected community 
councils in 1987. The Aboriginal Land Act 1991 (Queensland Government, 
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1991), the Native Title Act 1993 and the Native Title Amendment Act 1998 
(Commonwealth of Australia; 1993, 1998) have accelerated the ‘return to 
country’ movement which had gathered momentum through the latter 1980s 
and early 1990s. There are 13 outstations that have been established in 
Pormpuraaw since 1989; and 22 that have been set up in Kowanyama since 
1997. Outstations are the main features of the peri-urban landscape, which 
are now emerging around Aboriginal communities; they are small 
settlements that are located in the traditional country of their residents and 
are mainly occupied in the dry season, which is also the time of the greatest 
fire risk in the landscape. 
 
Structural features of Aboriginal peri-urban landscapes 
 
The main structural features of Aboriginal peri-urban landscapes are the 
immediate town hinterland area, dinner camps, camp sites and outstations.  
 
 
 
Figure 9.2 Magkara Lagoon is a popular dry season fishing place in the 
Kowanyama hinterland  Source: Kowanyama Collection 
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Town and hinterland 
 
The hinterland is that tract of landscape around the township that people 
can access year round without the need for a motor vehicle. It is the area 
where people will go to hunt or to forage for fruits and bird eggs; in many 
respects it is the community ‘larder’ and an important source of protein 
which is often expensive to purchase at the community store or which might 
be in short supply in the wet season. It is also a recreational area where 
families will camp out for a night or for a weekend.  With an extensive wet 
season the hinterland is inevitably smaller than in the dry season and 
extends over the area where water is shallow enough for people to walk or 
wade out to at that time of the year.  
 
Dinner camps 
 
 
 
Figure 9.3 Open fire cooking  Source: Kowanyama Collection 
 
Dinner camps are places where people will stop and cook their catch when 
they have been out on fishing or hunting trips (Figures 9.3 and 9.4). They are 
most frequently found near shady areas or rivers but are found throughout 
the landscape. They usually comprise a ‘kup murri’ cooking pit which is up to 
1.5m long along the main axis and about 0.50-0.75m deep. A fire is lit to 
make coals and these are placed in the bottom of the pit and the food placed 
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on top. In turn, the food is covered with either pandanus leaf or melaleuca 
bark, or sheets of corrugated iron; and earth placed on top of this covering.  
Food cooks very quickly in these ground ovens and a dinner camp stop 
where food is cooked, consumed, digested and the camp remains then 
cleared away is usually of no more than three or four hours duration. Despite 
their transitory nature, dinner camps may be longstanding features in some 
places because of the local availability of cooking materials, or the proximity 
of good fishing opportunities. 
 
Figure 9.3 shows Edmund Eric, a Kokoberra Elder, cooking a turtle at an 
open fire and Figure 9.4 shows Yvonne Jimmy and Ezra Michael, who are 
Kokomunjen [Yir Yoront] elders, ensuring that a kup murri pit has been 
completely extinguished. 
 
 
 
Figure 9.4 Tending to a kup murri pit  Source: Kowanyama Collection 
 
Campsites 
 
Campsites are found throughout the dry season landscape usually at 
locations where cattle infrastructure affords shelter and at traditional places 
which form the core of traditional homeland country (Figures 9.5 and 9.6). 
Many are in abandoned cattle yards where fencing still exists or timber is 
available from derelict yard buildings, or they are adjacent to lagoons.  They 
usually comprise shelters constructed from ‘star pickets’ or fencing posts and 
blue tarpaulin, with bed frames or breeze-block bases and old sink units 
supported by timber frames providing the furniture (Monaghan, 2005). 
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Figure 9.5 A dry season camp site  Source: Kowanyama Collection 
 
Families will holiday at campsites for many weeks on end. Children and old 
people are the main occupants during the week as many working-age adults 
are at work in the township and they join their families at the weekend. 
Truancy levels at community schools are very high in the dry season. Some 
campsites are considered community places because of their longstanding 
and school camps are held at them during National Aboriginal and Islanders 
Day Observance Committee (NAIDOC) week. There are, for instance at 
Kowanyama, four or five nodal campsites each of which, because of their 
location, has a distinct tribal or language group association and school camps 
are held at each of these sites for children from that respective background. 
Other campsites, which are usually close to town, are occupied by families 
who have camped there for many years, even though they have little 
traditional association with the campsite, they may be given permission to 
have their own camp site because their own traditional country is a long 
distance away. 
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Figure 9.6 Carrying water and supplies to a dry season camp site  
Source: Kowanyama Collection 
 
Figures 9.5 and 9.6 show aspects of a dry season camp site at I’ygow on the 
Mitchell River. This site, which is in Kunjen country, has had an outstation 
established on it since late 2002. 
 
Outstations 
 
Outstations are usually at locations where families have maintained their 
traditional links to their country in the occupation of temporary seasonal 
shelters or campsites over the years. Many of these sites now have more 
permanent ‘shed’ like structures on them which are set in concrete 
foundations and which have diesel generators to supply electrical power, a 
fresh water supply from rainwater tanks, toilet and shower facilities, and a 
communal cooking area. Each outstation usually has space for between 15 
and 20 residents.  
 
The majority of outstations consist of a cyclone-proof shed with a ground 
area of about 15m2 and 30m2, a generator, cooking area and water tank 
(Monaghan & Taylor, 2003). Outstations usually commence at a dry season 
camp. Once a site is established, infrastructure support in the form of 
fencing and water supplies, and concrete foundations for more permanent 
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residential structures are supplied as funds become available.  The minimum 
infrastructure requirements for each site are stock-proof fencing, a shed for 
residence, water and solar energy supplies, and toilet and shower facilities.  
A sum of around $20,000 has been allocated in the past for ‘start up’ costs 
for each site and Community Development Employment Project (CDEP) 
labour is used in their construction. The Federal Government has recently 
announced changes to CDEP parameters but as yet the effects of these 
changes are unknown. Longer-term aspirations are for the construction of 
permanent homes at some sites with the provision of between four and six 
houses depending on the number of families who live there (Monaghan, 
2003a, 2003b). People at almost all outstations have aspirations to set up 
their own enterprises and exercise control over land use in their outstation 
areas. Prospective enterprises include small-scale cattle or aquaculture 
operations, or camps for tourists and recreational fishing. People spend as 
much time as possible on their outstation in their homeland country so as to 
escape the occasional rigors of township life and to enjoy the tranquillity of 
the bush (Monaghan, 2003a). 
 
 
 
Figure 9.7 An outstation in Kokoberra country 
Source: Kowanyama Collection 
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Figure 9.8 An outstation in Kokoberra/Yir Thangedl country 
Source: Kowanyama Collection 
 
 
 
Figure 9.9 An outstation in Yir Thangedl country  
Source: Kowanyama Collection 
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Figure 9.10 An outstation in Yir Thangedl/ Yir Yoront country  
Source: Kowanyama Collection 
 
 
 
Figure 9.11 An outstation in Kuuk Thaayore country 
Source: Pormpuraaw Collection 
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Public and private space in peri-urban landscapes 
 
Decisions about where to locate outstations, and who should have access to 
them, are based on local criteria and negotiation between traditional owners 
and never involve any government agencies. Outstation groups are invariably 
identified either by the name of their leader, the surname of the dominant 
affiliate family, or by the name of the place or country where their homeland 
site is located. Affiliation, based on mother’s country or father’s country, 
underwrites the setting up of a homeland and the endorsement of all of the 
people with these affiliations is always sought before an outstation group 
proposes to establish a site. The group leader’s immediate kin and those of 
any of their brothers and sisters, and the partners and offspring of any of 
their children are usually the people who will live at a homeland site. 
Otherwise, membership of an outstation group is by invitation. People do not 
put themselves forward and ask to join an outstation. If there is a sufficient 
number of uninvited people, who are proximally related in both a 
geographical sense to country, and in a social sense to family, then they may 
form their own homeland group and look for a site elsewhere within that 
region that is available to them (Monaghan, 2003a). 
 
All outstations are private places and people are not allowed to visit them 
unless they are invited. In particular, they are exclusively Aboriginal spaces 
where people go to escape the rigors of township life, to assert their identity 
and connection to country, and to escape dependence on community health, 
education and police services.  Each outstation is the centre of a tract of 
country that either reflects the traditional clan estate interests of its 
members or an area that has been negotiated with neighbouring outstation 
groups and other community members. Many people may have rights of 
access to country even though they are not members of any of the outstation 
groups within the country. These rights of access are usually based on 
secondary rights of association to country and natural resource use, which 
are transferred through kinship protocols (Sharp, 1937; Taylor, 1984). 
 
The above processes mean that there are considerable variations in the 
accessibility of peri-urban landscapes, and their relative social permeability, 
which are also due to historical contingencies such as the nature of local 
mission and State Government administrations and geographical 
contingencies of distance from township, and wet and dry season access to 
traditional country (Monaghan, 2003a). For instance access to the 
Pormpuraaw landscape is heavily prescribed by traditional clan affiliations 
and outstations are discrete social and spatial entities that are maintained by 
various forms of social boundary defence (Cowlishaw, 1987) in public and 
private behaviour in community life (Monaghan & Taylor, 2003; Monaghan, 
2005). Even use of the Pormpuraaw hinterland is prescribed by clan and 
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kinship affiliation. This is evident, for instance, in distinct household 
residency patterns in the township and in the wet season in the distribution 
of dinner camps and fishing parties along the seashore. A walk along the 
beach from the Chapman River to the Mungkan Creek when there is a wet 
season ‘run’ of salmon or black-tip shark in the near-shore waters of the Gulf 
of Carpentaria is an introduction to the cultural geography of western Cape 
York Peninsula. On the other hand, Kowanyama is a more permeable 
landscape in terms of patterns of social organisation, and patterns of 
outstation occupancy and natural resource use. This is particularly so in the 
Kowanyama hinterland where hunting and fishing are largely regarded as 
communal rights for Aboriginal people and for white ‘staff’ residents alike. 
Further away from the hinterland permission is always sought of an 
outstation group if any hunting or fishing trip is planned in their country, 
and this is invariably granted (Monaghan, 2003b). 
 
The movements of any visitor to either Pormpuraaw or Kowanyama are 
always negotiated and planned before their arrival. People who arrive 
unannounced are accommodated if vacancies exist at designated camp sites; 
otherwise, they are directed away from the community. Kowanyama has a 
number of camps for recreational fishermen. Fishing permits are limited and 
demand for them is always high and never satisfied. The traditional owners 
of each camp site are consulted before the start of the fishing season on how 
many people may be allowed to fish there that year and a proportion of the 
fees that are received is paid into their outstation account and another 
proportion is allocated to the funding of aerial and boat surveillance of 
commercial fisheries in the Gulf of Carpentaria by community rangers 
(Monaghan 2003c). Tourist fishing camps have also been set up in the last 
three or four years at Pormpuraaw and some outstation groups there, as at 
Kowanyama, are looking at ways in which tourist-based enterprises may be 
included in future outstation planning. On the whole though, most people do 
not like to see strangers in their traditional country. 
 
Both communities also have a herd of between 4,000 and 5,000 cattle which 
are run as part of open range operations and the low nutrient status of 
pastures and distance to market preclude any financial investment in 
infrastructure in the form of fencing, paddock control and artificial watering 
points or bores. Nonetheless, people at almost every outstation aspire to run 
their own herd of ‘killers’ or ‘breeders’ and negotiations between groups and 
the ‘cattle company’ in each community to exclude ‘company’ cattle from 
outstation country or to receive agistment fees for their use of country have 
increased in recent years. These negotiations can be quite terse with the 
cattle people regarding themselves as ‘modernisers’ and as managers of a 
community resource, and the outstation groups asserting their traditional 
authority over community lands. 
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The community cattle operations are managed in the same way as any other 
pastoral enterprise in northern Australia and an important set of 
negotiations with outstation groups at the start of each dry season concerns 
the fire regime for the following year and in particular, when and by whom 
fires are going to be lit. These negotiations invariably require the 
reconciliation of two different systems of fire management, which are 
practiced by the cattle company and outstation groups respectively. 
 
Fire behaviour and fire risk in Aboriginal peri-urban landscapes 
 
Whilst some fires have their origin in lightning strikes, most fires on Cape 
York Peninsula are started deliberately as part of a land management regime 
of one kind or another.  Controlled burning of the landscape has almost 
certainly been a feature of Aboriginal land use for many thousands of years 
and many of the traditional patterns of burning in terms of the location, 
timing and intensity of fires are repeated in present day control of pasture 
for cattle grazing. 
 
The burning season starts almost immediately at the end of the ‘wet’ so that 
wet season growth and the more rank and unpalatable grasses can be cleared 
and cattle mustered or game such as wallaby driven out into the open for 
hunting. Early dry season fires tend to be low temperature and relatively 
small in extent. Burning continues through the dry season in order to 
promote the growth of palatable pastures for cattle, and increases in 
intensity and extent in the late dry season as the surface and interstitial 
water reserves required to promote grass growth become depleted. In 
October/November it can seem as if the whole landscape is either on fire or 
in some form of recovery from a fire. Indeed, a perusal of monthly fire-scar 
mapping between 2000 and 2003 by the Cape York Peninsula Development 
Association (CYPDA, 2003) shows that there are hardly any areas of the 
Peninsula that are not burnt at some time.  
 
Fire is also a phenomenon which is part of Aboriginal cosmology and is a 
motif of clan identity for some people in western Cape York Peninsula 
whereby they are required to perform duties that involve the creation and 
maintenance of fire in the landscape so that its contributory role to 
Aboriginal belief systems and the existence of the physical and social world is 
ensured. Traditionally, the failure to perform such duties would threaten the 
entire physical and social world and the cosmology or ‘stories’ that describe 
and underpin the creation and continuity of the universe (Sharp, 1937). Fire 
is linked through creation stories to other elements of the physical world and 
the narrative must be continuously maintained in story-telling and in actions 
in the landscape; for instance, members of the Grass Clan have important 
duties to perform in ritual aspects of the use of fire in land management as 
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grass is both destroyed and created by fire. The performance of these duties 
is an affirmation of personal identity and of responsibility to the rest of the 
community. ‘Smoking the country’ is a ritual act of purification of the 
landscape which is widely practiced throughout the western Peninsula, 
usually following the ending of a mortuary ban which is a period when areas 
of the landscape are closed following the death of a person affiliated to that 
country. This ceremony is very localised and performed at the place of 
strongest totem affiliation or sentimental attachment for the deceased. 
Mortuary bans often disrupt the operations of the community cattle 
company and also the holiday plans of visitors to the community.  
 
Traditional owners monitor the physical appearance of their country and if, 
because of the growth of understorey vegetation (‘rubbish’), they feel that it 
has not been adequately burned then they will perform that duty. Some 
traditional owners who have been away from their country for a long time 
will light a fire anyway, probably to demonstrate their ownership and their 
duties for the custodianship of that land. Such fires tend to be small in extent 
as, particularly later on in the dry season, ground cover can be very sparse 
and there is often little combustible material around. The large hot fires of 
this time of the year have to be started by incendiary devices that contain 
diesel or petrol. In summary, fire setting can be an expression of identity, of 
control of the physical, mythical and social world, as well as a land 
management technique. 
 
In a Natural Disaster Risk Mitigation study for the Pormpuraaw community 
(Monaghan & Taylor, 2003), local people regarded uncontrolled fire as the 
main natural hazard in the dry season landscape. In fact, uncontrolled 
bushfire was unequivocally identified as a greater natural hazard than 
cyclones or extreme wet season floods.  Fires can break out suddenly and 
extend over large areas very quickly. In this sense, they are the least 
predictable of all natural hazards. The reason for their unpredictability, 
which was identified unanimously by all of the outstation and cattle people 
who were interviewed in the study, is that the main cause of uncontrolled fire 
is negligence by people who drop matches or poorly extinguished cigarettes.  
Most outstation residents expect a bushfire to come in close proximity to 
their property at least once a year. Strathgordon, an Aboriginal-owned 
pastoral property about 60 kilometres from Pormpuraaw, experienced a 
bushfire in August 1999 that came close to the homestead and which could 
only be extinguished with the help of neighbouring pastoralists. The dry 
season is also the time of year when most tourists visit the community. At 
present, the activities and camping locations of tourists are largely 
unregulated though the community has established a Ranger service 
recently. The supervision of tourist activities is one of their roles. Camping 
locations at Kowanyama are more closely supervised and Pormpuraaw is 
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obtaining advice from community rangers there on procedures for the 
surveillance of tourists. 
 
One of the most unappreciated properties of western Peninsula landscapes is 
the number of Aboriginal people who are camped in them at any time during 
the dry season and in particular at weekends. The bush, both within peri-
urban areas and beyond in more remote areas, is literally alive with people, 
who move around either on foot or in four-wheel drive vehicles. It is hard to 
avoid people or indications of the presence of people such as a recently 
vacated dinner camp. Current scientific opinion is that most of the western 
Peninsula is a ‘wilderness’ (Abrahams, et al., 1996) with exceptional nature 
and remoteness qualities. This is quite literally an anti-social perception of 
landscapes in the region as they are populated by highly mobile, and in the 
context of bush hazards, highly vulnerable people. A few years ago, a search 
was conducted by the Australian Army for an area where ‘live ammunition’ 
exercises might be undertaken in the western and central Peninsula. The 
search was abandoned as it became clear that it was not even possible to fire 
a handgun at any place or in any direction without the risk of endangering 
lives.  
 
When people set up camp, vegetation is cleared on a large area of ground to 
create a firebreak and then they collect fuel and light a fire. Fires are 
continuously tended and when the camp moves on, fires are extinguished 
with earth and water and the remnants buried. Fire risk reduction is an 
abiding principle of bush life for people on the Peninsula. 
 
Despite the unpredictability of bushfires, Pormpuraaw people feel that they 
can manage and remove the risk of uncontrolled bushfires (Monaghan & 
Taylor, 2003). The fire regimes practiced by pastoralists, whether European 
or Aboriginal; rely on any area of the landscape only being burnt once, and 
twice in exceptional circumstances, in any dry season. Good fire 
management regimes not only promote fodder for cattle but they also 
remove fuel loads for future fires. Outstation organisers and cattle workers in 
Pormpuraaw and Kowanyama continually remind the rest of the community 
that only they should light fires in the bush. Planning meetings have been 
held at the start of the dry season in Kowanyama to formally plan each year’s 
fire regime and monthly satellite images and fire-scar mapping are inspected 
by traditional owners and cattle company workers to monitor the extent of 
burning in the landscape. 
 
The greatest risks of a catastrophic bushfire are around outstation sites as 
they often have generators and stores of diesel fuel on site. In terms of risk 
reduction it is clear that fencing around sites; well-defined firebreaks and 
little vegetation or vegetation debris within the living area at each site are the 
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best ways of safeguarding a site. During visits to outstation sites in 
November 2001 it was clear that those sites which had been identified as the 
most fire-prone were unfenced and had a lot of undergrowth and dry 
vegetation debris within their vicinity and were clearly at greater risk from 
late dry season wild fires (Monaghan & Taylor, 2003).  
 
 
Figure 9.12 Early dry season fire frequency 1999–2002 
Source: Monaghan, 2005 
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Figure 9.13 Late dry season fire frequency 1999–2002  
Source: Monaghan, 2005 
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Figure 9.14 Entire dry season fire frequency 1999–2002  
Source: Monaghan 2005 
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Figure 9.15 Outstation sites and fire frequency in 2001 in the Pormpuraaw 
DOGIT and Strathgordon pastoral property 
Source: composite of CYPDA June, July, September and October 2001 fire-scar 
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Figure 9.16 Fire scars in the vicinity of the Pormpuraaw township June 1994  
Source: Anyango, 1997 
 
Table 9.1 Bushfire risk treatment options in Pormpuraaw Natural Disaster 
Risk Mitigation Plan (Monaghan & Taylor, 2003) 
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Table 9.2 Fire management in Kowanyama Natural Resource Management 
Plan (Norris, 2003) 
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Fire risk reduction 
 
Table 9.1 provides a summary of the risk treatments that were developed, on 
the basis of current community infrastructure and human capacity, for 
coping with bushfires in the Pormpuraaw study (Monaghan & Taylor, 2003).  
 
The main recommended on-site treatments for outstations include the 
following: 
 
• fencing of outstations and the creation of a ‘buffer’ area of bare ground 
around living areas; 
• raise fuel tanks off the ground onto supporting stands; and 
• ensure an on-site water supply. 
 
It is clear from interviews, historical fire incidents and from fieldwork that 
those outstations that are most at risk from fire are either unfenced or have 
dense vegetation around them. At the level of regional infrastructure, 
anecdotal reports on the western Peninsula and fire scar maps created from 
satellite imagery (for instance Figure 9.15) show that there is a clear 
concordance between roads and fence-lines and the outbreak of bushfires, 
either from careless disposal of matches or cigarette butts or from arson. As 
in the rest of Australia, arson is a potential problem and clearly as new 
outstations are introduced then the potential for new access roads arise and 
hence the overall fire risk of the landscape that is traversed by them 
increases. Fire came within 200 metres of every outstation at Pormpuraaw 
on at least one occasion in the 2001 dry season, and to within 100 metres of 
four of these sites.  
 
Figures 9.12 to 9.14 show fire frequency in the Kowanyama region against a 
background of the major physical and cultural landscape units that have 
been identified in the region by Kowanyama people as part of a community 
natural resource mapping program (Monaghan, 2005). These maps show 
fire frequency between 1999 and 2002 and illustrate, at a regional scale, a 
stable pattern of seasonal burning with each landscape unit encompassing a 
fairly distinct ‘signature’ in terms of fire frequency and fire scar size.  This 
pattern suggests that fire regimes are as much a product of their physical 
environment as any prevailing land management regimes. There are some 
exceptions to this pattern in that late dry season burning to the north-east of 
Kowanyama (see Figure 9.13) is characteristic of a particular pastoral 
property  These outbreaks  have led the Kowanyama community to take 
precautionary measures in clearing firebreaks on the community boundary. 
Late dry season fires are invariably more extensive in area and in intensity 
than early dry season fires. Figure 9.16 shows the distribution of fire scars 
around the Pormpuraaw township in June 1994 (Anyango, 1997).  
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The occurrence of fires close to town is quite frequent and is mitigated by a 
fire break that is cleared around the town each year. Fires also come in quite 
close to Kowanyama and the Magnificent and Gooseberry Creeks, which 
always contain water, provide natural buffers to the spread of wildfire, also 
the country that is closest to the township is burnt and grazed early in the 
dry season so that later dry season fuel loads are never too high. 
 
Table 9.2 is an extract from the Kowanyama natural resource management 
plan (Norris, 2003) and provides a summary of the main points about 
community fire management in Kowanyama. The creation of firebreaks 
around outstations (‘homelands’ in Kowanyama) are part of annual fire 
planning with the community cattle company.  
 
The Pormpuraaw study also identified the following issues as germane to 
effective natural hazard risk management: 
 
• The difference in perceptions of risk from natural hazards between 
local people and the ‘staff’ population - local people are more accepting 
of these risks and of their ability, and the capacity of the Council, the 
police and the SES to deal with them; 
• The maintenance of risk standards in the future planning of 
community housing, infrastructure and land use; 
• The absence of a rate revenue base and the reliance on external funding 
for Council operations; 
• Training and equipping of SES volunteers and community rangers 
(Monaghan & Taylor, 2003). 
 
The main issues in bushfire risk management planning in remote Aboriginal 
communities revolve around the socio-political context of each community 
in terms of staff–community relations and local Indigenous systems of 
governance. 
 
Socio-political considerations in fire risk management 
 
Remote Aboriginal communities are characterised demographically by a 
large, permanently resident Indigenous population with a more transient 
population of service deliverers who are mainly European Australians. There 
are also two separate systems of governance in DOGIT communities in 
Queensland in a locally elected community council which fulfils the role of a 
local authority as is found in communities elsewhere in rural Queensland. 
The other form of government is in local polities which consist of tribe and 
clan affiliations that are based on traditional governance protocols and more 
recently in the 1990s and early 2000s in homeland or outstation groups who 
are the land-holders of traditional country. 
 
183 
With reference to Pormpuraaw and Kowanyama, this section of the chapter 
highlights the socio-political differences that exist between Aboriginal 
communities and the implications for regional-scale risk management 
strategies in northern Australia. 
 
Community demography and service delivery 
 
Pormpuraaw currently has a population of about 633 people (ABS, 2002), 
559 of whom are Aboriginal people who are long term residents, the majority 
of the remainder are white ‘staff’ residents who tend to remain in the 
community for between two and five years. Kowanyama has a population of 
about 1200 people and a staff population of comparable size. As was 
highlighted in the previous section of this chapter, the attitude of these two 
populations to the management of bushfire and other natural hazard risks 
can differ quite markedly. 
 
Staff are individuals and their families who have positions in Council 
administration or its agencies, or in the State Government service sector. 
Most staff are temporary residents, mainly non-Indigenous, and employed 
on a term contract. They are generally highly skilled people who work as 
police, teachers, nurses, clerks, accountants, and managers or tradesmen. 
Those employed in the State Government positions rarely stay for longer 
than two years and many are in the community under financial inducement 
or with the promise of a ‘fast track’ posting to a more a desirable location or a 
more senior position. Those people who work for the Council tend to stay 
longer. In time, all staff members move on and on the whole the staff 
population is a transient and changing one. About 20% of the staff 
population at any time are single persons. Married couples with no children 
or with grown-up families make up more than 50% of the staff population. 
Those staff families who do have children of school age send them away to 
boarding school. It is common for both married partners to find employment 
in the community (Monaghan & Taylor, 2003). A similarly constituted staff 
population is also present in Kowanyama. 
 
Turnover in the staff population can lead to swings in ‘corporate’ morale in 
the various service centres in a community and individual people can have 
great influence, if they choose to exercise it, in community life. More so than 
Pormpuraaw, Kowanyama is characterised by a relatively stable staff 
population who tend to remain in the community for a longer time. On the 
whole, western Peninsula communities have a welfare economy and local 
people have a low material standard of living by mainstream Australian 
standards. They are poorly equipped to deal with the kind of investment in 
supplies and household preparations that are normally undertaken by a 
family to prepare for a natural disaster and have great reliance on the 
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Community Council and Federal and State government agencies for 
sustaining daily life. Most of the employed population work on schemes 
funded by the Commonwealth government’s CDEP scheme that supports 
projects that provide or aim to improve infrastructure and social services in 
the community. Many of these projects in fact provide essential community 
services. The wages that people receive are the equivalent of social security 
or unemployment benefit payments (Monaghan & Taylor, 2003).  
 
Good relations exist between staff and permanently resident populations in 
both Pormpuraaw and Kowanyama. New staff members are often introduced 
into local families and many are assigned fictive relationships within local 
kinship networks which enable them to gain an insight into local systems of 
social organisation and modes of community governance. It is impossible for 
many staff to work effectively without this understanding of how local society 
works and those who acquire this knowledge and familiarity with community 
life are often those who are less susceptible to ‘burn out’. Council and other 
service staff are invariably busy people who are also faced with the pressures 
of being expected by government to deliver mainstream standards of service 
in contexts where under-funding, lack of peer support and remoteness and 
isolation often make such expectations unrealistic. Local people are often 
supportive of staff who would otherwise find it difficult to cope and help 
them to ‘cut corners’ so that their work may be done, mainstream goals 
achieved (though not necessarily in the way that government policy 
demands) and their morale sustained. 
 
The Pormpuraaw study identified a tendency for local people to rely on 
service deliverers, such as emergency services personnel; this is part of a 
wider pattern of dependencies that arise out of local economies that are 
overwhelmingly welfare-based. In another sense this dependency can be 
viewed as an active rather than a passive phenomenon, which is 
symptomatic of the way that local–mainstream relations are conducted by 
Aboriginal people so that their distinctive cultural and social identities are 
maintained. Australian government attempts to assimilate Aboriginal people 
into mainstream lifestyles have been described in terms of ‘social’ and 
‘material’ technologies (Chase, 1980; Smith, 2000). For the purposes of this 
chapter, social technologies may be regarded as paradigmatic changes by 
government in their management of Aboriginal affairs such as church 
administrations, DOGIT tenure and the introduction of regional scale 
Aboriginal government in the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
Commission (ATSIC) and Land Councils in the early 1990s; and now in the 
early 2000s the transformation of DOGIT administrations into shire 
councils, just like those that exist elsewhere in rural Queensland. Material 
technologies are those instruments such as housing and infrastructure, 
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health and education services, or telecommunications which are the expected 
agents of social change within any prevailing paradigm (Monaghan, 2005).  
 
To briefly summarise the influence of social and material technologies on 
mainstream-Aboriginal relations, the Aboriginal response to institutional 
change through social technology is to ‘underground’ the main cultural 
elements of their society and to accommodate social change within their own 
systems of social organisation. An example of the latter is in the fictive 
relationships that are assigned to staff people so as to place them within the 
local Aboriginal social universe.  ‘Undergrounding’ refers to the oblique view 
of the Aboriginal domain and of core decision-making by people about their 
affairs outside of the community council that is often only partially visible on 
initial visits to a community. Political activity is conducted within the 
network of locally evolved traditional and historically based protocols that 
determine social relations within any particular community and is 
exclusively Aboriginal. 
 
Aboriginal decision-making and relative autonomy or domains of 
relative autonomy tend to be concentrated in areas conceived of by 
outside interests largely as private affairs not as part of the public 
domain, and these are areas such as entertainment, gambling, sport 
and religion or ceremonies or whatever. In reality, though, these areas 
may be the very ones that contain focal and basic stages on which 
Aboriginal public, political and economic life is lived out and in which 
they exercise what to them may be quite critical areas of relatively 
autonomous decision-making. In other words, they are not a side show, 
they might be core activities for people, and core activities for whole 
communities (Sutton, 1990; cited in Rowse, 1992, p. 20). 
 
In terms of material technology, services such as welfare and pension 
payments and household and neighbourhood organisation, which have 
arisen from town planning, are received into local modes of social 
reproduction such as kinship and reciprocity relationships (Monaghan, 
2005).  
 
“Material practice is embedded in and is the articulator or mediator of social 
meaning” (Smith, 2000, p. 429).  For instance, natural resource 
management practice by community rangers in Kowanyama and 
Pormpuraaw includes the use of remote sensing and computer satellite 
images and global positioning systems as well as control of the 
environmental and mythical properties of the landscape from those special 
places, poison places or increase sites, where the ritual knowledge and belief 
systems that are associated with natural resource management are located. 
There is no sense of any traditional or modern dichotomies in management 
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practice by rangers; instead, all of the technologies and techniques that are 
used by them are regarded as one integral suite of management tools 
(Monaghan; 2001, 2005). Community rangers are also at a nexus between 
the delivery of mainstream services or the enforcement of mainstream 
regulations and local customary practice, and on the whole they try not to 
confront the authority of traditional owners who may accuse them of acting 
‘like a white fella’, or who may invoke clan and kinship affiliations to 
question the authority under which a ranger is working in any situation. The 
latter criticisms are strongest in any issue to do with land management, more 
so in homeland country. Also, such criticisms are strongest in issues, such as 
bushfire risk management, where the feeling is that intervention or support 
from outside is not required because most people feel that they deal with the 
issue adequately; and when such opinions are expressed then this is often 
true.   
 
The successful introduction of mainstream management practices into local 
communities, whether they are Aboriginal or otherwise, requires a period of 
time in which they are allowed to embed themselves into local practice. 
Moreover, the uptake of mainstream management practices is even more 
successful if people are made aware of their availability and then left to make 
their own decisions on their utility; and, providing a grant or unsolicited 
financial aid is absolutely no guarantee of success. 
 
Homelands are becoming more autonomous political and land-holding 
entities in the early 2000s in Cape York Peninsula and native title rights and 
forthcoming legal changes in the way that Aboriginal community councils 
are constituted are probably going to make them the authority and 
operational unit in the management of Aboriginal peri-urban landscapes 
within the foreseeable future.  
 
Political considerations in the management of Aboriginal peri-
urban landscapes 
 
As stated earlier in this chapter, there are two forms of government in 
remote Aboriginal communities in the locally elected council and in the 
‘Aboriginal domain’ of tribe, clan or kinship affiliations. These polities tend 
to look after the affairs of the township and the landscape respectively. 
 
Councils comprise seven members and are elected every three years. Each 
council has a chair elected from their membership and a Council Clerk or 
Chief Executive Officer is responsible to Council for the administration of the 
community. Membership of the council in Pormpuraaw is usually 
representative of the ‘tribe’ or language groups who live there. The township 
is divided into two neighbourhoods based on linguistic affiliations. There are 
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speakers of Wik dialects in the northern neighbourhood – ‘Mungkan side’ 
and speakers of Kuuk Thaayore on the southern – ‘Thaayore side’. There are 
also Yir Yoront speakers on Thaayore side and speakers of non-Wik dialects 
such as Bakanh on Mungkan side. The distinctions between the two 
neighbourhoods are based on language and clan estate affiliations and there 
is little overlap between people in these groups in daily life.  The composition 
of the council at Kowanyama is more eclectic and reflects a larger and more 
heterogeneous population whose traditional country may be found over a 
wide area of the southern and western Peninsula and the northern Gulf 
country.  
 
Pormpuraaw (formerly the Edward River Mission) was the last Aboriginal 
mission to be established in Queensland in 1939 whereas Kowanyama 
(formerly the Mitchell River Mission) was established in 1903. There are 
clear differences between the two communities in their colonial histories and 
in their respective geographies in the way that State-assigned reserve 
boundaries coincided with the underlying political geography of pre-contact 
Aboriginal tribes and language groups at the time of their establishment. For 
instance, Pormpuraaw traditional owners have lineages based on descent to 
the mythical figures who are emblems of clan identity (Taylor, 1984) and 
those in Kowanyama mainly have a cognatic system based on connection to 
apical ancestors who are identified by the name of those male ancestors who 
were alive at around the time of the establishment of the Mitchell River 
Mission (Taylor, 1999). Despite the post-colonial changes that have occurred 
in social organisation, almost all patterns of social behaviour and land 
management practice in both communities find parallels in those recorded 
by ethnographers in the early years of the twentieth century (McConnel, 
1931; Sharp, 1937; Roth, 1907). 
 
The most visible form of Aboriginal polity in community life and the one that 
has the greatest authority in land management is the homeland or outstation 
group.  
 
The role of the leader and their capacity as a broker in reconciling 
secular and traditional interests in their homeland country and in 
negotiating for homeland services with the Community Council or with 
government agencies is crucial to the success of a homeland group. 
Three or four homeland groups may combine to form a ‘mutual society’ 
of support for their members. These societies prioritise homeland 
development plans between themselves and make plans for 
enterprises, such as cattle grazing, aquaculture or fish ranching, or 
tourist fishing camps to sustain their homelands in the future. They 
occupy geographically contiguous areas and share strong clan 
associations and also have the strongest corporate identities in 
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community life. Their ‘focal’ leaders, of which there are four or five in 
Kowanyama and in Pormpuraaw, exercise considerable influence and 
their groups are the basic operational units in community natural 
resource planning and management in sea and inland country on the 
southern Gulf Lowlands (Monaghan, 2005). 
 
Focal leaders often exercise a quiet authority and can have a low and under-
stated profile in community life so that, for instance in Kowanyama, they 
may appear to have little or no involvement in mainstream affairs or in the 
community council. Homeland groups are identifiable in township life as 
large co-resident groups with members often living in houses that are in 
close proximity to each other (Monaghan, 2005).  
 
Other distinguishing criteria which can set homeland groups apart from the 
rest of the township include the following: 
 
• stability of co-residence; 
• a common surname; 
• cognatic descent or clan affiliation to geographically contiguous areas 
of the landscape; and 
• an age and gender balance in their membership that maintains a high 
reproductive potential for the group (Monaghan, 2005). 
 
These criteria are not exclusive of each other and all criteria have to be 
satisfied before a homeland group can be confidently identified. For 
instance, a high density of a common surname in one part of the township is 
not necessarily indicative of the presence of a homeland group. Stability of 
residence is a particularly important indicator which can only be established 
by repeated censuses of household residents over many years. Three 
household surveys over a period of more than 15 years at Pormpuraaw have 
demonstrated that household mobility, a feature of Aboriginal community 
life, whereby people move between households over periods of weeks or 
months, is virtually absent in those households occupied by homeland 
groups (Monaghan, 2005). The national census cannot be used to profile 
homeland groups as they can only be identified at the household level 
(Monaghan, 2005). Their identification relies more on sociological than 
economic criteria as almost all community residents are participants in a 
welfare economy. Household or group ‘wealth’ is more evident 
demographically in terms of the number of women of reproductive age and 
in the number of young people who can act as future leaders for a homeland 
group and who can lobby for their interests in community life. Also from an 
economic perspective, a good distribution of children, working adults and 
pensioners may not necessarily endow advantages in terms of gross income 
but it can ensure access to a spectrum of welfare, wage and pension incomes 
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at different intervals over the fortnightly household income cycle 
(Monaghan, 2005).  
 
Homeland group membership, like traditional clan affiliation, forms a 
sociocentric or corporate identity for those people who have access to that 
place where their homeland is situated. There are also other people who have 
their own egocentric or personal rights to homeland country through 
traditional law but who are not members of a homeland group resident in 
that country. These latter rights may include important ritual links to 
country and even though they are not members of the homeland group, these 
people have to be acknowledged or consulted in land management issues. 
Their absence from group membership does not mean that they have a 
minor role in the affairs of homeland country. ‘Ideological’ or personal 
identities are heavily grounded in traditional law and in personal 
sensibilities of ‘being’; the protocols of kinship and clan or homeland 
affiliation also enhance the unique sense of identity that each person has in 
Aboriginal society, and because of this individualism, a wide variety of 
opinions can be expressed in community political life. The contingencies that 
relate homeland group or sociocentric identity to personal or ideological 
identity are quite complex (Monaghan, 2005); at the very least it has to be 
understood that even though a person may not be a member of a homeland 
group that this does not necessarily exclude them from ‘talking for country’. 
Conversely, a person may be a member of a homeland group and be actively 
involved in land management issues but have no authority to ‘talk for 
country’.  
 
Implications of socio-political organisation for bushfire risk 
assessment 
 
There is a general resistance, in Cape York Peninsula at least, to any attempts 
at regional level organisation of issues that concern homeland country. Also, 
despite the widespread structural similarities in homeland group 
characteristics in Aboriginal Australia there are considerable differences in 
their modus operandi, even between two adjacent communities such as 
Pormpuraaw and Kowanyama, which preclude generalisations that might be 
made about fire management or regional scale peri-urban trends in remote 
Aboriginal communities. Fire behaviour and fire management practices can 
only be understood at the community scale.  
 
The significance of social and group, and ideological and personal identities 
had to be continually borne in mind in the Pormpuraaw Natural Disaster 
Risk Management study (Monaghan & Taylor, 2003) and thus community 
consultation was time-consuming as it had to include consideration of 
mainstream organisation in the community council and its agencies, and the 
 
190 
various traditional and contemporary polities that make up the Aboriginal 
domain there. Many people in remote communities, and not just Aboriginal 
communities, will assume that the investigator has an understanding of local 
political life and local modes of social organisation because the community is 
their entire social universe and they know no other.  Some may only visit a 
regional urban centre such as Cairns or Townsville for their birth and their 
death. Consequently, research prior to a visit or some time devoted to getting 
to know people is crucial before the start of any study as ignorance of the 
ways of local society on the part of ‘outsiders’ is often not tolerated in remote 
communities.  Certainly, attempts to sample people in surveys or reference 
groups, as opposed to getting a complete census of opinion, that the author 
has observed in natural and cultural resource management projects over the 
years have rarely succeeded in eliciting adequate information or 
participation to make subsequent management plans work. Everybody has to 
be personally invited, and many people will be gratified by the invitation and 
will then defer to the authority of community leaders, otherwise any 
recommendations resulting from a study will be ignored.   
 
‘Mainstreaming' approaches adopted by regional planning strategies such as 
the Cape York Land Use Study (CYPLUS) to community consultation in the 
mid-1990s failed to recognise the diverse range of natural resource interests 
and the local polities that exist within communities in the Peninsula 
(Monaghan, 2005).  Similar encounters between Aboriginal communities 
and State agencies involved in land and natural resource use planning and 
management have been reported elsewhere (Lane & Chase, 1996).  
 
Lane and Chase describe land use projects in the Lockhart River area of the 
east coast of the Peninsula, and report that despite the existence of formal 
planning processes for their inclusion, that there was often only a limited 
recognition of Aboriginal perspectives in the projects. 
 
Too often the ‘community’ is seen simply as a homogenous unit, with a 
simple representative structure (the council) which somehow stands 
for or represents the varied local traditional interests in an 
unproblematic way (Lane & Chase, 1996, p. 182). 
 
The creation of formal planning structures should be the outcome of 
careful and detailed local ethnographic inputs, an appreciation of local 
historical factors and, more importantly, detailed knowledge about the 
politics of relevant Aboriginal communities and domains (Lane & 
Chase, 1996, p. 173). 
 
 
191 
Similar criticisms can be applied to academic studies of Aboriginal natural 
resource management where ‘culture’ is treated as an indeterminate constant 
or invariant background to management practice, and where the interactions 
between social practice and management practice are reviewed in terms of 
‘traditional’ and ‘modern’ dichotomies, which are largely unrecognisable to 
the Aboriginal people with whom the author has worked. 
 
At the same time consultation has to consider the multi-valence that attaches 
to statements about the landscape and the wide range of  economic, 
mythological, kinship, or resource and ownership values that can be 
expressed for any place within it. Statements about country, either its 
physical or social properties, can rarely be taken at face value; sometimes, 
the social context of the informant has to be known before their statements 
can be interpreted. This distinction has to be borne in mind in natural 
hazard risk assessment as in other resource assessment studies when people 
talk about bushfire, are their comments grounded in the general knowledge 
of the physical environment and its seasonality that most people share, or 
does it have a phenomenological base in the totem affiliations, and stories or 
experiences that underpin personal identity? More importantly with 
questions related to management – does this person have the authority to 
make recommendations about risk management strategies in any particular 
area of the landscape?  Such assessments are critical if management 
recommendations are part of the outcomes of a study. 
 
Above all, the aims of a community consultation have to be presented clearly 
and unambiguously as there are barriers of language and vocabulary that 
sometimes have to be overcome so that participants may be able to 
contribute their own risk values or mitigation strategies to community 
planning confidently. The use of a geographical information system to store 
and display graphical media that represent landscapes and infrastructure 
and environmental hazards and that also presented risk models and local 
perspectives of the landscape based on recognisable landmarks has been 
particularly effective in natural hazard risk assessment in Pormpuraaw 
(Monaghan & Taylor, 2003) and in natural resource assessment projects 
there and in Kowanyama (Monaghan, 2005).  
 
The changes to Aboriginal community governance that are now taking place 
as a result of the introduction of shire councils and of ongoing native title 
determinations, mean that in the future the affairs of the township and the 
landscape will be dealt with by different bodies. The administration of the 
township will be by a council that operates under the various local 
government acts that apply to local authorities elsewhere in the State, and 
that of the landscape will be by homeland groups. The latter may function 
cooperatively as a lands trust with each group acting as a ‘prescribed body 
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corporate’ under Queensland corporate law and federal native title 
legislation. Such arrangements already exist at Injinoo and Hope Vale, where 
land claim determinations under the Aboriginal Land Act 1991 (Queensland 
Government, 1991), the Native Title Act 1993 and the Native Title 
Amendment Act 1998 (Commonwealth of Australia; 1993, 1998) have 
already been made. This will lead to a higher profile and greater visibility for 
homeland leaders in public life and also one might anticipate a more densely 
occupied peri-urban landscape where the present day townships provide a 
service centre for the appropriate hinterland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A modified version of this chapter was first published as Fire risk in Aboriginal peri-urban 
landscapes in North Australia: Case studies from western Cape York Peninsula, on a Centre 
for Disaster Studies web site in April 2004. 
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10 
 
Bushfires at the  
urban-rural interface 
 
Luke J. Balcombe 
 
Bushfire-prone areas of most concern to the Australian public, Governments 
and fire authorities are those where the economic costs and 
social/environmental impacts are greatest. Such impacts of bushfire appear 
to have been experienced more intensely in the south-eastern states/territory 
of Australia and to a lesser extent in Western Australia and Queensland. The 
most significant bushfire risks in Australia generally occur where populated 
areas meet with areas of bushfire risk – the areas referred to as the rural-
urban interface. 
 
The rural-urban interface 
 
Rural-urban interface areas exist wherever homes and other developments 
are intermixed among trees and other combustible vegetation. The rural-
urban interface or peri-urban developments in Australia are also known as 
the wildland-urban interface when referring to the equivalent in North 
America. 
 
The conception of the physical layout of peri-urban locations needs some 
clarification according to Cottrell (2005): 
 
Peri-urban zones can be totally new suburbs with small lot housing, 
shopping centres, service facilities, but essentially a suburb next to 
bushland. Peri-urban zones can also be large lot suburban 
developments. In many areas, they may be a mix of suburban and 
industrial zones as housing has spread into peripheral industrial 
estates. In other areas they may be conurbations gradually infilling 
unsettled areas on the periphery, and in yet other areas they may be 
encroaching on rural production (Cottrell, 2005, p. 110). 
 
Communities in the rural-urban interface (areas on the fringes of cities) tend 
to feature relatively large populations living in close proximity to highly-
flammable bushland areas. High fuel loads are often complicated by rugged 
topography with poor access and exit points. A high proportion of the 
inhabitants in these areas are commuters with little experience of living in 
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the bush or fending for themselves in a major fire (Miller, Carter & Stephens 
1984). Nicholson (1995) suggests that “fringe communities are the most 
vulnerable part of the Australian and world wide environment” (p. 3). 
 
In the context of bushfires there are four general types of urban-rural 
interface conditions that may occur:  
 
1. Interface condition: Structures adjoin bushland fuels. There is a 
clear line of separation between structures and bushland fuels along 
roads or back fences. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1 Interface condition – Tamborine Mountain, Queensland 
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2. Intermix condition: Structures are scattered throughout the 
bushland area. There is no clear line of separation; bushland fuels 
are continuous outside of and within the developed area. 
 
 
 
Figure 10.2 Intermix condition – Tamborine Mountain, Queensland 
 
3. Occluded condition: Structures abut an island of bushland fuels, 
normally within a city, such as a park or other open space. There is a 
clear line of separation between structures and bushland fuels along 
roads or fences. 
 
 
Figure 10.3 Occluded condition 
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4. Rural condition: Scattered small clusters of structures (such as 
ranches, farms, resorts) are exposed to bushland fuels and there is 
much space between developments.  
 
 
 
Figure 10.4 Rural condition – Tamborine Mountain, Queensland 
 
In response to the devastating effects of the Canberra fires in January 2003, 
there has been an increased interest within the Queensland Fire and Rescue 
Service (QFRS) in the identification and management of the urban-rural 
interface.  The interface zone (i-Zone in Queensland) is where human 
population and flammable vegetation meet and is also known as the urban-
rural interface zone.  The classic example of this is where high-density 
housing is in close proximity to flammable vegetation, as was the case in 
Canberra (Type 1 i-Zone). Another type of dangerous interface zone is 
present in Australia, where rural residential properties are set amongst 
flammable vegetation and this has been identified as Type 2 i-Zone. 
 
The GIS/ Risk Management division of QFRS undertook a project to identify 
these two types of i-Zone.  They used two criteria for the model, firstly 
population density which was derived from a combination of land parcel size 
and proximity to the next property and secondly vegetation flammability (as 
identified in previous studies of bushfire risk). 
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Figure 10.5 Type 1 i-Zone   Figure 10.6 Type 2 i-Zone 
 
The resulting categorisation identifies potential areas of concern for both 
urban and rural brigades.  Specialised training for those personnel working 
within these areas of concern was identified by the QFRS as being required 
so as to reduce the potential risk of serious loss of structures and life.  The 
two types of i-Zone are illustrated in Figures 10.5 and 10.6.  Figures 10.7 and 
10.8 (below) indicate where the two types of i-Zone can be found in the 
Mount Tamborine and the northern Gold Coast area. 
 
The National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management says that the 
i-Zone project is about holistic service delivery for communities in the rural-
urban interface zone: “It is focused on Fire and Rescue Service personnel and 
how they can make a difference through a shift in culture, from separateness 
to inclusiveness” (Ellis, et al., 2005, p. 195). There is mention that the service 
providers can make gains by resolving i-Zone challenges in every aspect of 
service delivery, from the planning of new developments through to 
community education and awareness, service delivery planning, and 
response activities. 
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Figure 10.7 Mount Tamborine 
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 Figure 10.8  Northern Gold Coast 
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Current Situation 
 
Consequently, there is strong recognition that the interactions between the 
fire services and the communities they serve are crucial if there is to be 
successful avoidance of substantial losses to infrastructure and property, 
especially to interface zone housing. The legacy of some very poor planning 
decisions that were implemented three to four decades ago, exposing many 
interface zone housing areas to impact by high intensity fire is now apparent. 
As history has shown all too graphically, that threat can easily be realized 
whenever the necessary elements combine. A particular reason why interface 
zones are difficult to manage is that “appropriate planning protocols were 
not mandated until the mid 1980’s, albeit in an ad hoc manner, with few of 
the necessary development controls keeping apace with new developments” 
(Koperberg, 2003, p. 2).  
 
The impacts of fire upon the rural-urban interface are increasing for three 
primary reasons: fire suppression and less hazard reduction has led to 
increased fuel loads; fire risk has worsened due to drought conditions; and 
the population and density in areas of high fire risk is growing and rural-
urban interface areas are growing rapidly, as more people seek to live in non-
metropolitan areas and near amenity-rich areas (Frentz, Farmer, Guldin & 
Smith, 2004). 
 
Reconsidering the Future of the Interface 
 
The incidence of bushfire at the interface is dependent more on a set of 
environmental and human conditions than on a geographical location. 
Although the geographic location does dictate a set of general climatic 
conditions that encourage fires, the conditions in which interface zone fires 
occur (or have occurred) exist in nearly every community in the world. It is 
these conditional elements of weather, humidity, vegetation, building 
construction, road construction, lot size, housing density, topography, and 
other factors that simply make some communities more vulnerable to 
wildfire losses than others. 
 
Smalley (2003) estimates that the most likely future is that “the growth of 
communities into previously forested areas is one of the three major factors 
that will propagate the pressures of the interface on communities. The other 
two are unusually severe weather events (from prolonged drought to severe 
heating periods and floods that erode soils and vegetation) and inadequate 
infrastructure due to the rapidity of growth or aging” (p. 5). The issue of 
adequate infrastructure is the one that community-focused programs can 
most effectively change when implemented locally (Firewise Communities, 
2003). It is more difficult to change the communities that already exist in 
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hazardous conditions, however, there is a good opportunity to make wise 
fire-safety decisions at the outset of planning for new housing developments.  
 
Breaking the Cycle of Loss  
 
Planning for fire events and establishing creative incentives for encouraging 
homeowners to take appropriate responsibility are two things that 
community leaders should be doing immediately. Smalley (2003) warned 
that “insurance companies are not going to give significant premium 
adjustments for positive action, nor are they willing to increase premiums or 
cancel insurance for perpetuating hazardous conditions” (p. 7). Floods, 
earthquakes, cyclones and hailstorms are disasters that can be taken into 
account for adjusting insurance premiums, however, bushfires are an 
exception to this category. Reliable formulae to predict losses or project the 
mathematical expectations of wildfire occurrence are not available. 
Therefore, the data (loss and predictive) are not available to justify the 
financial decisions for adjusting rates and the bushfire risks that affect their 
bottom line. 
 
What is needed are local solutions to encourage “doing the right thing”. For 
example, if homeowners want to make improvements to their property (e.g. 
putting on a non-combustible roof) local government should provide real 
incentives. Perhaps waiving building permit fees for preventative 
improvements, waiving higher taxes on the preventative improvements, or 
providing community guidelines for preventative improvements would 
provide mitigating incentives. Homeowners, especially, must share the 
responsibility through active participation.  
 
Smalley (2003) argues that “when the responsibilities are clearly defined and 
direction is provided, the paradigm of protector/victim is redefined” (p. 8). 
Firefighters and homeowners (along with other organizations) become 
partners. Community-wide and community-based fire protection can exist 
through mutually agreed-upon and mutually-respected responsibilities. 
 
Community Response during Bushfires 
 
The Australasian Fire Authorities Council (AFAC) has an agreed position in 
relation to community safety and evacuation during bushfires. Essentially 
this position advocates that where people have adequately prepared 
themselves and their houses and properties, they should remain with their 
homes during bushfires, rather than evacuate. Conclusive research 
conducted by agencies such as the CSIRO following major bushfires in 
Australia underpins this position. Most buildings lost in bushfires are the 
result of initially small fires started by sparks and embers. Buildings will 
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generally survive the initial passage of a fire front providing adequate 
preparations have been made and providing people remain to extinguish 
small fires started in and around them. Exposure to dangerous levels of 
radiant heat created by bushfires is the greatest risk to people’s safety. 
Consequently people who are prepared and take shelter in their homes are 
well protected from radiant heat. Last minute evacuations from bushfires are 
inherently dangerous and can create much greater risks than remaining in 
the fire area. 
 
Most Australian fire authorities no longer support large-scale evacuation of 
people from areas threatened by bushfires. The approach advocated is to 
empower people and communities to take increased responsibility for their 
own safety. Gledhill (2003) advises that “this is a departure from the 
conventional paternalistic approach of emergency services in dealing with 
large-scale emergencies. It in many ways is a move back to the pre-
emergency service era when communities were left to take care of their own 
safety” (p. 1). Such empowerment creates many advantages but also brings 
with it many challenges. Bushfires are a natural hazard which can be 
foreseen, prevented and combated to a greater degree than hazards such as 
severe storms, floods, earthquakes, tsunamis and volcano eruptions. 
Australian fire authorities have the challenge of reducing the negative 
impacts of bushfires on a community who increasingly wants to live close to 
the bush complete with all its natural attributes including fire hazards. 
 
Stay and Defend or Leave Early 
 
People who have not undertaken adequate preparation are advised not to 
stay and defend their property against bushfire. Where a house does not 
have sufficient defendable space and access to water supplies, the chances of 
saving it are greatly reduced and the danger for remaining occupants is 
increased. The advice therefore, for those people is to leave, but to do so 
early. Quite commonly in the Australian environment, because of the steep 
terrain and the rapid fire spread through spotting (fires started ahead of the 
fire by burning embers), there can be little warning time. Escape routes 
become blocked by smoke, fire, falling trees or power lines. In such cases 
when the dangers posed by escaping exceed those of remaining, clearly the 
best option is to stay. 
 
The road systems in the interface and rural areas are typically not designed 
to handle high traffic flows and speeds, particularly when people are going in 
the opposite direction to responding fire appliances. The logistics of moving 
a lot of people quickly and safely make large scale evacuations very difficult. 
Television images of people with belongings packed, caught on blocked 
highways fleeing from danger are not uncommon. Even organized 
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evacuations are not always orderly. Inexperienced and frightened people 
faced with evacuation from a terrifying fire may behave irrationally. Being 
told to go by authority figures – police or fire officers, is the final signal that 
all is far from okay. Seeing and hearing people in authority anxiously urging 
people to leave sends a very strong message that disaster is imminent. 
 
The responsibility or duty of care of those who order evacuations is such that 
they are answerable to ensure that the evacuees are safe during the transit 
process as well as being safe in the chosen refuge. While fleeing from danger 
is a normal human instinct and not being there is the safest option, as 
discussed above there are many reasons why this is not a practical or safe 
option. Fire events are very dynamic and place specific. The orientation of 
the interface and the road network with respect to a fire front or series of fire 
fronts, as well as smoke effects make it very difficult to realistically simulate 
or predict bushfires. The inclusion of community factors such as 
demographics, community expectations and identification with the bush, 
and previous bushfire experience increase the difficulty of pre-incident 
planning. 
 
AFAC implicitly accepts that there will be occasions, hopefully very rare, 
where a person will be killed by staying with their home. In such cases where 
a person’s life is immediately at risk by them being in a particular location 
(in the opinion of the on-scene fire or police officer) they may be advised to 
evacuate. Should the advice be not heeded, then in most States, legislation 
enables evacuation to be ordered (with force if necessary). 
 
Evacuation as a safety strategy has in the past been supported and employed 
in the belief that people are prone to panic and irrational behaviour when 
faced with an unfamiliar and threatening emergency situation. Evacuation 
from a bushfire can itself result in some people being exposed to greater 
safety risks at times, as well as often resulting in much greater property 
losses. In the absence of residents, property has to be defended by often 
limited fire-fighting resources. If people are well informed, prepared and 
empowered, they are capable of taking appropriate actions to protect 
themselves and their property without the need for evacuation or close 
supervision and direction by emergency services. Such active community 
involvement will free up fire fighting and emergency resources, allowing 
their more effective deployment. 
 
Lessons from a major bushfire at the urban-rural interface 
January 2003 
 
The Canberra fires of January 2003 provided a special opportunity to draw 
conclusions from a fire that impacted on the critical area of interface zones 
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and was readily observed by fire-fighters, scientists and members of the 
community. Four people died and many more suffered injuries. The fire had 
a significant impact on urban dwellings and burnt large areas of natural and 
commercial forest. Over 500 dwelling were destroyed. The Canberra fires 
reflected the characteristics of many other bushfires because they occurred 
in natural Australian bushland as a result of lightning strikes and they were 
of little media interest initially as they were in the hills. The issue of greatest 
concern was the destruction which occurred at the interface during one 
afternoon.  Ellis (2003) described the following features of the fires that were 
unusual and make them of special interest: 
 
“• they were well observed throughout the event 
 • a series of fires joined to create a super conflagration with unique 
characteristics 
 • the impact into the suburban fringe extended far beyond the initial 
street of houses” (Ellis, 2003, p. 1). 
 
In the end, protection from bushfire is reliant on individual householders. 
During the Canberra fires in January 2003, individual residents or their 
neighbours saved the vast majority of homes. While fire-fighters may be in a 
position to assist, in all probability during a major bushfire, it will be 
individual planning, actions and preparations that will most likely determine 
whether they and their home survive. It is inevitable in Australia that 
bushfires will occur again. The outcome from those bushfires is dependent 
on the partnership between fire authorities managing the overall event and 
attacking and defending against the bushfire and individuals protecting their 
own lives and property.  
 
 
Figures 10.9 and 10.10 Canberra bushfires, January 2003 
 
Finally, the Canberra fires indicated to the Government that money spent on 
fire prevention and response is an investment in the future safety and 
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sustainability of the community and although it comes at a cost, this cost is 
far less than the cost of community recovery after such a devastating event. 
Ellis (2003) noted that “fire prevention and preparation for response is 
insurance, and needs to be viewed as a valuable risk management approach” 
(p. 5). The Canberra fire event of 2003 developed into a firestorm that few 
had seen before and Canberra has not experienced on its urban fringe for 
many years. Unfortunately many of the lessons identified in Canberra are 
lessons re-learnt across the industry. However, this tragedy provides a 
powerful opportunity for the industry to reinforce these lessons and ensure 
communities are better prepared in the future. 
 
Social Considerations of the Interface 
 
The social issues sparked by bushfire are as diverse as the needs and uses of 
fire.  Careful consideration of social norms and culture, economic needs and 
history of communities must be given to issues of suppression, fuel 
reduction, prevention, education, and other activities. What may be an 
acceptable practice in one location may have negative or even disastrous 
consequences elsewhere. What may seem a logical and practical step in one 
place may out of the question in another, solely due to social values. Indeed, 
social considerations may be as vital to the success of a prevention activity as 
a well-prepared shift plan or having the proper equipment available is to a 
suppression effort. Hamilton (2003) said “that community support is a 
direct result of a sense of community initiative and ownership, and not from 
a top-down, mandated approach” (p. 1). 
 
The best of intentions and the best in technology are not guarantees that fuel 
loads will be reduced in the critical areas where homes and bushfire meet at 
the interface. As Hamilton (2003) notes, “Wildland-urban interface 
neighborhoods are social systems. Failure to work with the social system will 
probably doom efforts to promote fire hazard mitigation” (p. 1). The 
challenge to fire management leaders in Australia is to address these issues, 
exchange ideas and techniques, involve and listen to communities, and work 
toward solutions in individual neighbourhoods. It is only through the 
initiative and commitment of neighbourhoods and communities that 
prevention and education programs will make more permanent the changes 
that are needed to reduce fire danger to people and their possessions. 
Understanding what stakeholders think about bushfire, and linking these 
cognitive patterns (e.g. value orientations, social norms) to management 
actions, is an important first step in developing a scientific means to inform 
bushfire educational and communications programs.  
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Future Challenges  
 
Educating people in at-risk-from-bushfire communities about bushfire 
preparation is a significant challenge. Empowerment must extend beyond 
people knowing what to expect and how to react when threatened by 
bushfire. The stay and defend strategy is only effective if it is preceded by 
adequate preparation. Preparation isn’t necessarily just creating a 
defendable space, but also mental preparation - knowing what to expect. 
Gledhill (2003) warned that “fire services need to be realistic in what they 
communicate to people in fire situations. The success of the strategy relies 
heavily on the people in affected communities making appropriate decisions. 
For that they need to have access to timely and accurate information about 
the fire situation” (p. 5). The emergency managers in those communities also 
need to conform to the policy. Gledhill (2003) also claims that “police and 
others need to accept that people will want to stay with their homes and need 
to be supported in place. They too need timely and accurate information”. 
Whilst that seems reasonable, gathering timely and accurate information 
and communicating it to the people needing it, presents a considerable 
challenge. Gledhill (2003) identified that “whilst most firefighters appreciate 
the importance of accurate and up-to-date information, few have seen a need 
to provide it to the people at risk” (p. 6). The empowerment and consequent 
effectiveness of residents is dependent on them also having good 
information. 
 
Public Agencies Assisting Community-Based Solutions 
 
Increasingly, fire agencies recognize that they cannot protect all citizens from 
all bushfires. The limitations of both rural and municipal fire agencies 
become most evident during major fires at the interface (Boura, 1999; 
Cohen, 1999; Rohrmann, 1999; Tasmania Fire Service, 1994; Smith et al, 
1991). Citizens too, are beginning to recognize that neither land management 
agencies nor local fire authorities can maintain fire suppression capabilities 
sufficient to conserve private property under extreme fire conditions. With 
this recognition, comes a growing understanding that the private property 
owner bears a margin of responsibility for protecting his or her own safety 
and property (Boura, 1999; Cohen, 1999; Ingalsbee, 2003, Waldron, 2001). 
 
Progressive fire authorities are adapting to this changing operational 
environment by empowering people to take responsibility for their own 
safety and developing their own fire mitigation strategies. In fact, experience 
suggests that people will rigorously implement fire prevention and 
mitigation strategies only if they have helped develop them (Beckingsale, 
1994; Boura, 1999; Jurie, 2000). 
 
 
207 
Progressive public fire agencies will adapt to this changing operational 
environment by recognizing the importance of empowering people to take 
responsibility for their own safety and developing their own fire mitigation 
strategies. DeGrosky (2003) stated that many of our best solutions are 
“community-based solutions which allow groups of people to rally around a 
commonly perceived problem that threatens their community; agree on the 
nature of the problem; and tackle it” (p. 1). Highly successful community 
efforts produce durable results, and derive from processes that are 
participatory, inclusive and highly collaborative. Successful community-
based solutions also require “community capacity,” or an ability to act. A 
combination of commitment, resources and skills that a community can 
deploy represents that community’s capacity to address a problem. Public 
agencies across Australia are exploring ways in which they can initiate and 
facilitate community efforts, build community capacity, develop 
commitment and produce lasting results. 
 
Increasingly, “community-based solutions” provide effective, and perhaps 
the best, solutions to public policy issues. DeGrosky (2003) stated that 
“successful community-based solutions typically share three essential 
characteristics. First, they are collaborative. Second, they are inclusive. 
Finally, they get people involved, resulting in commitment that allows 
durable or lasting results” (p. 2). The desired outcomes of self-reliant 
communities adequately preparing themselves and their homes for bushfire 
are much more likely to occur in the future if there are steps towards a 
realistic resolve in tackling the “what-ifs”.  
 
Collaboration 
 
In regard to community initiatives, collaboration occurs when people with 
different viewpoints work together to foster mutual understanding, build 
agreement and resolve disputes regarding community issues (Helling, 1998; 
Margerum, 2002; McKinney, 1998). According to Helling (1998), 
“collaboration creates a temporary forum within which consensus about the 
problem can be sought, mutually agreeable solutions can be invented, and 
collective actions to implement the solutions can be taken” (p. 336)  The 
value of a collaborative process lies in the ability to produce inclusive, 
sustainable results that people implement with commitment. However, 
community organizers may also encounter members of community groups 
and task forces who view the act of collaborating as a sufficient 
accomplishment in itself. Given the growing desire for processes that 
produce results, public fire authorities hoping to foster community-based 
solutions to fire problems with lasting results would be wise to measure their 
success by the results produced, rather than simply by the tools they use. 
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Inclusion 
 
Successful community initiatives involve those people affected by the issue, 
those needed to implement any agreement, and anyone who may undermine 
the process if not included (McKinney, 1998). This description provides an 
effective definition of a class of people commonly known as “stakeholders.” 
Helling (1998) provides an alternative definition, characterizing stakeholders 
as “all individuals, groups or organizations that are directly influenced by 
actions others take to solve the problem” (p. 336). In practical terms 
stakeholders are parties with an interest in an issue and may include 
individuals, groups of people, organizations or institutions. 
 
Successful community-based solutions typically evolve from efforts that 
include all relevant stakeholders, regardless of perspective. Efforts primarily 
driven by agencies, without sufficient involvement by stakeholders, run the 
risk of rejection by the community as “just another government program”. 
The success of community initiatives facilitated by government agencies 
(whether the local volunteer fire department or the Federal government) 
largely depends on conscious decisions that the facilitators make about 
inclusion and cooperation. No formula exists for determining the 
appropriate degree of inclusiveness and collaboration for a given project or 
circumstance. However, most often, as involvement and participation go up, 
commitment and potential for success follow. 
 
There exists a tension and a system of competing forces. DeGrosky (2003) 
explained this is because “collaborative approaches nearly never accomplish 
work expediently. The value of collaboration lies in the potential for higher 
quality and more lasting outcomes that a group effort brings”. While public 
agencies naturally, and rightly, seek a compact and efficient public process, 
with each decision the organizers make to exclude people or groups, they 
lessen the likelihood that those people or groups will feel like they are an 
adequate part of the plan or decision. DeGrosky (2003) warned that 
“stakeholders, unsatisfied with their role or influence in a process, rarely 
support the resulting decision or plan. Similarly, with each decision that the 
organizers make to reduce collaboration, in other words to reduce the 
influence the group has over the process, the problem definition, the 
solutions and implementation, the greater the possibility that people will 
grow unsure, apathetic, resistant or hostile to the decision, plan or solution” 
(pp. 3-4). 
 
Involvement, Participation and Commitment 
 
To succeed, community-based initiatives require commitment both by the 
involved communities and by the involved public agencies. A community 
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achieves commitment when it obtains sustained support throughout 
implementation of the solution, agreement or decision. Commitment to 
community-based solutions requires the active participation of community 
members. Doyle (2001) asserts that implementation will be incomplete and 
will be likely to fail without participation.  
 
With perspectives on the responsibility of the private property owner 
shifting, public fire authorities have shown increasing interest in 
empowering people to take responsibility.  
 
Ideally, a group of people rallies around a commonly perceived problem, 
agrees on its nature, and finds and implements the solutions to the problem 
with a high degree of commitment. Unfortunately, as DeGrosky (2003) 
advises, “this kind of effort remains relatively uncommon, particularly 
because they require public agencies and their staffs to relinquish a degree of 
control that they have traditionally maintained, and often require agencies 
and their personnel to significantly alter their relationship and approach to 
the community” (p. 5). Typical efforts organized by public agencies allow for 
public involvement, and they increasingly include most, if not all, 
stakeholders. However, DeGrosky (2003) explained that “too often, agency 
led efforts fail to meet the expectations of either the agency or the 
community. One reason is that, even when inclusive, communities perceive 
agency-based efforts as token, insincere or somewhat coercive” (p. 5). Too 
often, public agencies simply go through the motions of involving the public, 
bringing groups of people together merely for the purpose of fulfilling legal 
requirements or to create the impression of “public involvement.” In today’s 
operational environment, they do so at their peril; as half- hearted or less-
than-sincere efforts tend to breed distrust and can produce the unintended 
consequence of inspiring the active resistance of citizens. 
 
Herein lies a relatively new and evolving role for the public fire agency. This 
new role builds upon and enhances, rather than diminishing or replacing, 
the traditional function of the fire service. Progressive fire authorities 
increasingly recognize their role as community capacity builders and their 
responsibility to create awareness, motivate community members to take 
responsibility, and to facilitate community-based solutions (Frank & Smith, 
2000; Lipnack & Stamps, 2000). Most communities will need the assistance 
of a fire agency as they develop their community-driven fire mitigation 
responses. For example, in an evaluation of Community Fireguard programs 
in Victoria, Rohrmann (1999) found that a considerable degree of guidance 
and direction is necessary in order to get resident groups activated and 
eventually taking responsibility for improving fire preparedness. 
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Fostering Community-based Solutions 
 
The Australian Community Fireguard programs provide an example of an 
effective collaborative approach through which public fire authorities enable 
community-based solutions and help communities to build capacity. 
Community Fireguard initiatives provide a unique case study because the 
program has existed for ten years. Both anecdotal evidence and scholarly 
research offer evidence that this community-based approach benefits 
residents in fire-prone areas and improves fire risk mitigation by both 
individuals and the community. Preliminary findings by Rohrmann (1999) 
found considerable potential for the Community Fireguard concept, and 
offer encouragement that inclusive, participatory and highly collaborative 
fire mitigation efforts can achieve durable results that originate from the 
community (Beckingsale, 1994; Boura, 1999; Rohrmann, 1999; Tasmania 
Fire Service 1994). 
 
Originally conceived by the Country Fire Authority (CFA) in Victoria, 
Community Fireguard programs have spread to other Australian states 
including New South Wales, South Australia and Tasmania. This 
community-based initiative allows groups of people to come together, agree 
on the nature of a fire problem threatening their community, craft solutions 
that make sense for the community, and develop “community capacity,” or 
an ability to act. According to Boura (1999), Community Fireguard programs 
“involve small groups of people living in high fire risk areas, taking 
responsibility for their own fire safety and working together to devise 
survival strategies which suit their own situation” (p. 6). Most Community 
Fireguard groups are self-initiated by members of the community.  
 
The proportion of a community who effectively prepare for a bushfire varies 
greatly. Recent large-scale studies of community response to bushfire 
include the survey of 1200 residents affected by the NSW 2001 fires 
undertaken by Rhodes (2003) on behalf of AFAC, and a major quantitative 
study of preparedness in Victoria completed in 2002 by CFA. Rhodes (2003) 
found that “in some of the surveyed communities approximately half the 
population might be considered moderately to well prepared. However, in 
many communities the level of preparedness was lower, with a large 
proportion of the population poorly informed and prepared” (p. 9). There are 
many factors that are likely to determine the extent to which people become 
prepared. One of these factors is the extent to which the community is 
exposed to information and programs to increase preparedness. Evaluation 
of CFA community education programs (Rohrmann, 1999) indicate that such 
programs do lead to increased preparedness, but also that change is not 
uniform for all participants and that it is incremental and occurs over the 
long term. 
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When it comes to fostering community-based solutions, the appropriate role 
for public fire agencies depends on the circumstances and on the agency’s 
needs and motivations. The agency may choose to remain in the traditional 
role of community educator, stakeholder or other vested participant; 
convene the collaborative process; or facilitate the group effort. Depending 
on the circumstances, all the roles described here may prove appropriate for 
public fire agencies, and all can fit into a community-based, collaborative 
process. DeGrosky (2003) advises that “to effectively influence community-
based initiatives, public fire agencies must consciously decide and make clear 
the agency’s role and its motivations for participating” (p. 6). Given the 
growing desire for processes that produce results, public fire authorities 
hoping to foster community-based solutions producing lasting results are 
advised by DeGrosky (2003) to “assure that the collaborating parties 
establish objectives for the outcome of the process and articulate criteria for 
evaluating results” (p. 9). 
 
Successful community programs 
 
Successful community programs share the following five common traits: 
 
1. Identify the particular interface bushfire problems of the community 
 
Interface zone bushfire problems are different throughout the country and 
have the potential to develop in all states and affect communities of any size.  
Therefore, cause and effect of bushfires are a significant factor to consider in 
planning for local, regional and national contexts.  
 
2. Define roles for the affected agencies and individuals 
 
Changing attitudes and behaviour is a complex task even when the goal 
seems simple in attempting to reduce the threat from bushfire faced by 
people, homes and natural resources. The value of involving all of the 
affected agencies has long been understood. The roles of the members of the 
working team must be defined to improve efficiency and to prevent wasted 
or duplicated effort.  The best organizational effort will be able to harness the 
strengths of each team member. Roles are best defined when the process is 
done formally, in writing. 
 
3. Secure inter-agency cooperation 
 
The value of inter-agency cooperation is clear in that a team/ group can 
accomplish more than an individual when the goal affects a large number of 
people. The tough part is getting separate agencies with different priorities 
and perspectives to work together. To help this cooperative process, the U.S. 
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National Interagency Fire Center published six steps to help improve fire 
protection effectiveness.  
 
The six steps from the National Interagency Fire Center (NIFC, 2001) 
include the following: 
 
• Obtain the commitment of the separate agencies to work together; 
• Examine your problems together; 
• Set joint goals and objectives; 
• Develop programs and policies; 
• Approve and implement the plan; 
• Evaluate and revise the program as needed. 
 
4. Develop public support 
 
If lack of public awareness of interface zone bushfire safety contributed to 
the dangerous conditions seen in many areas, better public education will be 
a key element in improving those conditions. The first task, and the hardest, 
is to get the public’s attention. To reach varied audiences with such a wide 
demographic range requires an extensive and intensive media campaign 
involving a maximum sharing of information about every aspect of the 
problem.  
 
5. Implement, coordinate and evaluate programs.  
 
Ultimately, it takes action to change public attitudes and behaviour 
regarding bushfire safety. The successful programs show that there is no 
single answer or approach that will produce perfect fire safety in every 
community under all conditions. Good planning is essential, but eventually 
those plans must be translated into programs that are implemented and 
coordinated to keep them on target. After the programs get under way, an 
objective evaluation helps measure the success and serves to refocus efforts 
as needed to improve success.   
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Figure 10.11 Canberra bushfires, January 2003 
 
Interface bushfire management requires collaborative partnerships for 
planning, implementation and evaluation of global concepts on the local 
landscape level. Over time, it is hoped that fire services help communities to 
become more self-reliant. 
 
Conclusions 
 
As more people move out of cities to the interface, tragic and disastrous 
bushfires will inevitably occur. Whilst people, directly and indirectly, are by 
far the greatest cause of bushfires in Australia, controlling people and their 
use or abuse of fire is not a realistic or practical solution. Empowering the 
communities at risk from bushfire to play an active part in their own safety 
and in the protection of their assets in partnership with the fire services is a 
viable long-term strategy to enable safe co-existence with fire as a natural 
element of the environment. The combined efforts of fire protection services, 
legislators, planners, developers, land owners and homeowners will be 
required to prevent tragic loss of lives and homes at the interface. For fire 
services to provide these communities with effective protection from 
bushfire requires a holistic approach based on the needs and aspirations of 
all community members. In many instances the local community that is 
potentially at risk needs to be educated on those risks and the consequences 
of action, as well as inaction, if they choose to ignore the risks. 
 
Australia has realised that long-term planning and commitment from all 
levels of government can sustain investment in research and development 
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for safer communities, economic development and fuels management and 
forest health. Collaboration is required among the many stakeholders to 
assess and prioritise which interface zones and landscapes to concentrate on 
and to reconcile conflicting management objectives.  
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Living with bushfire: What do 
people expect? 
 
Sally Bushnell and Alison Cottrell 
 
The physical and economic impact of bushfires has been well documented, 
particularly in the United States of America. A National Interagency Fire 
Centre (NIFC, 2003) report revealed that in 2002, more than 88,450 
recorded fires burned 6.9 million acres and 2,381 structures, and the total 
suppression cost for the federal agencies reached $US1.6 billion. Figures for 
preceding years are similar, but suggest that these impacts from bushfire are 
growing in magnitude. Similar bushfire impacts have been recorded in 
Australia. The Ash Wednesday bushfires of 16 January 1983 are perhaps the 
most renowned in Australian history, and the following statistics suggest 
why: in Victoria and South Australia 76 people died; 2,463 houses were 
destroyed; and 360,000 hectares of land was burned (Ramsay & Rudolph, 
2003), total property loss were estimated to be over $A400 million (Willis, 
2004). The January 2003 bushfires, in New South Wales, Victoria and South 
Australia, rivalled Ash Wednesday in terms of widespread destruction and 
property loss (Gilbert, 2004), where four lives were lost, over 500 homes 
destroyed and total damage cost more than $A300 million (Willis, 2004). 
The 2003 fires were also a harsh reminder of how susceptible Australia is to 
bushfire. In a global context, Australia is widely regarded as the most fire-
prone country (Rohrmann, 1999; Gilbert, 2004). Furthermore, the situation 
may be worsening due to long-term droughts and higher average 
temperatures (Whittaker & Mercer, 2004). 
 
Loss of life and property, and the economic costs associated with suppressing 
fires and recovering from fire, are significant and obvious outcomes of 
bushfire, however there are many other impacts and costs of bushfire which 
are often not anticipated because they are more indirect and therefore not as 
obvious to the general public. These include social and economic costs to the 
individual, family and community such as the loss of livelihoods, 
interruption of life patterns and relationships, and in some cases the entire 
social fabric that defines a population as a community can be severely 
weakened (David, Baish & Hearn Morrow, 1999). 
 
Because fire is, in general terms, a natural ecosystem process (Beringer, 
2000), it is a hazard or a disaster only when human life and property become 
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threatened or destroyed; “The disaster itself occurs within society and not 
within nature” (Weichselgartner, 2001: 86). Indeed, in many areas of 
Australia and the world that have evolved with fire, bushfire plays a positive 
and sometimes crucial role for native vegetation and animals, which depend 
on fire for regeneration, refuge, protection and reproduction (Beringer, 
2000; Haswell & Brown, 2002). Accordingly, the climate, vegetation type 
and existence of ignition sources characteristic of these areas are compatible 
with fire and thus indicate that fire is inevitable (McGee & Russell, 2003).  
 
In many countries, including Australia, there is a growing pattern of 
population movement into peri-urban areas (Hugo, 2002). These areas tend 
to be bushfire prone and because of the resultant, ever-increasing mix of 
people, property and bushfire (leading to the potential consequences of 
physical, economic and social impacts described above) bushfire is now a 
significant hazard (McCaffrey, 2004). 
 
The peri-urban area and bushfire risk 
 
Cottrell (2005) summarised a number of terms used to describe the peri-
urban area, these include the wildland-urban interface, rural-urban fringe 
and exurban, for example. The peri-urban area includes the extension of 
urban areas into rural areas and regional urban areas. There are many types 
(see Cottrell, 2005), however all peri-urban areas are typically areas where 
structures (whether residential, industrial, recreational, or agricultural) are 
located adjacent to or among combustible wildland fuel (CFS, 2004). There 
are many reasons why people are moving into peri-urban areas, a commonly 
cited reason is the attraction to rural areas because of the associated 
aesthetics of the landscape; other reasons include cheaper house prices and 
reduced crime, pollution and crowding (Monroe, Bowers & Hermansen, 
2003a). In essence these are quality of life issues. 
 
However, with the potential benefits of living in the peri-urban area come 
potential costs. The peri-urban area is the most fire vulnerable due to 
mixture of bushland, houses, people, paddocks and stock (Haswell & Brown, 
2002). The fire risk exposure has indeed grown significantly over the last 
several decades (McKee, Berrens, Jones, Helton & Talberth, 2004) and is 
expected to increase as peri-urban populations grow (Gardner, Cortner & 
Widaman, 1987). Furthermore, it has become quite clear that many 
bushfires cannot be fully controlled resulting in serious economic, social and 
ecological damage, as demonstrated by the previously mentioned statistics. 
Therefore, people living in peri-urban areas are exposed to a significant level 
of risk from bushfire and its consequences. 
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Reducing the risk 
 
Traditionally risk reduction strategies have been the responsibility of the 
government and its agencies, and have included fire suppression, fire 
prevention through reducing fuel loads and building firebreaks, building 
codes and zoning (the latter two however have not been implemented to such 
an extent, and not necessarily with other strategies, to significantly reduce 
the bushfire risk). More recently there has been a redistribution of rights and 
obligations and/or changes in the allocation of costs and benefits from the 
government to the public (Winter & Fried, 2000). For example, educational 
messages are commonly disseminated to the public to encourage individual 
fire prevention efforts (e.g., create a defensible space around the home by 
clearing vegetation), ordinances have been imposed requiring individuals to 
fireproof their homes (e.g., retrofitting roofs) or to pay tax on additional fire 
protection, and homeowners are often motivated themselves to take 
preventative measures voluntarily and/or engage in community programs to 
reduce the fire risk to themselves and their neighbourhood (Winter & Fried, 
2000; McKee, Berrens, Jones & Talberth, 2004).  
 
Given that bushfires are often uncontrollable and fire-fighting and other 
emergency services and resources become so overwhelmed that it is 
impossible to provide people and property with adequate protection, people 
need to take some responsibility to protect themselves and their property. 
However, there is considerable empirical evidence that households in areas 
prone to natural hazards risk under-invest in protective measures (McKee et 
al., 2004). Government intervention has often been unsuccessful due to lack 
of enforcement of ordinances, lack of support from the public or opposition 
to fire prevention strategies, and the public have often been unmotivated to 
take action themselves due to a lack of incentives or a lack of understanding 
of the risk (Winter & Fried, 2000; McKee et al., 2004).  
 
There are no guides to ‘best practise’ for community safety, not one strategy 
or combination of strategies are necessarily successful, nor have been 
adequately successful as discussed above. Therefore bushfire in the peri-
urban areas has become a major, often contentious, issue, and mitigating the 
risk and reducing the impact of bushfire is a problematic and complex 
challenge, but one that requires urgent attention. In addressing the 
challenge, input from the community at risk is important, if not crucial. 
Policies and management strategies should reflect what people expect or at 
least will accept. But what do people expect? Intuitively, people do not want 
to lose their lives or house to bushfire or suffer any other consequences of 
bushfire, but do they perceive the risk? Do they actually expect a significant 
impact? And in terms of protection and resilience, what do they expect of 
themselves? What do they expect of the fire service? What do they expect of 
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the government? To answer these such questions, this paper will review the 
literature to gain a better understanding of people’s knowledge, perceptions, 
attitudes and expectations in relation to bushfire.  
 
The peri-urban community 
 
The term community can have a wide range of meanings. A community is a 
group that has a number of things in common, which may be defined by 
location, interests, or function for example. A person can belong to a number 
of different communities, and there can be a number of different 
communities within a single location. Furthermore communities are not 
static with changing membership, ideologies or beliefs, for example 
(Boughton, 1998; Marsh, 2001; Cottrell, 2005). Defining and typifying 
communities in a location, and their members, is therefore a complex, if not 
impossible, task, and this may be especially so in peri-urban areas where 
there is substantial mixing of rural and urban community characteristics.  
 
There are a number of possible factors influencing the diversity of peri-urban 
communities. Perhaps the most obvious is the composition of communities. 
Along with long-term residents, there is an influx of people from urban areas 
which indicates a high proportion of newcomers with urban rather than rural 
backgrounds, and due to the attraction of the beauty of the rural landscape, 
there is also a number of weekend and seasonal residents, and 
holidaymakers. Therefore, substantial differences both within and between 
peri-urban areas may be observed in terms of demographics and 
socioeconomic status, life experiences, knowledge, attitudes, opinions, 
perceptions and expectations, for example. Furthermore, Jakes et al. (2002) 
also highlighted differences in social capital, human capital and cultural 
capital between locations within peri-urban areas. Such differences can have 
a significant bearing on bushfire management, and community preparedness 
and resilience, and further highlights the issues for fire policies and services. 
For example, Brunson and Shindler (2004) argue against the “one-size-fits-
all” policies and strategies (about fuels management). They found differences 
between respondent knowledge and acceptability judgements of wildland 
fuels management, which was associated with location-specific social and 
environmental factors as well as individual beliefs 
 
Bushfire awareness and risk perception 
 
Until recently, bushfire has not been perceived as a significant hazard 
(McCaffrey, 2004). Perhaps because throughout history (unlike other 
hazards) fire was depended on for warmth, cooking, and to heat water (De 
Cicco, 1990), and complete fire suppression was successful until only the last 
few decades. Today it is clear that bushfire is in fact a significant hazard, and 
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growing numbers of people are at risk. Risk however is a complex concept, 
but Meacham (2004) has provided a broad definition: 
 
[Risk is] the possibility of an unwanted outcome in an uncertain 
situation, where the possibility of the unwanted outcome is a function 
of three factors: loss or harm to something that is valued 
(consequence), the event or hazard that may occasion the loss or harm 
(scenario), and a judgement about the likelihood that the loss or harm 
will occur (probability) (p. 204). 
 
Assessing risk involves both judging the likely occurrence of an event and the 
likely damage that will be incurred, thus risk perception can be extremely 
subjective, especially in regards to bushfire risk (McCaffrey, 2004). There is 
evidence that risk is perceived differently by experts and non-experts; 
“experts” tend to base their perception of risk on statistics, however risk 
perception for lay people is much more complex. Therefore, in addressing 
risk issues, it is important to understand the risk perception of those at risk 
to move beyond a purely statistical approach (Meacham, 2004). 
 
Lupton and Tulloch (2002) conduced interviews with a group of Australians 
to gain a better understanding of the ways in which a range of risks are 
understood and dealt with by lay people, and how their risk knowledges are 
constructed and maintained or transformed. They found that risk was 
defined differently by different interviewees, but the major discourses 
centred around “the notion of risk as negative, frightening, involving taking a 
step into the unknown but also a degree of rational judgement and choice on 
the part of the individual concerning whether or not to take this step” 
(Lupton & Tulloch, 2002, p. 331). The interviewees own position in the life 
course, their gender, age, sexual identity, class and so on phrased the risks to 
which people felt they were exposed. Risk was seen as a part of life and also 
strongly tied to an individual’s life situation, which both exposed them to 
certain risk and influenced the ways in which they viewed phenomena as 
risks or not. Many described a life course trajectory of risk-taking and risk-
avoidance involving risk-taking when young, avoiding voluntary risk-taking 
when responsibilities such as family were important, and some reported 
increased risk-taking again in later years when responsibilities lessened. Few 
people avoided risk-taking altogether, in fact many argued for the 
importance of deliberately taking risks.  
 
In Lupton and Tulloch’s (2002) study, bushfire was not perceived as a risk to 
the interviewees themselves nor as a risk to fellow Australians, which is not 
surprising given that the study was not limited to any particular type of risk, 
and interviewees were not necessarily at risk of bushfire. However, it was 
noted that environmental problems in general were not identified as major 
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risks by the majority of interviewees. Although “environmental problems” 
encompasses a wide range of potential risks, it does include natural hazards 
such as cyclones and floods, as well as bushfire, the risk to which many 
Australians are exposed. One possible explanation is that perceived risks (to 
Australians) were closely tied to current issues receiving extensive media 
attention and public debate at the time of study. Perhaps if the study were 
undertaken after the 2003 bushfires, which received plenty of media 
attention and public debate, bushfires may have been identified by 
interviewees as a risk facing fellow Australians. However, there is evidence 
that people, even those directly exposed to the risk, simply underestimate the 
risk of natural hazards (Cunningham & Kelly, n.d.). 
 
Gaps between individual and community perception of risk and the objective 
data on the magnitude, frequency and consequences of the hazard can be 
influenced by a number of issues. Natural hazards, including bushfire, are 
relatively infrequent and not part of everyday life for a given individual or 
community, and are thus easily forgotten. Information on the nature of the 
hazard may be incomplete or ambiguous. In the absence of information, risk 
estimates are based on little data. Acknowledging the risk may bring about 
an uncomfortable psychological state, and coupled with the inherent 
uncertainty of hazards, individuals may resort to various mental strategies 
including denying the risk (e.g., “it won’t happen to me”), or giving in-place 
adjustments (e.g., fire suppression) the power of complete rather than partial 
protection, or reasoning that if an event happened recently it won’t occur 
again in the near future (Cunningham & Kelly, n.d.; Kumagai, Carroll & 
Cohn, 2004a; McCaffrey, 2004). Furthermore, “dread risk”, “unknown risk” 
and number of people exposed have been found to influence the gap in risk 
perception and actual risk. Bushfire fails to score high in this instance also: 
in some cases bushfire evokes little dread due to a feeling of control by 
agencies undertaking suppression of fires. McCaffrey (2004) argues that in 
Canada the extent of bushfire is reasonably limited and there are few 
fatalities, particularly in more recent times; bushfire and its effects are well-
known; and few people are exposed due to adequate warning for evacuation. 
Individual risk perception can also be shaped by the community in which the 
individual lives. Risk perceptions are filtered by community influences such 
as shared experience and existing power relationships, and a cohesive 
community will continually shape and mould their collective perceptions of 
problems (Flint & Luloff, 2005). Gough (2000) inferred from her study that 
community structure and cohesiveness is linked to a better understanding 
and acceptance of natural hazard risk. 
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Vulnerability and Risk 
 
Vulnerability is inextricably linked with risk. Vulnerability describes the 
degree of susceptibility to harm of those at risk (Young, 1998). Vulnerability, 
in terms of natural hazards, is obviously influenced by geography; a person 
living in a fire-prone area is thus vulnerable to the effects of bushfire. 
However, how vulnerable a person is can be influenced by socioeconomic 
characteristics and other characteristics of the individual, knowledge and 
experience of the hazard, and also the community in which a person lives in 
terms of social structures, community cohesiveness and support, and the 
structural environment in terms of infrastructure (Young, 1998; Anderson-
Berry, 2003). Vulnerability can also be determined by a person’s perception 
of risk; a person who underestimates the level of risk will likely expose 
themselves to the risk to a greater extent than a person with more realistic 
perceptions thereby becoming more vulnerable (Anderson-Berry, 2003). 
Vulnerability however, similarly to risk, is not always perceived realistically. 
People with adequate threat knowledge and risk perception do not always 
perceive their own susceptibility to the threat, and furthermore often 
perceive that, in the event of a hazard, that they would be resilient and 
recover quickly (Odgers, 2002). For example, when a person has experienced 
a minor hazard, or even survived a disaster, they may infer from their ability 
to cope in that instance the ability to cope with any future occurrence of the 
hazard, or assume that a future occurrence will not exercise an adverse 
influence on them (normalisation bias). In addition, people often simply rate 
themselves less vulnerable, and more skilful than average (optimistic bias) 
(Johnston, Bebbington, Lai, Houghton & Paton, 1999; Kumagai, Carroll & 
Cohn, 2004a). Also, a person who has taken a step to reduce the risk of their 
house burning (e.g., created defensible space around their home) may be 
overconfident thus underestimating their vulnerability (a whole suite of 
strategies may need to be employed to significantly reduce the risk) (Montz, 
1993). 
 
In view of the above discussion, the perceived risk of a natural hazard and 
vulnerability of those at risk to the hazard is distorted primarily by ignorance 
and non-comprehension of the hazard. However, people are not entirely 
unaware of the risks and often do have a good understanding of the risk as 
well as their own vulnerability but chose to accept or tolerate it. According to 
Handmer and Penning-Roswell (1990) (in Gilbert, 2004), the perceived 
probability of a natural hazard is not only distorted by ignorance and non-
comprehension, but by recognisable and tangible benefits of the non-hazard 
experience, and by the existence of family and friends nearby (i.e., awareness 
of a sense of community). Ultimately, people balance the perceived risk and 
the benefit of living in a particular area: the higher the perceived benefit, the 
greater the risk tolerance (McCaffrey, 2004). 
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Understanding the risk perceptions and vulnerability of communities in 
hazardous areas is important for a number of reasons. Perception of risk and 
vulnerability can be extremely subjective, and peri-urban communities in 
particular may have diverse levels of risk perception, in contrast with other 
areas, because of a diversity of people living in peri-urban areas. Risk 
perception has been linked to preparedness; at least in theory, a person who 
perceives a high risk is more likely to act to reduce exposure than a person 
who perceives low risk (Beringer, 2000; Odgers & Rhodes, 2002; Anderson-
Berry, 2003; McCaffrey, 2004). Furthermore, level of risk perception has 
been found to be influenced (to a variable extent) by awareness-raising 
programs (Rohrmann, 2000ab; Anderson-Berry, 2003). Therefore, in 
understanding the risk perceptions of people in a community and how they 
may be influenced, and identifying those who are particularly vulnerable, a 
community-based approach can be incorporated, which increases the 
adaptability of community safety policies, strategies and programs 
addressing risk issues to the uniqueness of the situation as required. 
Additionally, because people will accept or tolerate risk to a certain degree, 
an understanding of risk perceptions of the community at hand and the 
factors which distort perceptions can determine an acceptable level of risk on 
which policies, strategies and programs may be based. 
 
As would be expected from the discussion of communities and risk 
perception thus far, a variation in levels of inter- and intra-community risk 
perception would not be surprising. Research into peri-urban resident’s 
perception of bushfire risk has indeed revealed that there are considerable 
variations. For example, Monroe and Nelson (2004) found that a large 
majority (84%) of sampled homeowners in Minnesota and Florida were very 
aware of their risk of wildfire, McGee and Russell (2003) reported that 
almost all respondents (90%) in a Victorian community adequately 
perceived the risk of bushfire, and Beringer (2000) compared two 
communities in Victoria and found that about half (52%) of the residents in 
one community and less than half (36%) in the other were aware of the high 
bushfire risk in their area.  
 
Perception of Risk Levels 
 
In McGee and Russell’s (2003) study, the high level of risk perception of 
many of the respondents, and a good knowledge of bushfire, can be 
attributed to past bushfire experience and a close association with the local 
fire brigade. Furthermore, the cohesiveness of the community appears to 
have lead to similar realistic perceptions of risk of other community 
members who do not have the same direct experience with fire and have not 
been as involved with the fire brigade. Unfortunately this community is more 
of a ‘model’ community rather than a community representative of peri-
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urban communities. Not all peri-urban communities are as cohesive, which 
will be explored further in following sections, or as involved with the local 
fire brigade. This community has more rural than urban characteristics and 
is very cohesive. The authors did mention that there was some degree of 
separation between established farm-families and people living on smaller 
blocks, particularly newcomers, but high levels of risk perception were being 
maintained through contact between newcomers and the fire brigade, 
initiated by the fire brigade. Perhaps this community is more representative 
of a process where community cohesion and the existing social, human and 
cultural capital is sufficiently strong to maintain the bushfire risk perception.  
 
Although this was not addressed by McGee and Russell (2003), a number of 
authors have linked risk perception with level of community cohesion in 
growing peri-urban areas (Anderson-Berry, 2003). For example, Gilbert 
(2004) observed “the diminishing importance of community [in a Victorian 
peri-urban area] with increasing numbers of new arrivals to the area” (p. 
40), and found spatial differences in risk perception that were tied to 
community cohesion: people living in the more established and community 
oriented streets were far more aware of the bushfire risk than people in 
newer areas.  
 
Beringer (2000) also observed significant differences in bushfire risk 
perception between newcomers and long-term residents in his study. He 
explained that new residents cannot identify their level of exposure to risk 
until they assess the hazards to which they are exposed. He attributed a 
delayed assessment of the hazard to the reluctance of some people to believe 
in the reality of a threat, and the interval between moving to the area and 
receiving bushfire literature from the fire brigade. Information programs 
have indeed been linked with increased awareness of bushfire risk 
(Rohrmann, 2000ab; Anderson-Berry, 2003). However results from 
assessments into the effectiveness of such programs are inconsistent. 
Providing information on bushfire risk is not a straightforward process and 
there is not one type of material or method that is consistently successful in 
raising awareness of risk, and information sources are further subject to a 
person’s biases and preconceptions (McCaffrey, 2004).  In any case, 
newcomers to peri-urban areas appear to become more aware of the bushfire 
risk over time, and the higher the initial awareness the more aware a person 
will be with time, leading to a high perception of risk (Gardner, Cortner & 
Widaman, 1987). Therefore the initial period of residency of newcomers to 
peri-urban areas is an important time for developing perceptions of bushfire 
risk, and low awareness can correspond with the time of the year that the 
home is purchased (Cortner, Gardner & Taylor, 1990). In the non-bushfire 
season, the bushfire risk is not always obvious because of the deceptive 
appearance of the landscape, and bushfire would not be a current issue 
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leading to a possible lack of education and social information indicating the 
bushfire risk. Additionally, the acceptance of risk depends on the degree of 
confidence placed in the organisation charged with its management (Smith, 
2001 in Gilbert, 2004). For example, distrust in a government may mean 
that any information received through that government is disregarded thus 
having no impact on risk perception. There appears to be a greater trust in 
community-based organisations, such as the local fire brigade and their 
community schemes, than governmental organisations (Gilbert, 2004). 
 
Gardner et al. (1987) investigated newcomers’ perception of risk over time 
and found that 6% of respondents surveyed in two Californian communities 
perceived the fire situation to be very serious at the time they bought their 
house. At the time of the survey the proportion of homeowners perceiving a 
serious risk had increased to 27%. These results may reflect newcomers 
growing connection with the existing community and an increased share in 
the communities’ social, human and cultural capital over time or the 
exposure of respondents to fire information and brigade personal, for 
example. Gardner et al. (1987) mentioned that increased awareness of 
bushfires in their particular study was due to respondents witnessing recent 
bushfires in the area or obtaining information on these bushfires from media 
coverage. Many studies have reported that respondents with past personal 
experience of bushfire have a significantly higher awareness of the risk of 
bushfire than those with no experience (Blanchard & Ryan, 2004; McGee & 
Russell, 2003; Gilbert, 2004). Winter & Fried (2000) stated that direct and 
indirect (e.g., via accounts from neighbours, friends and mass media) 
experiences with wildfire are more influential in perception formation and 
reinforcement than the hazard information received by homeowners in their 
study.  
 
Gardner et al. (1987) also compared risk awareness and perception of risk of 
people in a fire-affected community and in a non-affected community. They 
interestingly found that risk awareness in the community that was affected 
by the bushfire tended to remain low, the non-affected community felt more 
aware of the danger of bushfire in their neighbourhood. Furthermore, 
respondents from the affected community assigned a much lower probability 
of future fire than the non-affected community. The authors suggested that 
there was a dampening effect on awareness levels and risk perception in the 
fire-affected community. The respondents may have based their assessment 
on the adage that lighting does not strike twice in the same place, or on the 
assumption that the recent fire has reduced the vulnerability of the 
landscape to another fire. Jacobson, Monroe and Marynowski (2001) also 
suggested that experience with bushfire reduces the perception of risk, but 
the type of experience had different effects. The authors found that 
experience with bushfire smoke was correlated with increased awareness and 
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interest in learning more about fire management, perhaps because it 
reminded individuals about fire without generating great fear. McCaffrey 
(2004) also agreed that indirect experiences with wildfire are more 
influential than direct experiences on risk awareness and perceptions. 
However, she commented that perceptions based on a single experience are 
limited and biased, but on the other hand repeated experiences can lead to a 
“disaster subculture” where people become used to the hazard and do not 
perceive it to be a great risk. Experience with a natural hazard and its effect 
on risk perceptions therefore appears to be rather inconsistent. 
 
Without reinforcement of risk perceptions such as the reoccurrence of fire or 
reception of bushfire information, risk perception may change over time. 
Cunningham and Kelly (n.d.) investigated bushfire perception levels and 
changes in knowledge over time. They surveyed households in 1993 and 
2001 in a New South Wales peri-urban community that was affected by fire 
in 1985. In 1993, all (100%) households that had experienced fire understood 
the high fire risk in their area, in 2001 only 58% understood the fire risk 
suggesting a clear attrition in individual perception of risk. Similarly, 
knowledge about bushfire history decreased between surveys. As time 
progresses from the fire incident and people recover from the impact and 
return to their normal lives, the memory tends to fade and other issues begin 
to take priority. In the same study, the community (including those who had 
and had not experienced the fire) in 1993 had a good understanding (70%) of 
the high fire risk in their street with 33% of households having experienced 
the fire. In 2001 only 27% understood the fire risk despite 26% of households 
having experienced the fire. With a similar reduction in community 
knowledge of bushfire history, this study also highlights a clear attrition in 
community perception of risk and knowledge. This appears to be subject to 
individuals changing perceptions over time and possibly a decrease in the 
instances in which people discuss bushfire issues, it may also be due to 
changing community structure and processes typical of growing peri-urban 
areas (i.e., changing community cohesion and social, human and cultural 
capital), all leading to a lack of collective memory. However, Cunningham 
and Kelly (n.d.) did not investigate reasons behind the observed changing 
perceptions of risk of their respondents.  
 
Regulations and Risk 
 
A few authors have also considered the influence of building codes and 
regulations on risk perceptions. Institutional arrangements influence how 
people think about and respond to risk (Winter & Fried, 2000). Gilbert 
(2004) found varying effects: those who had built their homes and had to 
adhere to building codes specifically addressing bushfire safety were more 
aware of the risk because their attention was thus drawn to the issue; 
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however there was no such effect in the new housing estates, because people 
moving to these areas were largely urban people with little prior knowledge 
and awareness of bushfire risk, a lack of concern and even interest. However, 
Montz (1993) suggested that such building requirements may provide a false 
sense of security to residents, who may see their home as hazard-proof when 
it is not, thus distorting their perception of risk. Blanchard and Ryan’s 
(2004) study indicated that people who are less aware of the bushfire risk are 
particularly susceptible to low levels of risk perception after undertaking 
some degree of fire-proofing. Fire insurance, which is commonly perceived 
as highly effective in protecting investment from bushfire, as suggested by 
Nelson, Monroe, Fingerman Johnson and Bowers’ (2004) study, may also 
provide a false sense of security: if it is believed that belongings will be 
replaced if lost or damaged, perception of risk will be lower (Anderson-
Berry, 2003).  
 
Anderson-Berry (2003) suggested that “an accurate understanding of 
insurance status and extent of coverage is essential for an accurate and 
realistic perception of risk” (p. 226). Although, many people simply consider 
themselves less vulnerable to hazards than others in the same area who are 
exposed to the same level of risk. The literature indicates that people in high 
fire risk areas more accurately perceive the risk of fire in and around the area 
they live than the risk of fire to their own property. For example, Holden, 
Jones and Gabler (2000) found that while 64% of respondents, from a 
number of Gold Coast suburbs at medium to high levels of bushfire risk, 
perceived a medium to high fire risk for their area, only 35% perceived a 
medium to high risk of damage to their home from a bushfire. This may be 
driven by an unrealistic perception of preparedness. For example, Holden, 
Jones and Gabler (2000) also identified a large gap between stated 
preparedness and actual preparedness. Such gaps between perceptions and 
actual susceptibility moderates the perceived level of risk, which 
consequently leads a person to be more at risk. 
 
Many people move to and live in peri-urban areas for non-hazards benefits. 
The literature clearly indicates that people highly value the aesthetic appeal 
of the rural surroundings, and that this is the primary reason for living in the 
area (Gilbert, 2004; Monroe, Bowers & Hermansen, 2003a). Living in the 
area because of the importance of community such as to be close to family 
and friends, as proposed by Handmer and Penning-Roswell (1990) (in 
Gilbert, 2004), appeared to be a minor motivation throughout the literature. 
For example, Gilbert (2004) found that just 11% of respondents cited 
community benefits, which was suggested to be the result of a decreasing 
sense of community in his study areas. Nevertheless, such non-hazard 
benefits do distort perceptions of risk, many people are aware of the bushfire 
risk but choose to live with it in order to gain the perceived benefits. Most of 
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Gilbert’s respondents agreed that the benefits of living in their peri-urban 
area outweighed the risks. Holden et al. (2000) found that people in their 
focus groups were particularly well aware and knowledgeable about bushfire 
in their area, but were still willing to take that risk. 
 
Bushfire risk perception has also been related to various demographic and 
socioeconomic factors. For example Beringer (2000) found that the 
perceived fire hazard rating decreased with increasing age, he explained that 
older residents may consider themselves less vulnerable because of increased 
experience and knowledge of the fire hazards. Gilbert (2004) also observed a 
pattern similar to Beringer (2000) in one community, however he found the 
reverse in the other community and suggested that increased experience and 
knowledge may have alternatively lead to increasing risk perceptions with 
increasing age. Gender has also been investigated, for example Beringer 
(2000) and Gilbert (2004) found differences in bushfire knowledge between 
genders. Men tended to have a better understanding of bushfire, and this 
was statistically significant in Beringer’s (2000) study, and he suggested that 
a lack of knowledge may lead to females perceiving the bushfire to be a 
greater threat. Anderson-Berry (2003) linked level of education with risk 
perception; people with a higher education are likely to have a more accurate 
perception of risk because they more readily understand the scientific 
complexities of hazards, and they are likely to be better skilled at searching 
for and acquiring information. Fothergill and Peek (2004) reviewed the 
literature concerning the affect of socioeconomic status on risk perceptions; 
it appears that people of lower socioeconomic status may perceive higher 
levels of risk possibly because poorer people have little control over their 
lives and hold little power in the world. However occupation may affect risk 
perception, people of lower socioeconomic status tend to work in more 
hazardous occupations which can moderate risk perceptions (Fothergill & 
Peek, 2004). Fisek, Yeniceri, Muderrisoglu and Ozkarar (2002) alternatively 
suggested that socioeconomic status does not affect risk perception; for 
example income had no effect on overall risk perception. These studies 
strongly suggest that while demographics and socioeconomic factors can 
influence risk perceptions, the resultant effect is largely unpredictable. 
 
Expectation of the impact of a bushfire event 
 
Most people are well aware of the potential major impacts of bushfire, the 
effects are often experienced through mass media coverage, and many peri-
urban people understand that they live in a fire-prone area. However it 
appears that there is an overwhelming majority of people who do not expect 
a bushfire event to occur where they live, or at least whilst they are living 
there. Considering the high fire risk in most peri-urban areas, most people 
participating in various studies spoke about “if” a fire comes rather than 
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“when” (Monroe & Nelson, 2004; Nelson, Monroe & Fingerman Johnson, 
2004). People tend to consign rare events to the distant future and do not 
consider that “some time” could be tomorrow (Kerry, Kelk, Etkin, Burton, & 
Kalhok, 1999). If a fire did come however, there were various expectations of 
the event, and expectations were often based on the perception of bushfire as 
an uncontrollable or controllable event. Those people who perceive fire as 
uncontrollable thus expect random and significant destruction where 
suppression efforts are futile. These expectations were voiced during focus 
group discussions in Winter and Fried’s (2000) study. Participants 
characterised wildfire as an awesome, uncontrollable force where 
destruction is inevitable. The participants however, had experienced wildfire 
either directly or indirectly, and many saw dramatic examples of fire 
behaviour, examples that contradicted expectations such as houses with a 
300-ft-wide defensible space destroyed and wood sheds left standing despite 
being directly exposed to the flames. It is apparent that these participants 
did not have an understanding of the impact of embers on buildings.  
Participants who had directly experienced the fire held stronger beliefs that 
destruction was inevitable. The authors suggested that such an attitude helps 
them cope with the issue of personal responsibility for their loss. In the 
absence of hazard experience, similar expectations of random or total 
destruction can also be formed by vicarious experiences through the mass 
media, which tends to focus on destruction and loss of life (Paton, 2003). 
There are also many misconceptions about bushfire in circulation, which 
could also lead a person to believe that bushfire is an uncontrollable event. 
For example, there is the expectation that bushfires are so severe that only 
houses built especially to withstand bushfire will survive, or that houses 
explode in bushfires (Ramsay & Rudolph, 2003). 
 
In contrast, there are people who perceive bushfire as a controllable event 
and thus expect controlled and insignificant damage, and particularly do not 
expect their homes or property to be damaged, wholly or even partially. Such 
expectations may be based on a lack of knowledge, misinformation, or due to 
beliefs or experience based on successful fire suppression and controlled 
damage in the past (Kumagai et al., 2004a). It is also likely that these people 
are most at risk in a bushfire due to a probable lack of preparedness, and late 
evacuation in the instance where bushfire threatens their home. There were 
a number of people in Brennan’s (1998) study who did not expect that the 
fire would come near their property, but if the fire did happen to approach, 
and they felt threatened, they presumed that they would be able to evacuate 
safely. One respondent said they would “make a spilt-second decision on 
whether to stay or go and consult with my neighbour [when the fire reached 
the house next door]” (Brennan, 1998, p. 16), which would have been a very 
dangerous survival strategy had the fire reached next door. Discussions with 
respondents indicated that they did not consider what conditions would be 
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like when evacuating as the fire approached. Furthermore, residents were 
more ready to accept that the fire was under control than the fire fighters 
who were concerned about a wind change. Similarly, during the Ash 
Wednesday fires there were many people watching the fire front, not 
expecting to find themselves in the path of the fire and thus not taking any 
precautions, until the wind changed (Lazarus & Elley, 1984; Krusel & Petris, 
1992). A lack of knowledge of fire behaviour and conditions, leading to such 
unfounded expectations, is life threatening. A large proportion of deaths 
during the Ash Wednesday fires were due to late evacuations, and 
deliberately entering the fire area, because people did not recognise the real 
threat to their safety (Krusel & Petris, 1992). The extreme wind change that 
occurred on Ash Wednesday, which was unexpected by the majority of 
people, was associated with most deaths. A respondent in Holden et al.’s 
(2000) study expressed concern about the general lack of understanding “If 
there is a fire down the bottom, you’ve only got 3 minutes. They have 
absolutely no idea” (p. 3). Additionally, the loss of electricity and water 
during a bushfire event is in many cases unexpected. Water is obviously a 
crucial element in fighting fires, and there is a heavy reliance on mains water 
supply and electricity for water pumps, however these services do often fail 
because of bushfire. There were a number of examples during the Ash 
Wednesday bushfires where the fire could have been controlled, and houses 
saved, if there was water (Lazarus & Elley, 1984). 
 
The expectation that fire can be controlled on the other hand, may be based 
on a good understanding of bushfire and mitigative measures. In this 
instance, expectations of the bushfire event and potential impacts are more 
realistic. For example, respondents in Nelson, Monroe, Fingerman Johnson 
and Bowers (2004) and Monroe and Nelson’s (2004) studies, who seemed to 
have a good understanding of bushfire, did not believe that bushfire events 
were out of their hands, they “had a healthy respect for the damage that a 
wildfire can do” (Nelson et al., 2004, p. 423). While there was the general 
expectation that houses prepared for bushfire would withstand the event, 
they understood that houses and property could be lost, including houses 
that were prepared, if certain climatic conditions existed.  
 
The Colorado Office of Community Services (Burns, Porter-Norton, Mosher 
& Richard, 2003) undertook focus group discussions consisting of 275 
people from 29 Western Colorado communities. While it was noted that the 
participants were not necessarily representative residents of their 
communities, they were chosen for their good understanding of their 
respective communities and because they had some awareness of, and 
interest in bushfire. The participants also had a very good understanding of 
the direct and indirect impacts of bushfire. Although discussions centred on 
participants’ ideas and concerns about bushfire issues (i.e., did not 
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necessarily reflect what the respondents actually expected would happen to 
themselves or their community), respondents acknowledged that wildfire 
would impact on the cultural, social and economic fabric of a community. 
They mentioned the cumulative effects and the negative consequences for 
the economic health of the region, quality of life and scenic beauty of the 
area, for example, and the social costs such as neighbourhood relations and 
other values that cannot be easily reconstructed. This study indicates that 
there are a considerable number of people who do have realistic 
expectations, or at least ideas, of bushfire and associated potential impacts. 
However, through various accounts given by people after experiencing a 
bushfire, it appears that regardless of a person’s understanding, knowledge 
and expectations of a bushfire event, when a bushfire actually occurs, for 
many people, the bushfire was not only unexpected but many events that 
unfolded were unexpected, and pre-conceived expectations were often not 
met.  
 
Indirect costs, particularly social costs, are difficult to measure, and are often 
omitted in official loss statistics complied in the aftermath of a natural 
disaster, and thus do not reflect the true costs of a disaster (David, Baish & 
Hearn Morrow, 1999). Therefore, unless one has experienced a disaster, it is 
difficult to actually know what to expect, and given that people generally do 
not expect a bushfire to occur, they perceive a low risk of damage to their 
homes (Holden et al., 2000) and are over-confident in their ability to cope in 
the event of a bushfire (Odgers & Rhodes, 2002), it is not surprising that 
they are shocked when a bushfire does occur. For example, from Halvorson’s 
(2002) investigation into the 2000 Bitter Root Valley (Montana) fires, 
people described finding themselves “living in harms way”, some 
respondents expressed disbelief or even denial that bushfires were burning 
close enough to threaten communities. Everyone in the area felt affected, and 
many were significantly traumatised by the event and experienced multiple 
anxieties. Various comments from respondents indicate that the magnitude 
of the event was completely unexpected as were the short and long term 
psychological, economic and environmental effects. People often do not 
expect that their basic needs can be compromised (Debelle, 1993), and that it 
takes such a long time to get back to normal. The 2003 fires in Canberra 
particularly highlight the latter point, The Age newspaper (Rising from the 
ashes, 2004) interviewed residents who were affected by bushfire one year 
after the event, and revealed that very few had rebuilt their homes. This was 
partly due to planning delays, under insurance and a shortage of builders, 
but also because of the enormity of the situation, not only rebuilding a home 
but also lives, which has been overwhelming for some people and impossible 
for others.  
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Expectation of themselves 
 
What people expect of themselves before, during and after a natural hazard, 
such as in preparation, protecting property and recovering from disaster, is 
related to perceptions of who is responsible. Responsibility can be linked 
with property rights to the hazard. For example, if the risk is regarded as 
public (i.e., the magnitude of risk an individual faces depends on the actions 
of others), then the individual perceives him or herself as having little 
responsibility in reducing the risk and/or dealing with the consequences, if 
the risk is regarded as private (i.e., an individual’s own behaviour determines 
the magnitude of risk), then the individual perceives him or herself as having 
primary responsibility. Bushfire risk can be viewed as having both public and 
private components because various people (e.g., residents and public land 
managers) contribute to the risk and share, to varying degrees, in the 
consequences. Perceived responsibility, in particular will play a role in 
determining which risks are ultimately reduced, and by whom (Winter & 
Fried, 2000). 
 
Preparedness and mitigation  
 
Recent studies investigating bushfire preparedness and mitigation have 
indeed found that people do perceive some level of personal responsibility. 
For example, Winter and Fried (1997, cited in Winter & Fried, 2000, pp. 36-
37) found that most respondents (80%) in their Michigan study considered 
wildfire protection to be either an equally shared responsibility between 
homeowners and the government (54%) or primarily a responsibility of the 
homeowner (26%). Very few (6%) saw the government as solely responsible 
for protection. Furthermore, in accepting some responsibility, most 
homeowners in Michigan were willing to pay for wildfire protection: willing 
to pay for protection activities undertaken by the state and/or by the 
individual (Fried, Winter & Gilless, 1999); and willing to pay US$57 per year 
for a 50% reduction in risk (Winter & Fried, 2001). Winter and Fried (2000) 
investigated which fire protection activities Michigan homeowners viewed as 
their own responsibility, and found that responsibilities were generally 
limited to being careful with fire and protecting their own property from 
wildfire damage, as well as maintaining insurance coverage on their home 
and personal property. However, because many respondents held the view 
that fire is an uncontrollable force that burns indiscriminately across 
ownerships, some declared that fire protection is simply everyone’s 
responsibility. Common fire protection activities cited throughout the 
literature that people expect themselves to undertake, or are at least aware 
of, include clearing and removing vegetation around the house (e.g., tree 
limbs, understorey, grass, leaves), keeping appropriate equipment on hand 
(e.g., water pumps, hoses, sprinklers), mowing the property, removing 
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flammable rubbish, insuring the house and using fire retardant building 
materials (Monroe, Jacobson & Marynowski, 1999; Holden et al., 2000; 
Odgers & Rhodes, 2002; Nelson et al., 2004). Despite the general perception 
of personal responsibility and the various activities people know and expect 
themselves to undertake to fulfil their responsibilities, many people do not 
actually take action to prepare themselves or their property for bushfire. 
Taking action can be moderated by several factors. In particular, if a person 
does not perceive the bushfire risk it is unlikely that they will participate in 
fire protection activities. In addition, many people who perceive there is a 
bushfire risk, and even knowing what actions to take to reduce the risk, still 
do not always undertake fire protection activities (McCaffrey, 2004). For 
example, a focus group participant in Holden et al.’s (2000) study 
commented on the distance between awareness and action succinctly; 
“People are aware of quite a lot of things these days, but few things are put 
into action. Like my neighbour who is a fire fighter. His property is full of 
scrub and fallen palm leaves, but he hasn’t done anything about it. If anyone 
is aware, he is; but he hasn’t done anything about it” (Holden et al., 2000,  
p. 4).  
 
According to McCaffrey (2004), in considering mitigation measures, people 
engage in two types of evaluation: cost-benefit and implementation 
feasibility. Cost-benefit analysis involves weighing the financial costs against 
the expected return of the investment over a relevant time frame. Many fire 
protection measures are costly (e.g., building modifications and removal of 
large trees), and there is significant uncertainty in estimating the benefit 
because there is no guarantee of protection from bushfire. “People do not 
exert any effort “for nothing”; they need to feel that their efforts will pay off” 
(Kumagai et al., 2004a, p. 30). It is also difficult for people to continually 
exert resources and effort for long periods of time (Kumagai et al., 2004a). 
This is particularly true for people on low income (or perhaps restrained by 
other socioeconomic factors) where costs are proportionately greater than 
for those on a high income. Turner, Nigg and Paz (1986, cited in Fothergill & 
Peek, 2004, p. 92) found that disaster preparedness increases steadily with 
income levels.  Fisek, Yeniceri, Muderrisoglu and Ozkarar (2002) also found 
that income was an important predictor of behavioural as well as 
psychological preparedness. A person who does not own their home is also 
likely to assume higher costs than expected returns because of the shorter 
time frame typical of renters.  Making a relatively large investment for a 
probable short period of time, and for someone else’s property, can certainly 
be perceived as doing something for nothing. Indeed Beringer (2000) found 
that non-property owners were less likely than property owners to make 
even small investments in fire protection, such as cleaning guttering, reading 
bushfire literature and discussing what their family should do in the event of 
a fire. Furthermore, people who perceive bushfire as an uncontrollable force 
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will be less likely to invest in protection measures because of the expectation 
that their efforts will be futile (Winter & Fried, 2000; Nelson et al., 2004) 
 
The feasibility of implementing an intervention includes consideration of the 
environmental and technical viability of a fire protection activity: how well it 
fits with the area and current land use, and the availability of skills and 
resources. It also includes socio-cultural and personal considerations such as 
whether the activity conforms to personal beliefs, community, mores and 
laws (McCaffrey, 2004). A significant problem in protecting houses against 
bushfire is its perceived incompatibility with values about landscape forms, 
and other beliefs and values about the natural environment. Environmental 
values are fundamental to “our human identity and fulfilment depend(s) to a 
great extent on the satisfactory expression of these values… reflect(ing) a 
profound human craving for affiliating with nature and wildlife” (Kellert, 
1996, cited in Nelson et al., 2004, p. 414), or as simply stated by a 
respondent in Winter, Vogt and Fried’s (2002) study; “We live in the 
woods… because we want to live in the woods” (p. 19).  Removing or 
modifying vegetation around the house is generally seen as sacrificing the 
closeness to nature, the scenic beauty of the property, privacy, and the 
conservation of energy afforded through shade trees (Monroe, Long & 
Marynowski, 2003b; Nelson et al., 2004; Nelson, Monroe & Fingerman 
Johnson, 2005). A resident said that it would affect her emotionally to cut 
down trees (Nelson et al., 2005), and some felt so strongly about 
maintaining naturalness that they believed that if a fire did come it should 
take their house as well as the trees (Nelson et al., 2004), indicating that 
some people simply value the forest more than their house. On the other 
hand, in line with different people’s values (and also the ecosystem in which 
they live), whilst valuing nature, some residents also value a well maintained 
yard with a lawn for example. Therefore in this instance, while not always 
intentional, people are creating a defensible space to match their particular 
landscape values (Nelson et al., 2005); “The landscape of any farm is the 
owner’s portrait of himself” (Leopold, 1939, cited in Nelson et al., 2005, p. 
323). Although there is evidence that activities and modifications undertaken 
on one’s property need to be “within reason”, as determined by the social 
norm of the community. Respondents in Monroe and Nelson’s (2004) study 
reported social norms about fire preparedness in their communities, 
however the degree varied from certainty that their neighbours would 
disapprove of defensible space to equal certainty that their neighbours would 
not care what they did on their land. The Institute of Medicine (2002) 
considers such social norms as one of the significant factors in predicting 
willingness to adopt appropriate safety measures. 
 
McCaffrey (2004) also explained that the lack of action in undertaking 
bushfire protection activities is additionally due to the fact that people live 
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busy and complicated lives, which often means that natural hazards have low 
salience compared to other concerns. People’s judgements about preparation 
include reasoning about their permanence and their ease of adoption, thus 
fire protection measures that require little investment in time and effort both 
initially and over time, are favoured. Through investigating which 
preparation activities people have and have not undertaken, Odgers and 
Rhodes (2002) found that the activities actually undertaken were most likely 
to have been done for reasons other than bushfire, such as cutting back and 
removing vegetation from around the house and mowing the lawn, which 
also fulfils the desire for a tidy yard. Similarly, sprinklers and hoses are also 
installed for the purpose of watering gardens. Odgers and Rhodes (2002) 
also identified that activities least commonly adopted are those that are 
deliberate and specific to bushfire risk such as having a non-electric pump 
and a written plan. This pattern is mirrored throughout the literature and 
indicates that people in fire-prone areas are generally under-prepared. 
Furthermore, people who have experienced fire and even indicate their 
intentions to prepare themselves for a future event do not necessarily take 
action. For example, Hamer (2001) discussed his neighbour’s experience 
with bushfire which burned the (unmanaged) forest on his property and 
would have spread to houses along the street if not for a neighbour who 
stayed behind to fight the fire. After the fire the person cleared the grass 
under his trees and trimmed the limbs, however in time, with the fire no 
longer front-page news and new activities and issues needing attention, 
weeds were neglected and the forest was returning to its pre-fire hazardous 
state. Hamer (2001) on the other hand, who actually lost his house in the 
fire, is moving to another peri-urban area, building a fire-proof home, and 
defying community norms by creating defensible space. Although, 
experience with bushfire inconsistently influences individual preparedness 
in the same manner that it influences risk perception, there are a number of 
examples where people who have lost their homes to bushfire, rebuild fire-
proof homes (Gilbert, 2004; Thistleton, 2004). 
 
Response and recovery 
 
The literature clearly indicates that in the event of a fire, a person’s first 
priority is to protect themselves and their family, and, where possible, to 
protect their property. Families with young children and other dependent 
persons tend to evacuate, younger people (<40 years) are also more likely to 
evacuate because of young children and little bushfire experience (Beringer, 
2000). However there is a large proportion of people who intend to stay with 
their house, most of whom are male [67% in Beringer’s (2000) study and 
62% in Odgers and Rhodes’ (2002) study] because women tend to evacuate 
with dependents, and because women may perceive a higher risk due to a 
lack of knowledge (Beringer, 2000). Those people who intend to stay with 
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their homes, expect that they will be able to do so and thus not be forced to 
evacuate or be stopped by roadblocks on their way home. There are a 
number of accounts where people have defied the authorities, risking arrest, 
to get to their homes (Lazarus & Elley, 1984). People who were prevented 
from staying with their homes later expressed much anger from the distress 
that it caused (Beringer, 2000; Odgers & Rhodes, 2002). Although 
remaining with the house in a bushfire event significantly increases house 
survival, and thus will protect people providing they remain inside the house 
as the fire front passes (Krusel & Petris, 1992), people with unrealistic 
expectations of the event and themselves, will be at risk. 
 
Thus, there are many people living in high fire risk areas who do not perceive 
the risk, do not adequately understand bushfire and the impacts and under-
invest in fire protection measures. Despite this, there is a general expectation 
that they will be able to cope when faced with the danger of bushfire (Odgers, 
2002). However when a bushfire event actually occurs many of these people 
come to realise that they expected too much of themselves. In Brennan’s 
(1998) study, of 43 people or households who had planned to stay with their 
house during a fire event, only 15 were fully committed (being prepared and 
confident). The uncommitted households were those who were likely to leave 
the house at some stage during the fire, despite the intention of staying, 
which is a dangerous survival strategy. It seems that those who were 
uncommitted suffered stress from the experience of being alone waiting for 
the fire, were not confident even when fairly well prepared, or understood 
that they were not prepared and relied heavily on the fire fighting services. 
One person’s experience during the Ash Wednesday fires describes the 
physical and psychological stress a bushfire can have on a person; “[we] 
worked like mad for a couple of hours [preparing the house]… spent half an 
hour in the pool setting up the reserve pipe to the filter, but I forgot that the 
electricity was off. I wasn’t thinking clearly” (Lazarus & Elley, 1984, p. 12). To 
the inexperienced person, it is not always obvious that being prepared for a 
bushfire involves much more than physical preparations: a person must be 
fully aware of and perceive the risk of bushfire; understand how bushfires 
behave; how people and houses survive in bushfires and what to expect 
during a bushfire; they need to have a comprehensive household plan 
consisting of what each household member’s role will be; and be 
psychologically ready (Odgers & Rhodes, 2002). The latter points it seems 
are most commonly neglected, which leads people to evacuate at the last 
minute and risk their lives. 
 
People also tend to be overconfident in their ability to recover from bushfire 
(Odgers, 2002), but various reports investigating people after they have been 
affected by fire indicate that recovery for many people is not an easy process; 
it is a stressful and long process. The Sydney Morning Herald (Marriner & 
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Holder, 2004) reported that it took six months for a woman to face returning 
to the site of her old home and one year after the Canberra fires, which had 
burnt her home, she finally felt that she was ready to move on. Similarly, a 
man spoke to Peter Harris (2004) about the year in limbo after the Canberra 
fires burnt his home, and his struggle to move away from the “bushfire 
victim” mentality. He wanted everything to return to normal, and in the 
beginning he thought that it would be possible; they were insured, and 
possessions could be replaced, and he had his family. However, he and his 
wife came to realise that they could not return to their prior life, they had lost 
more than a home, they had lost part of themselves. Furthermore, another 
couple who also lost their home to the Canberra fires described the struggle 
with an avalanche of unexpected and unwanted decisions concerning their 
house and their lives (Campbell, 2003).  Even those people who had not lost 
their homes experienced a traumatic year after the Canberra fires: “The fires 
have had a big impact on the people who stayed behind… We’re living in a 
very desolate environment, the ambience of the area has gone” (Rising from 
the ashes, 2004, p. 1). and “The wind blows and it’s louder than it ever was 
before… You don’t hear the kids anymore” (Rising from the ashes, 2004, p. 
1). There are some instances, however seemingly very few, where the 
situation has not been so dire. For example, a couple who moved into 
temporary accommodation (a townhouse) after losing their home to the 
Canberra fires found that they loved the new lifestyle and living with less, 
and being free from clutter (Rising from the ashes, 2004). 
 
People who have a strong sense of community or societal commitment, and 
are generally well prepared and/or in a better position than others for 
example, feel compelled and that it is their responsibility to lend their 
support to others during and after a bushfire event. For example, Lazarus 
and Elley (1984) identified people who, after preparing their own house, 
helped others to prepare, and people who had equipment to fight the fires 
protecting their own house as well as neighbours’. One respondent explained 
that she would not have known what to do if her neighbour had not come 
and helped her. People in the Bitter Root Valley fires used existing formal 
and informal social networks and organisations to rally together to help 
others prepare their houses, and after the fires, to help people affected by the 
fire to recover; and to “do the right thing”. Some people were frustrated 
when they were not able to do anything to help (Halvorson, 2002). 
Furthermore, many people, particularly young people, want to be directly 
involved in fighting fires with the fire brigade; 66% of the 18 to 25 year old 
respondents were involved in fire fighting in Beringer’s (2000) study, and 
according to Beringer this perhaps reflects the number of young people who 
are involved in the local fire brigades. 
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Expectation of neighbours and community 
 
There are some important community characteristics that can determine the 
resilience of a community, and the individuals living within it, to natural 
disasters. Buckle, Marsh and Smale (2000) listed a number of factors that 
support individuals, families and communities to minimise the consequences 
of disasters including: shared community values; aspirations and goals; 
established social infrastructure; positive social and economic trends; 
sustainability of social and economic life; partnerships (between agencies, 
between community groups and between commercial enterprises); 
communities of interest (where a geographically diverse group shares a 
common interest, skill or expertise); established networks; and resources 
and skills. Similarly, Jakes et al. (2002) highlighted the importance of social 
capital, human capital and cultural capital in community preparedness for 
bushfire, and Anderson-Berry (2003) simply stated that “closer-knit 
communities tend to be more resilient“ (p. 226). 
 
 
 
Figure 11.1 Rural Fire Brigade member and cohesiveness 
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Being part of a community that is cohesive and rich with the above social 
characteristics will compel individuals and groups to assist fellow 
community members in need, as was described in the previous section. It 
will also mean that community members in need of assistance will look for 
support from their community. Furthermore, the community will be more 
likely to act as an organised collective group in preparing for, responding to 
and recovering from natural disasters. The importance of social responses 
(e.g., decision making, management and support), together with structural 
responses (e.g., building materials, defensible space and insurance), to 
bushfire threats was recently highlighted by Steelman and Kunkel (2004). 
They noted that social responses will be unique to individual communities: 
social responses operate at the local community level and consequently take 
diverse forms in different communities; and the social capacity of a 
community to respond is strongly dependant on its characteristics leading to 
vast differences across communities. 
 
Preparedness and mitigation  
 
A community with the social capacity to respond to a bushfire threat can 
encourage its individuals and equip them with the necessary skills and 
resources to undertake measures to protect their home. McGee and Russell 
(2003) investigated the link between social cohesion and bushfire 
preparedness and found a positive relationship; there were extensive social 
networks within the long-term resident community that addressed bushfire 
preparedness, newcomers however were generally not part of this network 
and were found to be less prepared for the event of a fire. There is also 
evidence that individuals in this community are self-sufficient and confident 
in the face of the bushfire threat because of the strong social network of 
support. Larsson and Enander (1997) have also suggested that how a person 
perceives the views of other members of their community to disaster 
preparations may influence an individual’s actions. Although this is an area 
that needs to be developed more, it is likely that people within a cohesive 
community that has a positive attitude toward bushfire preparedness, such 
as in McGee and Russell’s (2003) study, will be motivated to undertake fire 
protection measures because of an expectation of a positive reaction from 
others. On the other hand, if undertaking fire protection measures is 
expected to create negative reactions, such as defensible space in a 
community that values naturalness, it is unlikely that the measures will be 
undertaken. Hamer (2001) for example, was concerned about the bushfire 
threat in his neighbourhood and considered creating defensible space 
around his home, however in a discussion with a neighbour he realised that 
the action could create considerable negative reaction. He therefore did not 
create defensible space (perhaps consequently, Hamer’s house was later 
destroyed by bushfire). Flint and Luloff (2005) have explained that a 
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community will not take action and mobilise resources, and thus support 
individual fire protection measures, unless there is a shared community 
perception of risk. Furthermore, a fire protection measure that requires 
collective action is also unlikely to be undertaken by an individual unless 
others in the neighbourhood take action (Paton, 2003). However, in the 
instance where a community has collectively taken action to reduce the risk 
of bushfire, there are high expectations that all others in the community will 
do the same. For example, when “appropriate defensible actions” are not 
undertaken by residents, this inaction is viewed as personal apathy or 
irresponsibility (Burns, Porter-Norton, Mosher & Richard, 2003). In many 
cases, those who do not join in fire protection activities are newcomers 
and/or people without a strong connection the community in question, 
respondents in a number of studies have voiced their concern or frustration 
with the lack of participation of newcomers in particular (Halvorson, 2002; 
Gilbert, 2004). 
 
Response and recovery 
 
Family and community cohesion is an important predictor of an individual’s 
response to a natural hazard; social ties tend to increase the probability of an 
effective response (Krusel & Petris, 1992; Anderson-Berry, 2003). Social ties 
are an important informal communication network. The reception of 
information during a bushfire is particularly important to enable people to 
make informed decisions about what actions should be undertaken and 
when. During the Bitter Root Valley fires, residents responded to the general 
confusion of whether to evacuate or not by monitoring various conditions to 
judge the level of risk and then disseminating this information, which was 
tailored to the needs of others in the community, through various 
information networks (Halvorson, 2002). Bitter Root Valley is a good 
example of a community with the social capacity to respond effectively to 
bushfires, and community members, particularly those born and raised there 
and thus closely affiliated with the community, rely on this social capacity for 
support and, as a community, to be independent from outside groups. For 
example, many evacuated residents did not utilise the Red Cross shelter 
because they sought accommodation with friends and family, or camped 
with other families by the river (Halvorson, 2002).  
 
In the bushfire aftermath there was a similar “pulling together” within the 
Bitter Root Valley community. As discussed previously, community members 
established formal and informal support networks to help bushfire victims. A 
strong sense of community emerged both during the bushfire and after, and 
the experience of dealing with the fire hazard seemed to give an additional 
sense of identity to the communities (Halvorson, 2002). Kumagai et al. 
(2004a) explained that “a community’s disaster recovery processes reflect 
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the community’s pre-disaster social and physical conditions” (p. 31). Indeed 
the Bitter Root Valley communities were well prepared for disaster and were 
thus able to deal effectively with the aftermath; it appeared that the majority 
of people in need of assistance and support received assistance and support 
from fellow community members. Halvorson (2002) did identify victims 
who were not well established or connected to the local community, and 
these people fell outside of the community networks, however, critical 
financial and moral support was provided by external aid, the efforts of 
which were enhanced by the community support networks. Without such a 
strong sense of community and informal and formal community support 
networks, preparedness, response and recovery efforts would have 
proceeded incrementally and haphazardly (Halvorson, 2002). The existence 
of active community leadership has also been identified as an important 
component of hazard mitigation, response and recovery (Petterson, 1999; 
Reddy, 2000). There is a need, if not an expectation, for somebody, 
particularly existing community leaders, to activate and organise the 
community and its resources to respond to hazards effectively. Most research 
shows that such leadership does indeed emerge in the situation of a hazard 
(Petterson, 1999; Reddy, 2000). Despite the expectations of fellow 
community members that a person may have in times of crises, it appears 
that people are nevertheless amazed and heartened by the level of support 
that was actually received. Even people from the Bitter Root Valley 
communities expressed amazement: “The community pulling together was 
amazing for me” (Halvorson, 2002, p. 7). 
 
Many studies investigating the weeks or months after a disaster have 
reported the pulling-together of communities, even communities that were 
not cohesive pre-disaster (Moore, Daniel, Linnan, Campbell, Benedict & 
Meier, 2004). Such collective moments are termed “altruistic or therapeutic 
communities”, however this is not a long-term effect. Participants in Moore 
et al.’s (2004) study described the later phases (after experiencing the 
therapeutic community) of the Hurricane Floyd flood disaster in North 
Carolina as being characterised by a general lack of concern on the part of 
fellow residents (and governmental authorities). As a community begins to 
recover and the effects of the disaster become less apparent, memories fade, 
people are less willing to help and other issues and problems begin to take 
priority. For many, a period of disillusionment and anger entails the 
experiences and perceptions of high levels of trust, social cohesion, or 
collective efficacy, possibly leading to changes in the way these people view 
their community and their place in it (Moore et al., 2004). Hoffman (2000) 
also described the dichotomy of a community following the Oakland 
Berkeley Firestorm in 1991. “At first the outside community saw us with 
sympathy. Eventually, when recovery took longer than the day, week or 
month they envisioned, they came to view us as greedy whiners and 
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undeserving receivers of pots of gold” (p. 60). Driven by jealousy, the 
disaster victims thus became targets of wanton envy, they were viewed as 
“lucky” because they had all new things and would eventually have new 
houses. In response, disaster victims withdrew from the outside community 
and adopted equally separating, and in due course dehumanising, 
conceptualisations to mark them. 
 
A human-caused or “technological” disaster can also set the stage for anger 
and conflict as victims blame what they perceive to be the responsible party 
and disagree over remediation measures (Carroll, Cohn, Seesholtz & Higgins, 
2005). Bushfires have elements of both technological and natural disasters. 
Bushfires are a natural occurrence in many parts of the world, however, they 
can also be started by a deliberate or accidental human act. Technology also 
plays a role in suppression and management of bushfire. Carroll, Cohn, 
Seesholtz and Higgins (2005) investigated bushfire as a galvanising and 
fragmenting influence in three Arizona communities and found that 
although the disaster literature is replete with examples of communities 
suffering internal conflict in the aftermath of disaster events, there was little 
within-community tension and conflict in the communities studied. Rather, 
the communities pulled together. However, much of the disaster literature in 
this area does not address bushfire, therefore further investigation is 
warranted. Tension and conflict were apparent, but most of the blaming 
behaviour in these communities was directed at outside agencies, which will 
be discussed in later sections. Kumagai, Bliss, Daniels and Carroll (2004b) 
suggested that it should not be assumed that community responses to 
bushfire events are simple or predictable. 
 
Expectations of Organisations 
 
The public perceive the primary responsibility of fire and emergency services 
to be fire suppression and protecting people and property, and, in most 
cases, the fire services in particular are perceived to fulfil their roles 
effectively. Holden et al.’s (2000) study suggested that regardless of a 
person’s awareness or knowledge of fire brigades, most people highly value 
the fire brigade that services their area, even people who are not sure about 
which type of brigade actually services their area. Furthermore, Gilbert 
(2004) revealed that there is a general high level of confidence in local 
brigades. Such positive views may be attributed to a number of factors: fire 
fighters are often depicted at the front line of a bushfire, risking their lives to 
save others and are thus often viewed as heroes; and local brigades in 
particular are usually part of the community with family and friends 
volunteering and working for the community. As a result local fire brigades 
are viewed as distinct from government agencies. 
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Preparedness and mitigation  
 
Efforts made by fire brigades and their community schemes such as 
Community Fireguard (CFA, Victoria), to communicate with the local 
community appear to be well appreciated. There is an expectation that the 
information received by the local brigades is accurate and tailored to local 
conditions, and is thus perceived as credible. Participants in McGee and 
Russell’s (2003) study indicated their preference for information from the 
local fire brigade, above other information sources. It was also suggested that 
most people in this community prefer to actively seek such information 
themselves, however, these people also tended to accept much of the 
responsibility to respond to the bushfire threat. People in other communities 
generally do not perceive themselves as having such a high level of 
responsibility, and are less resourceful, and consequently rely on others to 
provide information. The opinion that fire brigades adequately liaise with the 
general public appears closely related to whether residents have had contact 
with the local fire brigade since living in the area.  For example 67% of 
residents in Beringer’s (2000) study had had contact with the local fire 
brigade and 67% felt there was sufficient liaison between the CFA and the 
general public. Therefore, although people highly regard and prefer 
information received from their fire brigade, there does not appear to be an 
expectation that fire brigades will be visibly active and have regular contact 
with residents to provide information. Holden et al.’s (2000) study revealed 
that only 5% of respondents thought that information delivered through door 
knocks and one-on-one meetings would be effective, the majority indicated 
that literature in the form of a pamphlet, booklet or leaflet (65%) and 
television (15%) would be the best delivery mode. Furthermore, in Odgers 
and Rhodes’ (2002) study, respondents believed that fire brigades should 
assign a higher priority to bushfire hazard reduction than educating the 
public. Similarly, Holden et al.’s (2000) respondents thought that fire 
brigades should take a more active role in prevention, however; it was 
perceived that brigades are constrained by a lack of resources and sometimes 
authority. 
 
Response and recovery 
 
During a bushfire event there is a huge reliance on fire brigades and 
emergency services, as would be expected. However, it is clear throughout 
the literature that a majority of people expect too much of these services, in 
particular many people expect that fire fighters will be available to protect 
their homes and that they will be specifically warned and told when to 
evacuate (Beringer, 2000; Gilbert, 2004). These expectations are based on a 
lack of awareness; indeed emergency service priorities are to protect people 
and property, but in a major fire event these services are often overwhelmed 
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and not able to meet such expectations. Furthermore, front line fire fighters 
do not always have the most accurate and up-to-date information (Brennan, 
1998), and, possibly as a result, actions taken by fire and emergency 
personnel are not always the most appropriate. For example, there are a 
number of instances where people have been evacuated, from their otherwise 
safe homes, during the height of the fire (Braun, 2002).  
 
Newcomers and those who have not experienced a bushfire, who are more 
likely to rely heavily on emergency services, are most often astonished by the 
fires and the alleged lack of emergency services (Halvorson, 2002).  Carroll, 
Findley, Blatner, Mendez, Daniels and Walter (2000) also mentioned that 
people’s emotional reactions tend to be equal to the fire’s magnitude and 
intensity. One community in their Washington study appeared to be more 
emotionally charged and more likely to give rise to conflict than the other 
two communities because a section of this community experienced some 
serious direct impacts that the other communities did not. Although such 
astonishment and conflict may lead to blaming behaviour, it is more likely 
that the government and its agencies, including federal fire services, will be 
blamed rather than local fire brigades (see next section). After experiencing a 
bushfire, the community in Odgers and Rhodes’ (2002) study praised the fire 
services despite an overall opinion that they could have been better 
prepared, the local government was generally viewed as ineffective and 
criticised for its lack of action. 
 
There is obviously a great reliance on emergency aid organisations after a 
major bushfire, particularly for those people who do not have strong social 
connections to the community. However, it would appear that there is also a 
large perception gap between what fire victims expected and what occurred. 
Two major themes surfaced from Carroll et al.’s (2005) study: individuals 
expected both a better organised and more effective distribution of financial 
resources and a more sympathetic and caring response; and a more 
equalised distribution of resources between the three communities affected 
by the bushfires. This resulted in considerable tension between the 
communities and the American Red Cross to the point that the organisation 
was picketed by locals. Furthermore, the unequal distribution of resources 
created considerable conflict between the three communities. Unequal 
distribution of aid appears to be a common occurrence post-disaster, but is 
nevertheless unexpected (David et al., 1999; Moore et al., 2004), and people 
of lower socioeconomic status are often further marginalised (Fothergill & 
Peek, 2004).  
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Expectation of government 
 
Because bushfire risk has a considerable public component, and bushfires 
are commonly perceived as a technological hazard, all levels of government 
are perceived to be responsible to some extent to mitigate bushfire and its 
impacts. However, although there is the general expectation that 
governments need to take action, which actions and to what extent can vary 
considerably from person to person and area to area. Much of the literature 
investigating people’s reactions to or acceptability of mitigative measures has 
been based on the Theory of Reasoned Action, which suggests that beliefs are 
a strong predictor of attitudes and attitudes are a strong predictor of 
behaviour (Bright, Vaske, Kneeshaw & Absher, 2002; Vogt, Winter & Fried, 
2002; Vogt, Winter & Fried, 2005).  
 
Preparedness and mitigation 
 
People’s knowledge and perceptions of fire and fire policies are becoming 
more sophisticated. Thirty to 40 years ago people generally believed that fire 
was bad and thus supported aggressive suppression. As people became more 
knowledgeable about the beneficial effects of fire, attitudes changed and 
support for suppression-only policies gave way to fire management (Cortner, 
Gardner & Taylor, 1990). In most instances, fire management on public land 
is expected, but opinion on how this should be done varies. Prescribed 
burning and mechanical fuel reduction, the major fuel reduction techniques, 
have both been the subject of controversy. For example, in the USA 
mechanical fuel reduction has been broadly supported but environmentalists 
are suspicious because fire more closely mimics natural disturbance 
patterns, and they have accused the federal forest agencies of using fuel 
reduction as an excuse for logging. The timber industry and many foresters 
are equally suspicious of prescribed burning, which they consider as 
wasteful, and dangerous because of the risk of the fire getting out of control. 
Similarly, grazing as a fuel management technique has attracted debate 
(Brunson & Shindler, 2004). Peri-urban resident opinion has also led to 
controversy over fire management techniques, however, judgements of 
acceptability can be based on a variety of factors. For example, using a 
Theory of Reasoned Action approach, Bright, Vaske, Kneeshaw and Absher 
(2002) identified six basic belief dimensions that may influence a person’s 
perception of bushfire management: anthropocentric; biocentric; 
responsibility; capable/trust; freedom; and benefit/harm. Knowledge, 
experience and personal importance are also entwined with acceptability 
judgements. 
 
A study undertaken by Daniel, Weidemann and Hines (2002) in northern 
Arizona has suggested that people who value the beauty of forested areas, or 
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value nature for what it provides humans (i.e., the anthropocentric belief 
dimension), are less supportive of fuel management strategies that 
compromise aesthetic values. Prescribed burning and bare fuel breaks in 
particular do not protect aesthetic values. However, there was evidence that 
people in the above study would support other fire management strategies 
that address the safety-aesthetic value trade-off. Newcomers to peri-urban 
areas are perceived to be more anthropocentric. Participants in Monroe et 
al.’s (2003a) study, including various government, non-government and 
industry representatives as well as homeowners representing 13 southern US 
states, indicated that newcomers were viewed as not connected to the land 
and environmentally irresponsible because they planted exotic species and 
complained about bushfire smoke. On the other hand, people who valued 
‘naturalness’, leaving forested areas as natural as possible (i.e., the biocentric 
belief dimension), were more supportive of prescribed burning because it 
reflects a natural ecosystem process (Nelson et al., 2004; Nelson et al., 
2005). 
 
The perception of who is responsible for reducing the bushfire risk can 
influence the acceptability of fire management strategies. As previously 
discussed, a person who regards the bushfire risk as public will perceive the 
government as primarily responsible for reducing the risk and will thus 
expect institutional intervention, consequently leading to institutional 
legitimacy (Winter & Fried, 2000). Much of the literature suggests that 
people are more in favour of fire management policies that require the 
government to take action rather than themselves (Gardner et al., 1987; 
Blanchard & Ryan, 2004). However, with regard to private property, many 
people do perceive themselves as responsible for protecting their own house. 
They are not supportive of any policies that require homeowners to take 
steps to reduce the risk themselves, because such policies would also 
impinge on perceived rights to freedom. Therefore reducing the fire risk on 
public land is perceived as government responsibility primarily, and fire 
management policies that address the risk on public land are supported, if 
not expected, particularly when homeowners are implementing fire 
protection measures on their own property. A lack of action on public land 
nearby can also moderate private landholder mitigation measures (Kent et 
al., 2003; Anonymous, 2004). However, once again, which specific policies 
will be supported and by whom, will vary. 
 
Trust has emerged as an important factor influencing public opinion of fire 
management strategies (Vogt, Winter & Fried, 2002; Winter, 2002; Vogt, 
Winter & Fried, 2005). Trust in the government to implement a fire 
management strategy is closely related to the perceived competence of the 
government to implement the strategy successfully. For example, there are a 
number of instances where prescribed burning became out of control and 
 
246 
threatened people and properties, therefore the government agency is viewed 
as incompetent and consequently is not trusted to undertake prescribed 
burning safely. As a result people have intensely rejected prescribed burning 
as a fire management strategy (Winter & Fried, 2000; Vogt et al., 2005). 
 
There is an emphasis on individuality and self-reliance in the western world, 
and the right to free choice is an important concept (McCaffrey, 2004; Bright 
et al., 2002). Therefore government actions that restrict or dictate what is 
done on private property or affect private property values may be resisted. 
Indeed, homeowners are not supportive of policies that affect the way they 
manage their property. Participants in Winter and Fried’s (2000) study were 
not supportive of building codes, safety ordinances, zoning and regulations 
to modify vegetation on their own property. They wanted the opportunity for 
voluntary compliance and thought that such policies would be unnecessary 
because of existing and potential insurance markets, and that it would 
detract from aesthetic and convenience aspects of their homes. Blanchard 
and Ryan (2004) suggested that local residents may support land-use 
regulations, including building codes, for new developments because it 
would not impinge their own property rights. Residents in the Burns et al. 
(2003) study, who appeared to have a good understanding of the fire risk 
and the importance of mitigation, were in full support of land-use planning 
and building codes.  New residents may also be supportive because there is 
still an element of free choice: they can choose to live in a lower fire risk area 
if they do not agree with such regulations.  
 
A belief that bushfire is harmful to nature may lead a person to not support 
management strategies such as prescribed burning. However, an increase in 
knowledge of bushfire and its effects can influence such beliefs. Cortner et al. 
(1990) discussed the general increase in people’s knowledge of the effects of 
fire over the last four decades and an increasing positive attitude toward fire 
(e.g., bushfire is beneficial to nature). Loomis, Blair and Gonzalez-Caban 
(2001) investigated the effect of knowledge on attitudes toward prescribed 
burning and found that Florida residents’ attitudes were more supportive of 
prescribed burning as knowledge increased. Therefore an increase in 
knowledge may change a person’s perception of bushfire, which may then 
lead to the acceptance of prescribed burning. Indeed, knowledge has been 
found to be an important consideration in reactions to fire management 
issues (Winter, 2002). Blanchard and Ryan (2004) revealed that 
respondents in their south-eastern Massachusetts study who have a high 
level of knowledge about a specific fire hazard reduction strategy were more 
likely to support the use of that strategy. It has therefore been suggested that 
the public be educated about fire management issues (Winter, 2002; 
Blanchard & Ryan, 2004).  Loomis, Blair and Gonzalez-Caban’s (2001) study 
suggested that educational information can increase knowledge leading to 
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attitudes that support prescribed burning. However, once again, the 
effectiveness of public education programs in influencing attitudes or 
knowledge, and behaviour, has been questioned (Cortner et al., 1990).  
Although, it seems that the public expects to receive educational material, 
participants in Winter and Fried’s (2000) study were overwhelmingly 
favourable toward educational programs designed to reduce fire ignitions. 
However this was because of a belief that human action, mainly that of 
newcomers and visitors who are viewed as ignorant of the fire danger, is the 
cause of most forest fires. Participants in other studies have indicated their 
desire for information on other bushfire issues such as bushfire awareness 
and preparing homes (Gilbert, 2004). Furthermore, there is particular 
demand for more innovative and community-based information, for example 
information that details how to protect homes from bushfire whilst 
maintaining aesthetic values (Creighton, Baumgartner & Gibbs, 2002), and 
more specific information that assists people to purchase fire protection 
products that are appropriate to their needs and budget (Odgers, 2002). 
 
The effect of personal experience with bushfire on attitudes toward fire 
management strategies is also questionable. Vogt (2002) investigated 
seasonal and permanent homeowners’ past experiences and approval of fuel 
reduction and found that seasonal homeowners had less experience with 
bushfire and fuel reduction techniques, however, there was general support 
from both seasonal and permanent homeowners for prescribed burning and 
mechanical fuel reduction. Jabobson, Monroe and Marynowski (2001) and 
Vogt et al. (2005) similarly found no significant effect of past experience with 
bushfire on attitudes toward fire management. On the other hand Blanchard 
and Ryan (2004) suggested that past experience with bushfire can increase 
the level of support for prescribed burning because people who have 
witnessed fires in the past may have become more comfortable with them. 
Although it may depend on the type of experience; participants in Winter 
and Fried’s (2000) study who witnessed significant destruction due to an 
escaped prescribed burn were suspicious of prescribed burning and generally 
not supportive of it as a fuel reduction strategy. Additionally, because the 
past experience with bushfire led many to believe that it was an 
uncontrollable force, investment in suppression infrastructure was 
considered pointless, although it was acknowledged that the government 
needs to respond to bushfires that do occur and ensure that fire fighters are 
well equipped for their own safety. 
 
Vogt et al. (2005) investigated the effect of personal importance (or personal 
relevance to fuel management techniques) on homeowner’s approval of fuel 
management techniques. They found that personal importance was a good 
predictor of approval. For example, from the same study, Winter, Vogt and 
Fried (2002) indicated that if vegetation amenity is important to a person, 
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defensible space compliance will likely be disapproved, if property rights are 
important, any ordinances impinging on such rights will likely be 
disapproved, and if smoke sensitivity is an issue, prescribed burning will also 
likely be disapproved. However, Vogt et al. (2005) also highlighted the wide 
range of factors in addition to personal importance, including belief 
dimension(s), knowledge and experience discussed above, and also social 
and environmental factors associated with where a person lives (e.g., 
demographics, political traditions and ecosystem type), that are intricately 
linked leading to great variations in opinions and acceptability of fire 
management practices between and within locations. Brunson and Shindler 
(2004) found such differences in their western USA study suggesting that 
government policies addressing bushfire management need to be adaptive to 
the local situation at hand. 
 
Response and recovery 
 
With increasing knowledge, people’s expectations of how the government 
should respond to a bushfire are changing (Cortner et al., 1990). For 
example, people do not necessarily expect a fire to be immediately 
suppressed, however, this depends on a number of factors. For example, 
Kneeshaw, Vaske, Bright & Absher (2004) investigated situational influences 
of acceptable wildland fire management actions, they found that fire origin 
was one of the most important factors for “put the fire out” and one of the 
least important factors for “let the fire burn”; if the fire was ignited through 
lightning there was support for letting the fire burn, and conversely if the fire 
was ignited through human carelessness there was support for putting the 
fire out. Furthermore the relative importance of risk of private property 
damage and forest recovery was consistently high in influencing acceptability 
of management actions; if the fire posed a risk to private property and if 
forest recovery were to take many years there was support for putting the fire 
out. The relative importance of air quality was minor but there was general 
support for putting the fire out if air quality became poor. The relative 
importance of outdoor recreation was lowest, if a recreational area was 
closed due to the fire, recreating in another area nearby may be an 
acceptable substitute. Past experience with bushfire is also an important 
factor, however once again the effect will vary depending on the type of 
experience. 
 
In the USA, federal fire services have been criticised in their efforts to 
collaboratively fight fires with local services. Federal fire services focus on 
the big picture of the fire as a generalised event whereas local services have a 
more place-specific view. Some people view this as depersonalisation, which 
grates on local residents and fire fighters whose particular homes and special 
places are at risk (Carroll et al., 2005). This was the underlying cause of 
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much of the post-fire conflict in the communities of Carroll et al.’s (2005) 
study. It appears that local fire fighters expected that their knowledge, skills 
and commitment would have been better valued, and utilised. They also felt 
too constrained by the rules and decisions made at higher levels, and this led 
to local fire fighters and homeowners defying the instructions of the Incident 
Command System. Federal services were also accused of putting the majority 
of their resources into fighting fires in one community, leading to 
intercommunity conflict. Carroll et al. (2005) explained that “the relative 
inflexibility of rational, bureaucratic systems was seen as unable to adapt to 
quickly-changing conditions, something at which the spontaneous creation 
of local helping systems seemed more adept” (p. 316). This highlights the 
importance of the government and its policies to become more attuned to 
local situations, and the importance of communities to become more 
organised and better prepared to be able to respond to bushfire. This would 
lead to effective collaborative efforts that significantly increase the resilience 
of the community. 
 
The government however, is often blamed in the event of a bushfire. Blaming 
behaviour has been well documented among people affected by disaster, and 
this phenomenon can create much hostility toward the organisation or 
institution that was supposed to protect people from disaster (Kumagai et al., 
2004a), namely the government and its agencies responsible for some aspect 
of fire protection. Just 33.8% of respondents in Odgers and Rhodes’ (2002) 
study felt that the local government was effective in responding to bushfires, 
compared with 92% of respondents indicating that the fire service was 
effective, and although reasons were not given, there appears to be a general 
public opinion that governments are ineffective in their efforts to mitigate 
bushfire. Blaming behaviour can be the result of whether property damage 
was incurred, whether or not a person maintained a sense of control, and/or 
whether the bushfire was perceived as primarily natural or technological 
(Kumagai, Bliss, Daniels & Carroll, 2004b).  Participants in Kumagai et al.’s 
(2004b) study who incurred property damage from the Butte Complex Fires 
in Nevada in 1999 attributed the damage to “others actions”, specifically 
backfires started by the California Department of Forestry and Fire 
Protection (CDF) in spite of the fact that there was no public evidence of 
such backfires. The study also indicated that people who had lost their sense 
of control tended to attribute damage to factors associated with fire fighters 
and the CDF. Losing one’s sense of control was associated with a belief that 
their property did not receive adequate attention from fire fighters, and not 
being able to obtain up-to-date information during the bushfire. Participants 
who viewed the fires as the result of nature (rather than technology) were 
less likely to blame others, one respondent acknowledged the build up of fuel 
as a contributing factor to fire magnitude but said that humans can not do 
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anything about events that “are totally the act of God” (Kumagai et al., 
2004b, p. 120). 
 
The primary expectation of all levels of governments post-disaster is the 
provision of assistance, and in many cases actual assistance received falls 
short of what was expected. Controversy about government assistance after 
the Canberra bushfires was well documented throughout the media 
(Government must do more, 2003); $5000 per rebuilding household was 
considered miserly and not enough to rebuild social capital and address the 
social issues following a disaster. Years after Hurricane Floyd in North 
Carolina, families were still waiting for promised assistance, and for 
authorised repair and replacement units, which affects the trust that 
residents have in their local government (Moore et al., 2004). Communities 
rely on external assistance to mitigate the economic impact associated with 
natural disaster, and indeed, with such assistance, disaster can result in 
economically positive impacts on a stricken community (Kumagai et al, 
2004a). However, there are a number of issues concerning disaster 
assistance, primarily the issue of equity. As previously discussed it is not 
uncommon that assistance, from both government and non-government 
organisations, does not adequately address those most in need (David et al., 
1999; Fothergill & Peek, 2004). Secondly, because of disaster assistance, the 
costs of disaster are borne not only by those affected, but also by the 
community, all levels of government and the general population (Cortner et 
al., 1990). Thirdly, there is evidence that people may not undertake 
preventative measures, such as home insurance, in view of the existence of 
disaster recovery programs (Cortner et al., 1990; McKee et al., 2004). 
Because people expect that they can live where they wish, continually putting 
themselves in dangerous situations and thus creating such economic 
problems, Sowell (2004) has suggested phasing out state and federal disaster 
relief and relying more heavily on prevention and mitigation activities, 
particularly insurance. After a disaster there is an expectation of government 
that actions will be taken to prevent another disaster. For example, after 
Hurricane Floyd, people were sceptical about whether their counties’ had 
learned anything from the disaster, respondents mentioned that, since the 
flood, counties had not done a good job of keeping drainage ditches free of 
debris and that bridges were not high enough to surmount future flood levels 
(Moore et al., 2004). Disaster prevention, however, such as relocating and 
redesigning infrastructure, can be influenced by a communities’ desire to 
“return to normalcy” as quickly as possible, which does not create a positive 
environment for orderly, well-planned reconstruction processes (Petterson, 
1999). Similarly, recovery planning can become thwarted by old perceptions 
and mental pictures of the community as it was before the disaster 
(Petterson, 1999). Furthermore, in terms of encouraging homeowner 
participation in preventative measures, policies are not well accepted. 
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However, respondents in a number of studies have indicated that they 
support citizen involvement in developing fire hazard reduction programs 
(Blanchard & Ryan, 2004), which is important because such programs and 
policies need public input to be able to deal with the realities of public 
expectations as well as the realities of the biophysical environment (Cortner 
et al., 1990).  
 
Expectation of the media 
 
Prevention and mitigation 
 
The media has a significant influence on public knowledge, perceptions and 
opinions. Many studies have linked respondent knowledge and perceptions 
of bushfire and opinions of bushfire management with information 
disseminated by the media. For example, Cortner et al. (1990) reported that 
the news media, second to experience, was a way in which people were made 
aware of the bushfire hazard. Jacobson et al. (2001) found that public 
opinion about the benefits of prescribed fire closely matched the benefits 
identified by the media, and similarly Loomis et al. (2001) suggested that 
media coverage of bushfires in Florida contributed to Florida respondents’ 
knowledge and support of prescribed burning. There is also evidence that 
people prefer bushfire information to be delivered via the media; 
respondents in Holden et al. (2000) indicated that television, second to 
literature (e.g., pamphlet, booklet), is the best delivery method for bushfire 
information. However, Monroe and Nelson’s (2004) study has suggested 
that the media is not always a trusted source, and indeed in the USA for 
example, there has been cause to distrust the media because of conflicting 
messages (Cortner et al., 1990; Burns et al., 2003). Respondents in Monroe 
and Nelson’s study (2004) indicated that written news and televised 
interviews with experts are better trusted. Focus groups discussions in the 
Burns et al. (2003) study revealed that people believe the media should be 
more proactive, not only by providing more accurate and objective 
information but by discussing the complexity of bushfires and the benefits of 
prescribed burning, and explaining “why” mitigation action should be taken, 
rather than providing mere informational messages. “The well functioning of 
a modern society is based on the good and fast circulation of information. 
This is even more relevant in the case of a society vulnerable to natural 
hazards” (Anonymous, 1998, p. 21). Information (collection, production and 
dissemination) and communication media are a crucial link in the chain of 
sound prevention measures and awareness-raising (Anonymous, 1998).  
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Response and recovery 
 
In a bushfire event people rely heavily on and need information to make 
effective decisions, and although emergency services remain responsible for 
the communication of risk (Krusel & Petris, 1992), the media plays a crucial 
role. Often the media is the only potential source of information during a 
fire. From Lazarus and Alley’s (1984) study, it appears that many people 
during the Ash Wednesday fires could not use phones, lived a significant 
distance from neighbours and/or had no contact with emergency services, 
however, they did have access to a radio and/or television but there were 
reports that the media did not provide adequate information. As a likely 
consequence, some of these people did not know the fire was in their area 
until it reached their house. There are a number of reports suggesting that 
the media could have done a better job of warning people of an impending 
hazard (Moore et al., 2004). Furthermore, Odgers and Rhodes’ (2002) study 
suggested that people would like the media to provide more specific 
information during a fire event, such as the location, severity and direction of 
the bushfire. 
 
The media can also influence the recovery cycle of a community after a 
disaster. For example, the 2002 Rodeo-Chediski fire in northern Arizona 
highlighted the influence of media coverage during and after the fires on the 
magnitude of recovery assistance received by a community. One community, 
of three affected by the fire, received the most media coverage and as a result 
received the most help offers from ordinary people and helping organisations 
wanting to contribute money and other resources to aid in recovery. This 
inequity contributed to the tension and conflict observed in the aftermath 
(Carroll et al., 2005). 
 
Expectation of insurance agencies 
 
Insurance agencies are obviously depended on for money to rebuild homes, 
however, often a person’s insurance policy does not cover 100% of the loss, 
which is commonly unexpected because people may not realise that they live 
in a fire-prone area or forget to update their policy, for example. However, 
there are also unanticipated disputes between fire victims and their insurers. 
For example, in the aftermath of the Canberra fires a woman claimed that 
her insurance agency was unreasonable in offering to pay only two-thirds of 
her home insurance, because it did not cover the concrete slab, which had 
been compromised according to an engineer, and the assessment excluded 
part of the house (Morris, 2002). Although it is primarily the responsibility 
of the person buying insurance, there is a need for insurance agencies to 
undertake an awareness raising role concerning people’s insurance policies, 
which, if effective, would lessen the financial repercussions.  
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Cortner et al. (1990) revealed that people in a fire-affected community who 
did not update their policies were provided an economic advantage because 
they were able to apply for a low interest loan, which effectively provided the 
resources to rebuild bigger and better homes than their neighbours who had 
updated their policies. There is also perhaps a need for insurance agencies to 
play a role in promoting homeowner bushfire preparedness, via mechanisms 
such as a reduction in home insurance premiums if a house is constructed of 
fire resistant materials, as was suggested by a respondent in Winter and 
Fried’s (2000) study. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This review of community expectations of bushfires and the impact of 
bushfires on communities shows quite clearly that there are considerable 
differences between and within communities in terms of bushfire awareness, 
perceptions of bushfires, expectations of what happens during a bushfire, the 
impact on individuals and communities, and expectations of the roles of 
various organisations. The implications of this are substantive and fraught 
with difficulties for service delivery and applied social research. Locality 
clearly remains important and it often falls to the local service providers to 
understand the expectations and beliefs held by the communities they serve. 
There is a clear need to identify effective strategies for service providers to 
understand and engage with their communities. The challenge for applied 
social researchers is to identify and develop appropriate strategies or models 
for engagement. 
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Glossary 
 
Catastrophic Disaster 
An extreme natural hazard event which impacts on a community, or 
communities resulting in widespread, devastating, economic, social and 
environmental consequences. 
 
 
Dreamtime 
Dreamtime is most often used to refer to the 'time before time', or 'the time 
of the creation of all things', while Dreaming is often used to refer to an 
individual's or group's set of beliefs or spirituality. 
 
 
Mitigation 
Measures taken in advance of, or after, a disaster aimed at decreasing or 
eliminating its impact on society and environment. 
 
 
Normalisation bias 
Persons without event experience are more reluctant to personalise risk and 
respond to pre-event warnings, whereas those with experience are more apt 
to respond.  Also, the judgment that if the first event did not affect oneself 
negatively, then subsequent events will also be avoided.   
 
 
One hundred year flood 
A flood having a 1 per cent chance of occurring in any one year. 
 
 
Optimistic bias 
The judgment that negative events are less likely to happen to oneself than to 
other people. 
 
 
PPRR 
Emergency management can be identified as having four phases: 
Preparedness, Prevention, Response and Recovery (PPRR).  The activities in 
an emergency management plan that support these phases are not 
necessarily sequential, with elements frequently taking place concurrently. 
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Relief 
The provision of immediate shelter, life support and human needs of persons 
affected by, or responding to, an emergency. It includes the establishment, 
management and provision of services to emergency relief or recovery 
centres. 
 
 
Risk management 
The systematic application of management policies, procedures and 
practices to the tasks of identifying, analysing, evaluating, treating and 
monitoring risk. 
 
 
Sustainable development 
Development which meets the following sustainability principles: inter-
generational and intra-generational equity; integration of the economy and 
the environment; dealing cautiously, yet anticipatory with risk, uncertainty 
and irreversibility; conservation of biological diversity; and recognition of 
the global dimension. 
 
 
The Dry 
In northern Australia between May and September the Dry Season features 
low humidity and rainfall brought on by dry southeast winds. 
 
 
Theory of Reasoned Action 
 
The Theory of Reasoned Action suggests that a person's behaviour is 
determined by his/her intention to perform the behaviour and that this 
intention is, in turn, a function of his/her attitude toward the behaviour and 
his/her subjective norm (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1980). 
 
 
The Wet 
In northern Australia between October and April the Wet Season features 
warm, moist monsoonal northwest winds which bring high humidity and 
high rainfall. 
 
 
Vulnerability 
The degree of susceptibility and resilience of the community and the 
environment to hazards. 
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